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Income Taxation is new in Egypt. The introduction of income taxation in 1939 was
aimed at achieving two basic objectives; first, to raise revenue to meet the steady
increase in public expenditures, and secondly, to establish an element of equity in the
tax system, where indirect taxation, which is regressive in nature, predominates. The
main object of this study is to analyse the competence of the income tax system in
attaining these objectives.
Before starting our enquiry into the performance of the income tax system it seems
desirable to present at the outset the background of the Egyptian economy within which the
income tax operates. Part I of this study deals with the economic background and gives a
brief account of the evolution of the Egyptian tax system. Until the early 1950's fiscal
policy was based on what is called "sound finance". Income taxation was used mainly to
achieve a balanced budget by providing the Treasury with revenue to meet the increase in
public expenditure. This classical attitude was changed after 1952, when a policy based
on "functional finance", was attempted. In general, public policy was directed primarily
towards the acceleration of the rate of economic growth. Investment in the private sector
has proved restively inadequate for economic growth. As the data in Chapter I show, there
has been a continuous decline in private investment, and the public sector, therefore, had
to replace the decline in private investment. The result was a continuous rise in public
investment, financed basically through deficit financing. By and large, the dependence on
income taxation to reach economic objectives has been relatively unsatisfactory by virtue
of the fact that the scope of its application is very limited due to the persistence of a
subsistence economy, which implies a low income per capita.
Our enquiry into the performance of the income tax system pert ins to the discussion
of the various objectives of the tax. Any income tax system has to be judged according to
three rain criteria; first, its adequacy as a revenue-raiser; secondly, its efficiency
in establishing equity in the distribution of the fiscal burden, and thirdly, the
economic efficiency of the tax judged by its impact on incentives, e.g. incentives to
work, to save, and to invest, besides its role as an economic stabilizer.
The at ainment of any one of public policy objectives produces a conflict with
other objectives. For example, to achieve equity in income taxation a high exemption
limit which coincides with the general necessities of the population has to be provided
in the system. This provision, when applied to less-developed countries, implies the
exemption of the major part of the population and hence reduces the tax revenue.
Actually, the introduction of full or partial exemptions (a reduced rate on earned income
for example) may be equitable; they render the tax less efficient as a revenue-yielder.
In the meantime, to achieve equity through introducing a highly progressive income tax
may have a disincentive effect on the economy and, therefore, the economic efficiency
of the tax is by-passed. A compromise has, however, to be reached. But any compromise
reached would include a partial sacrifice of one of the objectives in favour of the others.
In general, the compromise which should be reached is usually based cn the main objectives
of the Government fiscal policy.
Part II discusses the performance of the Egyptian income tax system. The procedure
of the investigation followed throughout this part is to judge whether the tax has reached
its objectives or not, and is divided into three categories. The discussion starts with
a brief analysis of the theoretical background of the existing theories relating to the
basic aims of any income tax system, followed by its applic tion within less-developed
countries and, finally, its applic tion to the Egyptian system. To be more precise, the
Egyptian system is judged thro ghaut this part on its merits and demerits in the light of
the latest theories of public finance.
The first section, Chapter 3, is devoted to efficiency of the income tax as a
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revenue-raiser. The efficiency of the ta • as a revenue-yielder depends on various
and diversified factors. These factors are of four main c ategories, all of which
could easily be interdependent; they are, (l) factors related basically to adminis¬
trative efficiency; (2) the degree of tax consciousness; (3) the degree of illiteracy
and book-keeping; and, (4) the degree of tax evasion. In most less-doveloped countries
the inefficiency of the income tax as a revenue-raiser originates mainly from the inadequacy
and inefficiency of the above mentioned f ctors.
A badly administered tax, though equitable, would prove more liar ful than a partially
inequitable tax with an efficient administr tive machine. The flexibility of the tax
and its competency as an economic stabiliser is usually hampered by administration and
the low standard of tax morality which exists between taxpayers, particularly in backward
countries.
The second section, Chapter 4, is concerned with the que tion of the equity of the
tax and how far the system has reached this objective. It is quite conceivable that a
more extensive use of income t xation within the fiscal system introduces a higher degree
of equity into the tax system as a whole. In less-developed countries where the over-all
tax burden is inclined to be regressive as a result of the great dependence on indirect
taxes, income taxation, as the most effective and personalized direct tax, could serve
as an element of equity within the tax system.
Equity in taxation has been widely discussed by many economists as well as politicians.
In popular discussion of the equity concept the fairness in the distribution of the tax
burden is usually regarded as an important, if not the outstanding, teat of the fiscal
s, stem, and its ability to inspire that confi ence in the fiscal basis of goverment sustains
public morale and promotes productive effort and economic growth. An elementary application
of the equity concept requires the equal treatment of persons in similar economic circum¬
stances. But the economic position and circumstances of individuals vary widely, and the
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rang® of equity secured by the applic tion of the concept is, therefore, not very wide
in its operation. Now the most commonly accepted applic fcion of the criterion of equity
is found in the principle of levying taxes according to relative 'ability to pay'.
'Ability to pay' includes and necessitates some degree of progressiveness in the tax
rate if fairness in relative trc trnent of persons with unequal incomes is to be achieved.
is
Ho formula underlying the scale of progression/considered equitable regarding the distrib¬
ution of the tax burden, as any scale may include ultimately an element of arbitrariness
which in turn would render the tax less equitable.
However, our discussion of the equity principle in relation to the Egyptian income
tax system is confined to two major concepts; first, horizontal equity, i.e. the equal
treatment of equals and the f ctors affecting it, such as the definition of taxable
income, personal exemptions and reliefs required to attain more equitabl e treatment of the
individuals enjoying the same income but having different personal and other obligations.
The question of personal exemptions and other reliefs is closely related to this concept.
Equity, however, is achieved through the functioning of personal reliefs. This supports
the introduction of personal reliefs and the xemption of subsistence income from taxation,
and defeats the out-dated allegation that exemptions are a deviation from equity doctrine.
The second concept of equity is the vertical equity, i.e. the unequal treatment of persons
in unequal economic situations; this necessitates progressiveness in the rate structure.
Income taxation may affect the functioning of the economy. Firstly, it alters the
supply of the factors of prod ction and secondly, it may alter the decisions of business
firms and thus the demand for these factors. By and large, both effects will alter the
level of national Income, its composition and its distribution. In other words, through
its effects on the national income the tax may have a considerable effect on theeconomic
incentives which are of great importance for economic development. In a less-developed
economy like the Egyptian one, we believe that the anlaysis of the effects of the income
tax on the basic economic aspects which are related directly to economic development
should receive the lion's share of the analysis. Therefore, it is both desirable and
fruitful to diseuss the impact of the income tax onj (a; the incentive to work, (b) the
incentive to save, and (c) the incentive to invest.
By the end of Chapter V; the end of the enquiry into the effect of the Egyptian
system on the various incentives, we have not in fact reached the final stage of our
enquiry into the development and the performance of the Egyptian income tax system,
be must, in addition, consider the role of income tax exemptions in the system. This
is of s ecial significance, as they affect directly the degree of achievement of the
tax objectives. Liability to tax is the rule and exemptions are the exce tion.
Therefore, exemptions, partial or complete, affect the size of the tax base and hence
the amount of revenue raised. The princi] e of equity could on the one hand, be
achieved ana on the other violated thr .ugharemptions. This in f.oct depends on the
ultimate aims of public policy. Personal and business exemptions, however, are needed
to accomp! sh economic objectives, such as being used as an inducement to s ve and invest
Income taxation lias also been recommended as a stabilizer through the use of various
exemptions arid reliefs. In general, exemptions and reliefs, either personal, or business
are considered the principal tools on which the income tax depends to perform its task
in the genomic and social fra ework of the country. For this reason we devote a special
part of this analysis, before concluding cpur investigation into the performance of the
Egyptian income tax, to a discussion and analysis of the role of the exemptions and
reliefs within the Egyptian income tax. This will be the subject of Chapters VI and VII,
Chapter VI deals with the main objectives which income tax exem tions and the various
reliefs are primarily designed to accomplish. Chapter VII deals with a special problem
of income tax exemptions, the problem of double taxation in regard to its dual sections,
domestic and international. The di cussion of the role of exem tions in the income tax
system concludes Part II on the performance of the Egyptian income tax.
€
Particular conclusions are set out in the course of the study whenever thin appears
appropriate. However, it does seem valuable and syste' atic to conclude our research by
pointing out the main reforms which seem adequate to make the Egyptian income tax more
effective in adeveloping economy. The pathway to reforms, Chapter VIII, which is our
conclusion, is divided into two main sections; first, r forms for the immediate future,
and secondly, reforms for a long term applic tion.
This study of the Egyptian income tax system elucidates, the actual working of the
system in the Egyptian economy. The writer found great difficulty in obtaining data
concerning the Egyptian income tax, but we h ve made use of almost all the available







The main purpose of this part is to indicate the background of the Egyptian
economy whore the income tax system operates. This background is essential, as
the study of any aspect of the fiscal system necessitates the knowledge of the
environment within which the system stands. As our main object of this study is
concerned, with econo ic policy, social and political policies are considered only
in so far as these policies affect the functioning of the economic organisation
of the country.
The first section of this part (Chapter I) gives a descriptive analysis of
the Egyptian economy from three main aspects: (a) the composition and distribution
of the national product; (b) the structureof public finance, and (c) the main basis
on which Egyptian fiscal policy has been established.
The second section (Chapter II) is devoted to the evolution of the Egyptian
income tax. The main aim here is to elaborate the historical development of the
tax system in general and the income tax in particular. In adition, this Chapter
sheds some light on the objectives which the income tax system was designed to
accomplish.
Generally the main object of Chapter I is to bring out the basic characteris¬
tics of the Egyptian economy as a whole, and to separate the various components of
public policy from one another. The factors composing the national economy are,
however, interdependent, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate one
factor from the other. On the other and, the discussion in Chapter II is
essentially confined to the tax system - the reven e side of the Budget - and the
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inooia® tax in particular. In other words, the evolution of the income tax within
the framework of the tax eyeten is the • nin the-a of Chapter II.
In the Appendix to Part I, the structure of the present main taxes on income
is outlined.
By and large the purpose of the analysis in this * art is to acquaint the reader
with the fundamentals on which the Egyptian fiscal syater is established.
CHAPTER I.
THE SETTING AND STRUCTURE OF THE" EGYPTIAN ECONOMY.
Egypt's main economic policy, especially in the post-war period, has been
the struggle to maintain at least, if not to raise, the standard of living in
the face of rapidly growing population. Since the last century the population
of Egypt has been increasing at an average annual rate of over 20 per thousand,
(The present popxilation is estimated to be about 24 million (1958), Economic
growth accompanied by this population increase has come abort mainly through the
expansion of the cultivated area. Economic development up to the first quarter
of the present century was based on cotton, the output of which increased several
fold and correspondingly it resulted in the increase of exports,'
A marked slowing down of economic expansion was witnessed afterwards while
2
the papulation continued to grow at a high rate. The struggle to increase the
cultivated area proved difficult due to the shortage of capital. Therefore, the
cultivated area was fixed while soil exhaustion during the period of World War II
decreased the net agricultural output which was not adequately offset by the
expansion of industry which proceeded during the Second orld War,
Post-war Egyptian economic policy supported the expansion of cultivated
areas, the diversification of agricultural production, the expansion of industry,
1, Cotton output during the last decade of the 19th century amounted to an
average of 110 thousand metric tons and reached 373 thousand in 1957.
See, U.N., Statistical Year Books. (1949-1958).










































































































together with increasing financial autonomy of the country and an improved fiscal
•j
system. The effectiveness of the Government*s efforts within the economic field
before 1352 proved inadequate. Since 1952 a systematic drive for economic
developssent was launched and an attempt to redistribute wealth and income was
incorporated through the land Reform Act of 1952,
A. Composition and Distribution of the National i: rod-net.
Egypt, like most underdeveloped countries, is dependent primarily upon
agriculture, Egyptian agriculture is characterised markedly by a dependence on
one major crop for export, i.e. Cotton; employing a labour intensive technique;
..fv-f.
and unequal distribution of property accompanied, by very small-scale tenure and
2
farising. Cotton output increased several fold since the 19th century due to the
large-scale irrigation wor © constructed. Export*of cotton rose correspondingly
from 141,000 metric tons in 1870 to 412,000 in 1934 and then dropped to 288,000
metric tons in 1954 due to the decrease in output resulting from the limitation of
area cultivated.^
The dependence on a single crop for export, i.e. Cotton, has always resulted
in sharp fluctuations in the balance of payments and thus on the economy as a whole.
This has been due to the fact that cotton prices which fluctuate in the world market
are beyond Egypt's control. Needless to say, any change in cotton prices and hence,
1. C, P. Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century, London, 1954 pp. 240-245,
2. The Land Reform of 1952 h lped to a certain extent to equalise the distribution
of agricultural property. See Table 1 for the latest available data
concerning the distribution of the agriculture tenure.
3. U.N., Economic Develo . cnts in the Middle hast. 1945-54 pp. 25-31
in the amount exported is immediately reflected in the net national income. Use
increase in cotton prices and in exports is translated into an increase in producers1
inc:tries and trailers. On the other hand, the surplus in the balance of payments
would tend to increase domestic consumption. This increase usually leads to an
increase in prices of dome, tic products as the sup ly lags behind the increase in
demand. However, the increase in demand c uld be offset by an increase in imports.
While this may be the ease in a free economy, it is of a limited existence in Egypt
as the Government intervenes by restricting imports and imposing limitations on the
foreign exchange. Generally speaking, therefore, any increase in the c tton prices
results in a direct increase in prices of other commodities; it creates a temporary
inflationary trend Which, in most times, is only offset by a fall in international
cotton prices.
Consequently, external f-ctors play a fundamental rule in the Egyptian economy
due to this dependence on one cash crop. As a solution to this situation a diver¬
sification of the economy bar to take place.'
From Table 2 (Het Rati nal Product for 1950 to 1954), the agriculture sector is
the rain sector in the Egyptian economy? as it constitutes a proportion varying from
in 1950 to a mini' um of y&> in 1953. The value of agricultural pr»-d.«tion
depends on two variables, (a) the quantity of the crops which depend nainly on natural
factors beyond human control; (b) the prices of products especially Cotton/' Generally,
the fluctuations in the value of the agricultural sector is usually caused by the
fluctuations of the cotton prices a the total area cultivated is almost constant for
1. For an esoellent survey of the agricultural production in general, and of Cotton
in particular, see G. : . Said, Egyptian Economies. Cairo, 1951 (in Arabic).
2. The value of the c tton crop in 1950, for example, was <€5213.4 million out of





































































































































































































































































the last thirty years and now stands at just over six million feddans (one fed'an
equals 1.030 acres).!
W--.il© the significance of the agricultural sector as measured by its proportion
of net wrional product is deere ing, we find. tliat the importance of the industrial
sector is increasing slowly but yaduallyj from 11,8$ in 1950 to 14.1 in 1954. The
relative importance of the Government sector hoe increased since 1950} from 12$ to
16.5 in 1954. The policy of the Government since 1952 is to sti ulate ind; strial-
isation by all available roan®. Restrictions were i cosed through foreign exchange
control on Imports of oanuf ctured goods which could be produced locally. Domestic
manufactured goods also received pr- - taction through high r tariffs on imports, while
the imports of raw a orlnl and machinery w-:?re granted exemptions from, or reductions
in, Custom duties. In addition, Inc rae tax exemptions w re granted to new enter¬
prises d ring their first few years of operation. The Seventeen* partial atee! in
furnishing the capital of ajar industrial enterprises. Moreover, industrial, credits
wore increaserminly through the Industrial b-anks.
y and largo, industrial prod- ction in Egypt has increased considerably since
1950} the ind atrial pr d ctior index increased from 105 in 1951 (l95o « 100) to 133
p
in 1955. The upward trend of the ind atrial output is almost certainly due to the
increase' in industrial Investment.
As a consequence of the predominance of the agricultural prod ction, the economy
is heavily dependent upon imports as a source of manufactured consumers* and producers'
goods. The importance of foreign trade is in turn reflected in the relatively large
1. C. P. lacawi, op. cit., p. 102; and also ooe 1-tat.istica? c: ot Year nook. 1954,
Republic of Egypt, p. 33.
2. U.N., Economic levolc rent in the hid 1e Ih t. 1956-57. p. 12?
1 5
TABLE 3
Sources and Use of Resources at Current Prices*
£Emillions.
Item 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1 1955 1956
I. Sources
(a) Domestic Production 819 887 839 878 975 1033 1052
(b) Not Import Surplus -1 81 34 0 —6 -4 13
Total Resources 318 968 873 878 969 1029 1065
II Uses
i) Private Consumption 630 760 693 697 763 832 885
ii government Consurption 73 65 64 65 71 75 70
(a) Total Consumption 703 825 757 762 834 907 955
i) Private Investment 112 103 83 64 57 54 39
ii)Public Investment 22 29 25 34 53 62 66
iii)Changes in Stocks -19 11 3 18 25 6 5
(b) Total Investment 115 143 116 116 135 122 110
Source; National Planning Commission, Office of the Secretary General, Published




share of commercial, wholesale and. retail trade, ami transport tion services in the
net national pr d ct, some 14/t- to net dome-tic reduction.
An over-all picture of the economy is given in the figures on the availability
and use of resources compiled in Table 3. The general utlook of the economy is
its steady growth sine-" 1950 with the exception of he y are 1952 and 1953 which
were affected 'duly by 'unstable political conditions.
Since 1950 up to the present time, inflationary pressures generated by government
finance have been dampened to a great extent by a decline in gross capital formation
and deficits In the balance of payments. Savings activity has const .orally increased
since the Egyptianiaation of savings institutions which took place early in 1957.1
Estimates of capital formation since 1950 up to 1956 are shown in Table 4.
Public inve taont r se continuously while private investment declined* The increase
2
in public investment accounts was due mostly to the growing Government deficit.
Total national inve tment has declined since 1951? while no data are'available at
present, one could not preasce-tain the trend of abrogate domestic investment after
1956. According to the U.S. Report on the Economic Development in the Kiddle Bast,
1956/57, it rray be presumed that domestic resources under such circumstances, and
since consumption seems to have maintained a fairly constant ratio to production,
have not been overstrained and. that the present scale of total investment does not
1. The total amount of deposits in Postal Savings offices reached £K39»4m. a* the
end of Pay 1958 as against £E32.6b. in December 1956. Deposits in Government
Ins ranee and Pensions Funds have risen from £E20.7ia. at the end of January
1957 to £E32.0m. at the end. of Fay 1958. Savings and other deposits in all
banks rose from £E55.4n. at the end of 1956 to £E55.87to. at the end of 1957
to £,"61.93-at the end £f January 195-. See, The Sud/ret leoort for the
Year 1958/59. Southern Region, United Ara Republic, p. 26.






Item 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956
Total Investment 115 143 116 116 135 122 110
Gross Private
Investment 112 103 83 64 57 54 39
Gross Public
Investment 22 29 25 34 53 62 66
Changes in Stbcks -19 11 a 18 25 6 5
Total Domestic Savings 135 51 74 98 116 120 92
Private Savings 121 68 92 62 66 108 123




Go>.a-ce 8 National Planning Commission, Office of the Secretary General," """
published by the U.N. Economic Development in the Kiddle East
1956-57, p. 13.
necessarily lead to inflationary pressure." The decline in the public savings
in 1956, or in other words, the dis-eaving incurred in the public sector was
mainly due to the economic crises resulting fr m the Sues military operations at
the end of 1956,
The vs.ry low marginal propensity to s ve in the private sectors is an apparent
2
characteristic of the Egyptian economy as well as in most less-developed economies.
Although domestic production rose steadily, savings, as a percentage of domestic
production, declined from its peak of 15$ in 1954 to 12$ in 1955 and to 9$ in 1956
reaching the 1952 level. Various factors could be considered as the causes of '.he
lag in domestic a vings behind the rowth of domestic production. According to the
U.N. Report, previously entioned, the :.:ain cause in the public sector is the sharp
increase in the expenditure on defence, education and welfare. In the private
sector, the ain forces could be attributed to (a) redistribution of the agricultural
wealth and income no a result of the land Reform of 1952; (b) the rise in the price
level, during the period from 1954 to 1956 which ray have distorted the capacity and
will to save; (c) the rise in urban wages due to the Government intervention; and
(d) laotly, hut not least, the increase in domestic product in later years is largely
attributable to good harvests and that the resulting increase in income has been
enjoyed by the rural community which lias an exceptionally high marginal propensity to
1. Ibid.
2. The marginal propensity to consume was etinated to be very high, about 0,9 and
as the marginal propensity to import is about 0.5, therefore, the multiplier
would equal 1 0 r
(1 - 0,9) + 0.5 " °
- Cf., Pound Sherif, :.onetarv IV!lev In I&r.-pt (in Arabic) p. 24
13
consume and a very low marginal propensity to save.'1 Generally speaking, aggregate
gross investment has not Increased since 1954 (up to 1956) in spite of the continuous
2
increase in the Government expenditure on economic development.
K* I'ublic Finance.
(i) QMiSL Recelnto and Expenditure:
Cur discussion of the Egyptian pub'ic finance will be limited by the period
during which income taxation war. in operation; i.e. since 1939. From 1937/38 to
1949/50, receipts and expenditure of the general budget rose each year. In most
of those years, receipts exceeded expenditure, raising the accumulated surplus
reserve of the Government to the highest level in the country's history. In spite
of the consistent surplus accumulation, the economy experienced a considerable degree
of inf'ation due to the Allied Forces expenditure throughout that period. In later
years, from 1950/51 up to 1957/58 the general trend as seen from final accounts and
budget estimates showsa continuous eficit which was met by either drawing on the
•3
Reserve Fund or through borrowing,''
Government revenue increased sharply, in coney terras* due to the levy of new taxes
in the early forties and to the increase in the existing tax r-tes es ecially Customs
and Excise. Moreover, the increase in the rational income increased personal incomes
and profits and thus an increase in income tax revenues was apparent. In general,
taxation, direct and indirect, is the major component of the pre ent Egyptian ordinary
budgets. On the other hand, p blic loans cover an important art of the expenditures
1. Ibid., p. 14
2. lio data is available to show the situation of total savings and investment after
1956. But, in general, there is a rise in the trend as Government investment
on the Five Year Plan commenced late in 1956.
3. Fee Table 5 for an overall picture of the Egyptian public receipts and expendit¬
ure? nearly all years show a deficit oxce t the oar ending 30/6/54 which showed














































































































































































































on economic development especially since 1952 when the Government resorted to the
.policy of deficit financing.
Table 5 shows the amounts of public revenue and public expenditure of the ordinary
budget since 1939 u to the fiscal year ©Ming Juno 1958. Taxes on income and w alth
show a gradual increase especially since the end of the war. The s ra© c uld be said
about Customs and Hxcin© as well an property taxes. Other public receipts have also
increased, es oclally in recent years (since 1956), due to saany factors, such as; (a)
the increa e in reven e share of the Government in various industrial establish; onts due
to its expanding policy in stimulating industrialisation through direct participation in
equity Capital? (I) the increase in the proceeds of confiscated properties resulting
from the Suez crisis later in 1956? and, (c) the increase in the Government's share in
the net revenue of the Sues Canal Authority after its nationalisation in 1956#
The expenditure side of the e .e table shews the sharp increase in. exporrfit res on
defence es ecially after 1954. Expenditure on education shows a continue a steady
increase while experrf.it .re on health has been relatively at a constant level during the
post-war period up to the present tine. Current exrendit re to reet current Government
activities and administration continued to increase; it war £E3l.ls. in 1939/39, about
Tff of aggregate public expenditure, and reached <££146.6m. in 1948/49, about 8<$ of
aggregate public expend!t;ro, then it reached it© peak in 1958/59 (budget estimates)
-C.S245.6m., or about 91?-- of total public expenditure of the ordinary budget."1'
Since expenditure on the ordinary budget does not shew total public expenditure,
the expenditure estimates of Hational hevelo rent, Public Services and other autonomous
budgets reuot be sdded to it. These subsidiary autonoooua budgets (expenditure side)
amounted, to 1376®. in 1955? to £8100®. in 1956? and to Oll27s. in 1958/59.





























































































































Accordingly, from the foregoing information, we find that the Government sector
in Egypt is relatively large as a proportion of net domestic product. This fact is
of significant importance to the Government as it could, with the aid of a rational
fiscal policy, exert considerable pressure upon the price level.1
Table 6 shows that the ratio of Government expenditure (ordinary budgets) to net
domestic product tended to be fairly constant as it forms about one-fifth of the total
domestic expenditure with the exception of the year 1952 when it reached 30.9^. In
order to give a non-biased picture of the Government sector as illustrated by its public
expenditure, we have to add, as previously mentioned, the expenditure expended on economic
development and other activities which are not included in the ordinary budget. Therefore,
the ratio of public expendit re to net domestic product increases accordingly} to 26% and
to 29% in 1955 and 1956 respectively.
(ii) Public Debt:
Public debt in Egypt has risen steadily, especially during the last decade, since
the Government budget policy has changed from the dependence on the Reserve Fund to
cover budget deficits to public lx>rrowing.
The most striking change in the public debt structure during the World War II was
the conv rsion and repayment during 1943 of the entire external debt by means of national
loans. Since that time the public debt has consisted of domestic obligations only.
Domestic debt increased not only by conversion of foreign into domestic obligations, but
also by the issue of "Cotton Purchase Financing Loans" and other loans for military
purposes, e.g. "Palestine Loan". These loans were issued during the first few years of
the post-war period. In order to maintain cotton prices at a reasonable level after the
War, the Government was prepared to buy cotton at a higher price than the market price
from local growers and merchants. For financing such purchases, Treasury bills of

















































































































































£K12 ©illions and a "Cotton Purchase Loan" of £J33vm. v?oro issued in 1946. In the
ease year Treasury Mils of £E50a, wore issued to cover additional note issue of the
national Bank of Egypt for financing the cotton crop. In 1952, legislation was
passed authorising another issue of 3 months bills up to a Halt of £E$Qbu This
limit va raised in 1954 to £K6Gau, and in 1955 to £8150*3.* Before 1955 Trea ury
Mils were used only to finance the cotton transactions of the Government, but since
2
1955 they have been used for financing the Government's general activities.
Table 7 shows the changes in the components of the public debt since 1940.
The increase of public debt during the last four years was due to the reliance of
the 0overn»eat on deficit financing in isp-le: eating a considerable part of development
plans and also to finance part of other current activities which current receipts have
failed to poet. Almost four-fifths of the pub io debt in recent rears (since 1955)
has been financed by the banking oyster, particularly the Central Lank, which absorbed
two-thirds.
C. IMS&UMi!SSL-''
The objectives of the Egyptian Government finance can be surnarlssd as follows
1) The maintenance of the basic machinery of government and the prwmraaentof such
services as govo -nmntB generally provide for the citizens of their countries;
1. According th© Lm Ho. 242 of 1955» the Minister of Finance was authorised to
increase the amount of Treasury bills isnued to £E20Csu after the consent of
the Cabinet.
2. U.A., op. cit., p. 11
3. Ibid.
4. The analysis of the Egyptian Government fiscal policy has to be very brief as
our aim is only to nve the way for further analysis regarding the ©canonic




2) The reaction of economic development, either by direct government action, such
as the construction of highways, bridges, etc., or directly through the combined
effect of taxation a d expenditure® on the economic system.
3) The improvement of social and cultural conditions, including not only s ecific
purposes like education and public health, but also broad social objectives, such as
the distribution of income that will ensure a balanced growth of the economy. These
and
goals may be ursued through both tax j. Xicy/through expenditure policy. Besides
fiscal mooeuros other devices have been taken to redistribute wealth and income
especially in the agricultural sector through the Land Reform of 1952 which limited
the ownership of cultivable land by 200 feddans (one feddan » 1,038 acresj;
4) One of the fundamental objectives of any sound fiscal policy is to maintain a
high degree of economic stability in so far as possible, and compensation for
fluctuations in general business activities aiming at the conservation of a high
degree of employment. This tray be accomplished through the adaption of taxation to
changing econotaic conditions and through public workc.
Egyptian fiscal policy in practice had not aimed primarily up to the present
time, at stabilising the economy but its rain objective has been to maintain the basic
government machinery. In this context the rindpal aim of any Finister of Finance
has always b en to find the necessary funds to cover the current public expenditures.
Economic and social development, es sctally tlwj economic development of the indiatrial
sector received little attention, while the agricultural a ctor received a great deal
of attention due to the political influence of landlords. Most government expenditure
on economic development wan expanded on irrigation schemes. In general, all Ministers
of Finance used to follow the classical attitude of keeping a balanced budget in preser¬
ving a sufficient reserve fund to be used, in case of emergencies if final account®
showed any deficit.
Deficit financing through public borrowing has been developed in the 195C's and
particularly after tho 1952 Revolution when the Government was faced with major econ¬
omic difficulties due t. the enormous decline in cotton prices and exports. Since
1955 tho Government resorted to public borrowing to finance economic and social
development program." es (see Table l),1 Rofore the 1952 Revolution, public borrowing
was only resorted to in cases of emergency, e.g. Palestinian expenditure, or to
finance the cotton crop.
Taxation had a'ways been looked upon a a revenue raiser up till 1949 when the
General Income Tax was brought into force thus introducing a relatively high a rginal
an mil as effective rate of progression into the tax system. Unfortunately the
General Income Tax w s unable to reach one of its objectives, i.e. redistributing
income as the legislation and its administration suffer from vsrl us ole enta of
2
inefficiency.
Indirect taxes on the other hand, with their regreseiverat re, were adequate in
raising the ne.dod finds to cover any incrca.'r© in the public expenditure because of
their administrative simplicity. Customs and Excise duties served basically as a
source of revenue to the Government and secondary, as a protective device for several
industries.
1. Government deficits, calculated by comparative changes in Government debt and
Government deposits are as follows; (in £B millions).
Year : 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 195b
Deficit; -7.9 -45.9 -53.3 +2-2 -2.6 -50.1 -97.2
See, U.N., Pgvaloraaent of the Middle .Seat. 1956-57, p. 11
2. See Chapters II, III, and XV of this work.
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lactam taxation, as previously mentioned, was introduced primarily as a revenue
yielder, to meet the incr asing public expendit re.1 On the other hand, the Excess
Profits Tax was introduced to absorb a siseable part of the war profits and windfalls,
and to share with the taxpayers in their easy-made pr.fits, and hence supplying the
Treasury with a&ple funds to meet the increasing expenditure. On the whole, income
taxation has not so far played an important art in t e stabilization of the economy
for several reasons, one of the most important being the limited effect of any change
in the income tax rates on the economy. Individuals affected by the tax are very
o
limited in number (nearly less than half a million out of a population of 24 millions).
Another reason is the inefficient administr tive machinery of the tax which suet limit
its economic effectiveness.
By and large, therefore, Keynesian-typo fiscal policy, has not been fully applied
to the Egyptian economy. This is not only due to the old classical methods adopted
by the Ministers of Finance but also to the backwardness of economic structure as a
whole. To apply Kcynesian technique to any economy, obviously certain achinery has
to be fully developed; such as banking institutions, the market structure, and the tax
system.
1. See also Chapters II and III of this work.
2. Nearly one erson o t of 50 has some connection with income taxation. (Statistics




THE EVOLUTION OF THE EGYPTIAN TAX SYSTEM.
The main purpose of this Chapter is to discuss briefly the background of the
structure of the Egyptian tax system in general and then to concentrate on the
develo ~ent of the Egyptian income taxes. As income taxation is new to the Egyptian
fiscal structure, it is deemed desirable to study the situation before the introd¬
uction of these taxes. Accordingly the discussion will be divided into three main
sections following the dates and periods of important changes in the fiscal system
which will help us in understanding and elaborating the position of the newly imposed
income taxes. The first section covers briefly the period previous to 1939 when the
first income tax, in its modern form, was introduced. The second section, includes
the eriod from 1939 up to 1948 during which the Schedul ar Income Tax with its imper¬
sonal characteristics w s the only tax on income. During this period, however, a
special fiscal measure was introduced to overcome a specific purpose created by the
outbreak of World War II; that was the Excess Profits Tax. The third section includes
the eriod from 1949 up till the oresent during which the Blgyptian taxes on income have
been reshaped and supplemented by the General Income Tax with its personal objectives.
A. The Situation before 1939.
The main source of revenue for the Egyptian budget at the beginning of this century
was twofold. The first was the direct taxes on buildings and land. The second was
Custom and Excise Duties. Custom duties were governed by certain Commercial Conven¬
tions and the rates of duties could not be increased without approval by the signatories
0
beforehand. In .eneral the situation of the Government was bound by the Capitulations,*
and no other tax could be imposed that ight affect 'Foreigners' without consulting the
Capitulary Powers. Accordingly public expenditure was affected and the social welfare
was deteriorating resulting from lack of funds.
The financial and political hardships of the 1870*s brought difficulties to the
Egyptian economy and the surrender of its wealth and public fiscal resources to the
foreign creditors in order to guarantee payment of the debts. The foreign powers,
es ecially France and Britain exercised their full power in imposing restrictions on
the Egyptian Government concerning the levying of taxes and ec ecially on foreigners.
According to Capitulations the Government was unable to levy any tax on foreigners, and,
therefore, it was unjustifiable to levy any tax on Egyptians only. In fact the whole
public revenue and expenditure were subject to a dual foreign control, British and
French.
The only direct taxes existing up to 1884 were those on land and palm trees. The
former was based on the rental value of land of 28.64/® with a maximum of 164 P.T.
(£1:13:9) and minimum 18 P.T. (3/9d.) per acre. The rental estimates on which the
tax was based were to be valid for 30 years. This resulted in the inefficiency of the
tax system in times of economic fluctuations due to its inflexibility. The other tax
was an impost of palm trees at a rate of 10/» of the resumed yearly output. There
2
two taxes supplied about of aggregate revenue.
1. Certain Conventions provided 'Foreigners' with extra-territorial juridicial
treatment. Such Conventions were known as "Capitulations" through which the
privileged nationals of friendly nations enjoyed liberty of r idence, freedom
of travel and trade, freedom of religious practice, immunity from extra taxes and
other obligations which night be imposed.
2. A. H. Moursi, Income Tax. Vol. I pp. 126-130 (in Arabic).
An attempt was made by the Egyptian Government to impose a house tax in 1804.1
Immediately an International Conference was called as foreigners refused to pay the
tax. The Conference justified the imposition of the tax on rental values of houses
after deducting the necessary expenses for maintenance.
Prom 1885 to 1930 the land tax and the house tax were the only direct taxes in
Egypt w ich supplied a relatively large amount of revenue to the State, an average
of about thrity to forty per cent of total tax revenue. The inflexibility character¬
istic of these taxes prevailed and because of lack of funds the Government was unable
to meet the 1930's depression through increasing public expenditure.
In 1930 the Government started revising its Custom duties after regaining its
full authority to levy the full rates on imported commodities. The new tariff came
into force in 1931 but its yield was below expectations on account of the internat¬
ional economic crises which produced a sharp reduction in imports. The Government
was compelled to levy a tax on the earnings of its -ersonnel in September 1931 at a
rate of 2$ and this expedient supplied an amount less than a million pounds.
Exemption from this levy was granted to lower ranks in 1936. In 1939 the tax yield
decreased to about £E30G,000 and it was then repealed, being superseded by the new
Scheduler Income Tax.
As the land had to be reserved as a guarantee for servicing external debt and
as the house tax raised a very s all sum, the financial situation of the Government
became very critical. It had to adopt a deflationary policy instead of an expans¬
ionary one in order to comply with the obligations which necessitated keeping any
budgetary surplus in the Reserve Fund to guarantee the future payment of the debt
1. Op. cit., p. 125
charge.1 More important public works had to be completely curtailed and this inten¬
sified the existing deflationaiy ressure.
The over-all bur sen of taxation during the first period under discussion can
be judged from the situation prevailing during World War I and the two years after
it. The yield of direct taxes which was paid by the individuals composing the
property owners was stationary at £E5.6m., but the revenue from public services and
regressive indirect taxes increased from £E11.0m. in 1913 to £E22.7m. in 1918/19.
In general, the policy adopted by the Government d ring the War seemed to have
widened the gap between the rich and the poor. While c tton grow rs and dealers
amassed wealth through a sharp increase in prices, the poor were fighting to maintain
2
a subsistence level.
The fight to gain control over economic as well as political affairs continued
during the 1930's. and Egypt in 1936 concluded a political agreement with Britain.
1. In 1913 the Egyptian Government revenue was £E17.4m; 32/ of it was supplied by
land and house taxes; 22/ was supplied by Custom and Excise duties and other
minor indirect taxes, and the remaining 46m caue from State Railways, telegraph,
telephone and postal s rvices, public domain and profits from other sources.
The system of keeping a Reserve Fund for emergency was a dominant factor in the
Egyptian fiscal system which lacked the necessary flexibility. The Reserve
Fund reached £E4m. in 1915/16 and increased to £B12.4s. in 1918/19. The
Reserve Fund was the tool which hel od the vari us Ministries of Finance to
balance the budgets in all circumstances. T. Younes, The Budget: Series of
Lectures delivered for the Students of The Tax Institute, Cairo University, 1950.
2. Cotton prices increased from $12.01 per kentar in 1914/15 to $87.81 in 1919/20
and to $200 in 1920/21, it was estimated th t the family expenses of the poor
classes increased by 179$ by the end of the War while their earnings went up
by 30?" only. (Cf., A. E. Crouchley; The Economic Development of Modern Egypt.
1^, -p. 192)
Later in 1937 Egypt succeeded in terminating Capitulations and thus regained its long-
lost fiscal sovereignty. Immediately after the abolition of Capitulations, Government
and Parliamentary Commissions discussed how to reform the fiscal system in general and
how to construct a suitable tax system. The Parliamentary Comrission put forward
to Parliament a draft law of the Schedular Taxes on Income in 1938. Later, at the
beginning of 1939 the Law was enacted.
B. The Schedular Income Tax ar the Wain Tax on Income (1938-1940).
(1) The reasons behind the imposition of the Schedular Income Tax:
The new Schedule I.Tax of 1939 was a copy of the French Schedular Income Taxes
of 1917 with some modific tions taken from other European systems. It was not
accompanied by a general income tax as was the case in France. The adoption of the
French system was due mainly to the basic structure of the Egyptian Civil Laws which
were, and still are, based on the Hapoleonic Code modified to suit the social structure
of the Egyptian community. Therefore, as the basis of the legislative structure in
both countries were alike, it was a quick and easy procedure to adopt the French Income
Tax.
The rea ons which stimulated the introduction of the 'income tax' could be divided
into two main categories:
=a= The need of revenue to meet the increasing demands for reforming social and defence
plans. As 3oon as Egypt's hands were freed on her fiscal affairs, the Government
found that it was time to find new resources for the necessary social reforms which
were at a standstill for the lack of funds. Why, it may be asked, was it necessary
to impose a new tax on income and while not imposing a tax on Capital and wealth or
an increase in the rates of the existing taxes? It was believed that to increase the
rates of property taxes would have caused great harm and injustice to landowners as
they had been bearing a relatively heavy burden of direct taxation for a long time.
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Another political factor was that most of the members of Parliament were landowners
and to increase the low rates of land tax would incur great opposition.
Public loans could be considered as a means of financing; public expenditure, but
public borrowing at that period was considered as an improper and inadequate device to
finance public expenditure for the following reo onss
(1) In the care of foreign borrowing, this idea was completely neglected for the
psychological complexes which resulted from the financial crises of the 19th century.
Egypt had suffered considerably politically and economically from her foreign debt
policy during the 19th century; therefore, the Government was not in a position to discuss
foreign borrowing especially just after Capitulation had been abolished.
(2) The idea of domestic public borrowing was abandoned for the following reasons?
a) The predominance of an imperfect capital market;
b) the lack of banking institutions, e ecially the lack of a central bank;
c) the low rate of savings in an underdeveloped economy such as Egypt;
d) as a consequence of the above aspect, a relatively high rate of interest for
medium and long-term loans is an important reason for abandoning the idea of
public borrowing as the high cost of debt service will render any public loan
uneconomical in the long run;
e) According to classical, and also to neo-classical viewpoint, the government of
the thirties and early forties in Egypt believed in the idea that government
revenues have to cover current government expenditure, wh rear. Capital expend¬
iture may be met by receipts from loans if such loans were believed economical
and productive in the long-run. Therefore, following this line of thought the
Government of that period believed that public borrowing to meet current expend¬
iture was a highly undesirable, as well as unwise, policy to adopt.
Since the Egyptian Revolution of 1919 great emphasis was put on the improvement of
education, health and other social conditions in order to alleviate the people's
sufferings. In 1913 less than a million pounds was spent on welfare out of a budget
2
of £E16m. or about in 1937 welfare expenditure was 14.3,"- of the aggregate outlay.
1. T. Younes, op. cit.
2. Ibid.
The general trend afterwards was the rapid increase in social welfare expenditure in
order to make up the long-delayed reforms.
Defence expenditure was increasing sharply after the conclusion of the 19%
Anglo-Egyptian Agreement. Egypt had to depend on herself in defending her territory
and, therefore, had to reorganise the army.'" The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 required
an additional revenue to meet its obligations which in fact reached £151.2m. between
1939/40 and 19^2/43.2
=b= The second factor used to justify the imposition of the income tax was the
necessit to achieve equity in distributing the fiscal burden. Land and buildings
taxes besides the indirect taxes were the main sources of public revenue for a long
time. The burden of indirect taxes fell heavily upon the poor classes while other
individuals and companies enjoyed a complete immunity from any fiscal impost on their
3
earnings or profits. Therefore, the reformers found that such resources had to be
fiscally exploited in order to attain an equitable distribution of the tax burden which
was highly regressive. In addition, the public expenditure on social welfare was very
small, b"t increasing.^ This state of affairs had to be readjusted and the solution
was to levy an income tax on the different sources of income.
1. Before 1936 the burden of defending Egypt against attack was on Britain and, therefore,
there was no need for a full army. Defence expenditure was only about 5/> of total
outlay in 1936. cf. Final Accounts, Fiscal Year 1935-36. Egyptian Government,
Ministry of Finance 1939.
2. Statistical Iear Book of foyot. 1947.
3. With the exception of the tax levied on the salaries of Government employees in 1931
which, as previously mentioned, was repealed in 1939.
4. To illustrate this situation the indirect taxes were 75'/ of total taxes in 1937 while
the welfare expenditure was £E6.2m. out of a total outlay of £E42ra. or 14.3a.
"The Egyptian Budget". 1936/37.
(2) The Scheduler Income Tax during World War II:
When World. War II broke out the new Schedular Tax had just started to function
but its yield was very small, ^ess than half a million pounds of 1939. According to
the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 all facilities of supplies, manpower and finance had
to be provided for the forces. This situation increased the State expenditure on
defence which had to be expanded from £E2.9®. in 1937/38 to £E7.7m. in 1939/40.1 A
budgetary deficit appeared in that year amounting to £Bl«77m. which was met by drawing
on the Reserve Fund. Altre gh the year 1939/40 was the first full year since the
introduction of the Schedular Taxes, their productivity was noticeable; they supplied
£E2.7m. or about 43/ of the yield of both land and buildings taxes.
The extraordinary expenditure by the Allied forces during 1940-42 and the shortage
of consumption and capital goods created an inflationary pressure on the Egyptian economy
which had to find ways and means to control such a situation. On the other hand, the
Government had to find a new source of revenue to meet the increase in the public
expenditure which was due mostly to the general rise in prices. Therefore, taxes, as
fiscal measure, were used in fighting inflation and also in supplying the increase in
expenditure. Com: ercial and Industrial Pr fits Tax was increased gradually reaching a
rate of 12/ in 1942.^
An important step was taken in fighting inflation and that was the imposition of
the Excess Profits Tax in 1941. The tax was levied to absorb and share businessmen in
their windfall gains which were due to the great demand on locally produced commodities
which were unobtainable and free of external competition as imports were decreased sharply.
1. U.K., Public Finance Information Papers. Egypt. 1951.
2. All direct taxes supplied 23/ of aggregate revenue compared with 16f in the
previous year. The Egyptian Budget. op. cit.
3. The original rate for 1938/39 was 7/
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The Government found it necessary and equitable to participate in such windfall profits.
Moreover, the Government had to find another source to supply the Treasury with
the needed funds to cover the rapidly increasing expenditure due to the increase in
prices. Besides the war created new expenses which had to be net such as civil defence,
high-cost of living subsidies.
Summing up there were three ain reasons behind the imposition of the E.P.T.:
(a) Achieving social equity in charging only the individuals and businesses who
profited from the War situation in paying their share to meet the War expenses; (b)
producing a further so-rce of revenue; (c) controlling inflation thro gh price limitation,
as the rationing system had proved inadequate in most cases especially with the existence
of the black market. Besides, the rationing system did not include all types of
commodities. Prices of rationed-free corenoditie soared and sore form of control had
to be devised. E.P.T. was implemented so as to help in checking the increase in prices.
The E.P.T. was 'evied on profits exceeding a standard mo nt of the pre-war level
(i.e. 1937, 1938, or 1939 profits) or equal to 12$ of the capital actually invested.
Progression was appli d in the rates of this tax as they ranged between 20 on the excess
profits not exceeding a quarter of the basic figure, and 50$ on the excess profits
exceeding one half of the basic figure. The rates were increased two years later
reaching 75$ of that art of the excess profits over three quarters of the basic amount.
The tax became an important revenue-earner especially during the first five years.
E.P.T. was repealed in 1950 after being in force for exactly ten years.'3'
The fiscal system of the Egyptian Government during the War was in no difficulty
especially in meeting its expenditure. Economies were made mainly on social expendit¬
ures. Through this the Government realised a surplus nearly every year between 1940
and 1945. Taxation supplied about two thirds of the aggregate revenue, and income and
1. The tax was an important source of Public revenue as compared to other direct taxes.
It supplied over K50m. in almost a decade; over 60$ of the aggregate yield of the
Scheduler Taxes on income during the sn e eriod.
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other property taxes provided an average revenue equal to 22$ of the aggregate.
Table 8 illustrates these points:-
















1940/41 42.7 43-6 26.2 60 8.4 19
1941/42 46.1 56.3 33.2 59 10.3 19
1942/43 56.6 67.1 42.4 63 17.8 26
1943/44 71.9 77.7 48.0 61 21.7 27
1944/45 82.1 87.7 56.5 64 19.4 22
Source: U.N., Public Finance Information Papers. Egypt, (1951)
As mentioned before, direct taxes on land and buildings were constant during the War
and also during the three years after ; it yielded £E6.14a. in 1957/38; £E6.3®. in 1939/40;
£E6.6ra. in 194l/42; £E5.6m. in 1943/44; £E6.Gm. in 1945/40 and <£E5.36jb. in the period front
May 1942 to February 1948. While property ta es were stagnant, taxe: on income were
increasing in yield and the proportion of the first category to total direct taxes became
3/ in 1946/47 compared to 70/ in 1939/40; and obviously the balance charged as income
taxation was 69$ of total direct taxes in 1946/47 with the main burden, in relative terms,
being levelled on Commercial and industrial enterprises.
In 1946 some Members of Parliament raised the question of the role of the existing
Scbedular Income Tax in distributing the fiscal burden. They introduced a draft law
before Parliament in June 1946, designed to secure a measure ofequality, prop sing the
levy of a tax on total income.
C. The Introduction of a General Income Tax as a Complementary Tax on Income.
The idea of imposing a general income tax is not a recent one. It actually had
been studied when the Schedular Taxes were under discussion in 1937/38. But it was
3 9
thought that the time was not ripe to levy the complementary tax on total income as
the Scheduler Taxes were quite sufficient in supplying the Government with the needed
revenue.
Later, during 1945, a Committee was formed to study direct taxes in general and
the Schedular Taxes in particular. The imposition of 'he general income tax was one
of its main topics on the allegation that the existing tax system was far from achieving
social equity as the Schedular Taxes are impersonal in their objectives.
The idea of imposing a general income tax was a controversial one and had been
subject to several debates inside and outside Parliament. Generally speaking, there
were two groups, one advocating the imposition of the tax while the other was against
such imposition.* They supported their ideas by the following argument:
2
a. Arguments against the imposition of the tax:
(ij The then existing tax revenue was more than sufficient to cover the Government
3
expenditure as the final accounts showed a continuous surplus." Therefore, the
need to levy a new tax on total income for revenue purposes could be easily offset,
(ii) The administration was inadequate and would not be able to cope with the existing
taxes especially the Schedular Tax. The arrears cases without assessment were
enormous . It was proposed that it would be beneficial to concentrate on the
improvement of the assessment and collection of the Schedular Tax and, therefore,
increase its yield. Accordingly the need for imposing a new tax for revenue
purposes did not exist.
1. Kamal el-Garf and A. el-Kadim, The General Income Tax, pp. 9-15
2. The opponents were mostly Members of Parliament who repre ented the landowners.
3. There was a continuous budget surplus since 1940/41 which amounted to £E1.12m.
for that year, £E10.27in. for 1941/42; £E10.59m. for 1942/43; £E5.83m. for 1943/44;
£E5.63m. for 1944/45; £E8.2m. for 1945/46; £E10.30m. for 1946/47; and £E6.95m. for
I947/48. (fee U.K., Public Finance Information Papers, Egypt. 1951).
<1.
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(iii) Some Scheduler Taxes were levied on income calculated on an arbitrary basis such
as the tax on non-commercial professions, while others were not completely into
1
operation. Thus a proper enforcement of the Schedular Taxes should be of primary
importance. Some sources of income were exempt, e.g. agricultural profits, and
it was necessary that such profits should be taxed. This evidence indicated a
major source of inequality: between the individuals on one hand and in the
fiscal treatment of the various sources of income on the other. Therefore, it
was a necessity to adjust the defects of the existing tax before even thinking of
levying a new one.
(iv) The imposition of a general income tax while the E.P.T. was still in force would
be considered as increasing the fiscal burden.
(v) If the newly propo ed tax were to be enforced, its administration would prevent
it being efficient as the majority of the taxpayers did not have any proper
accounts to show their real income. On the other hand, the introduction of the
general tax on income would require an enormous adrainisIrative expenditure and
thus the tax would become uneconomical from the State's viewpoint.
These were the basic arguments against the imposition of the general tax on income
2
which were criticised by the advocates imposing the tax.
1. Especially the Schedular Tax on interest paid on bank deposits, and on other debts,
Articles 15-17, Law No. 14 of 1939.
2. The defenders of the imposition of the tax ere mostly academic arsons and members
of Parliament with non-feudalistic beliefs.
See, ilnutes of the Upper House. 2l/2/lS49.
41
b. Arguments for the imposition of the general tax on income:
(i) The main purpose of imposing the tax would be to achieve equity in distributing
the income tax burden. The Scheduler Taxes with t eir impersonal characteris¬
tics were far from attaining- an equitable distribution a:- they ignored the
personal aspects of the various taxpayers which affects their ability to pay
the tax.
(ii) Proportionality in personal income taxation was out of date in achieving the
equal sacrifice doctrine while progression in the rate was being widely considered
as the adequate device in reaching equality in sacrifice within the framework of
the theory of diminishing utility.
(iii) The State needed more revenue in s ite of the continuous budget surplus as there
were many economic and social projects which were held at a standstill during
the War period.
(ivy On the other hand, the proposed tax would act as a deterrent to the overwhelming
inflationary pressure which was increasing, afte the end of the War."*'
Finally, after severe attacks from property owners in general and landowners in
particular, the Law of the General Income Tax was given a final reading in August 1949
and the long-awaited complementary tax on income came into being. The tax was levied on
total incomes of the Calendar year 1949. The structure of the tax, which was originally
adopted from the French (before the 1948 reform) and Belgian models, is reviewed in the
2
Appendix along with the Schedular Income Tax.
1. Pinutes of the Lower House (douse of Representativesj 2/6/1948.
2. Paget^t-
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Since 1949 the income tax system could be considered as relatively complete
although some sources of income are still untaxable. The inequality of the
Scheduler Tax due to its impersonal characteristics is modified and mitigated by
the complementary tax on total incomes thro -gh its personal objectives. The
question of equity regarding the Egyptian income taxes is to be discussed in a
following Chapter when considering the performance and the efficiency of the system.
During a period of almost a decade the statutes of the two taxes on income
have been under a continuous change with a view to clarifying the ambiguity of
the legislation, to filling up the loopholes or to introducing a major change
in the technical make-up of the tax. As with most income tax systems, the
Egyptian system has been evolved for socio-economic as well as for administrative
1
reasons. Thie state of affairs; i.e. the enormous number of amending legislations
and regulations, created a confused and ambiguous atmos here around the interpret¬
ation and the enforcement of income taxes.
Durin the period under analysis several taxes were levied in addition to
those previously mentioned. These were of three major categories. The first in
importance i3 the Defence Tax levied in July 1956 to supply the Treasury with revenue
to cover the increasing defence expend it re. The estimates of the increase in defence
2
appropriations in the fiscal year 1956/57 were £E23m. Therefore, an immediate source
of revenue was needed to cover such great increases in expenditure. This tax is
1. Only the basic changes of significant social or economic implic tiens will be
discussed when judging the efficiency of the system. (Part II.)
2. The Budget Report for the year 1956/57. Ministry of Finance and Economy.
/5
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levied in addition to the Schedular Tax, the G.I. Tax as well as the Property Taxes.
The rate varies from 1% on small salaries, wares up to 10$ on the total income subject
to the G.I. Tax above £E'3G,00G a year.
Apparently the Defence Tax is to be a separate imposition but in fact it produces
an increase in the existing rates of direct taxes in an indirect way. For political
and psychological reasons it took the shape of a separate tax. It lias no doubt
increased the burden upon taxpayers but in order to reduce the psychological effect
on the people it was given the name of 'Defence Tax' so as to make it easier for the
people to accept it without much resentment.''"
The second categoiy is an additional tax levied to meet part of the expenditures
of provincial councils and municipalities. It takes the form of an excess percentage
over the main rate of the Schedular Tax, G.I. Tax and property taxes. As a matter of
fact special levies to meet the expenses of certain munici alities were in existence
even before the introduction of the Schedular Tax. But in 1950 a general law attempted
to organize the levy of additional taxes on top of the Schedular Tax. The municipalities
of Cairo and Alexandria, the two major cities, have their own autonomous legislative
power in imposing and collecting additional levies on the taxpayers' income within
their boundaries. But to attain a control over the rates of the additional levies,
the Central Government had to fix a maximum of 10$ on the basic rates of direct taxes.
In the third category is a newly introduced tax designed to achieve social
objectives. The tax is levied on any type of remuneration paid to a corporation's
1. The Government on several occasions lias announced its intention of not increasing
the rates of the existing taxes and, especially, in the last three successive
budget reports.
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director over and above the amount of Scheduler Tax and G.I. Tax paid.1 The Scheduler
Tax is deducted from the remunerations before the new tax is imposed. The rate of
the tax is progressive, ranging from 10^ on incomes above £E2,C00 and not over £E3,0Q0,
and 80^ on incomes over £E1G,000. The aim of this tax could be easily deduced
from the recent general drive a ainst feudalism and towards the redistribution of
income and wealth. Taxation wa . , therefore, used as adevice to attain such an
objective along with other direct social reforms. For example, a significant amendment
of the Companies Law took place in August 1958 reducing the number of Directorships
tenable by one person from six to two, with the exception of the Boards of Directors
of the Central Bank, and other banks or companies in which the State or a public
institution participates; in these cases membership is confined to one Directorship only
unless authorization is given by Presidential Decision. The Managing Dj ector must
2
confine his activities to one company. The maximum remuneration that a member of a
board of directors can get from a corporation salary, attendance allowances, or other
advantages in kind, is now fixed at £E2,50C er annum.
Generally speaking, the above-mentioned laws have established a kind of safety
valve to prevent the growth of industrial feudalism especially as the country is moving
quickly towards industrialisation. The introduction of these important amendments gave
the State, through its legislative power, a control over the private sector of the
economy in order to attain an efficient utilization of the business sector.
The three categories of additional taxes on income are in fact an increase in the
rates of the main Schedular and General Taxes on income. Their introduction was
1. Introduced in 1957 by the Law Ho. 153 and amended by Law No. 99 of 1958.
2. He is also subject to the age limit of 60 years, with the exception of members
owning at least 1C§6 of the share capital.
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necessitated by temporary conditions which might cease in the short-run. But other
additional taxes are levied with the intention of covering a continuous public
expenditure or to attain a long-run socio-economic reform. The redistribution of
wealth and income, so as to close the huge gap between income groups, is considered
to be one of the sain objectives of the present regime: The Land Reform was the first
step towards this aim. It limited land ownership to 200 feddans (one feddan = 1.038
acres). The drive continued afterwards to eliminate other types of "unproductive"
wealth accumulation which right lead to misallocation of the nation's resources if
proeer steps were not undertaken.
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APPENDIX,
The Structure of the Egyptian Income Tax System
i
The Egyptian income tax system is basically divided into two liiain taxes;
(a) The Scheduler Income Tax, and (b) The General (Global) Income Tax.
A. The Schedular Income Taxes;
These taxes were levied by Law No. 14 of 1939 which includes the following
specific taxes
1. Tax on Income Derived from Personal lovable Property;
At present, the rate of this tax is 17^ and it is levied on:
a) Dividends, interest and all other profits derived from shares of any kind,
and of founders' share in companies and general enterprises whether such dividends
are periodical or not, and whether the distribution has been made in cash or
gratuitously in the form of shares, bonis or founders' shares, or in any other
form, even indirectly,
b) Interest, and profits from Capital invested by sleeping partners in a
limited partnership.
c) Interest and all other profits derived from bonds, securities, Treasury bonds,
loans of every kind issued in any way by the State, or by Provincial Councils or
by municipalities and from securities or debentures issued by all companies and
undertakings mentioned above in (a) and (b) with the exception of:
(i) such securities, de entures or bonds as are specifically exempt by law from
this tax, and (ii) credits of a professional nature with certain reservations
provided in the law.
d) Pees of membership of the Board of Directors of companies with the exception
JL
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of profits or fees due to designated members of the Board for their managerial
work provided that not more than two directors of any one company may benefit
from this exception, and that the total sum accruing to each does not exceed
££3,000 yearly in whatever form it may be received.
e) Redemptions and repayments of shares if certain conditions are ascertained.
Dividends, inter st arrears and all other profits derived from movable
foreign securities which Egyptian insurance and reinsurance companies are compelled
to deposit, and maintain in deposit, abroad in the form of guarantees arid reserves
to cover matured claims and current risks, are exempted.
Subject to certain rules and conditions, the dividends which are paid out by
an Egyptian holding company are exenspted from the tax in proportion to that part
of the profits derived in return for its participation in the share capital of a
subsidiary provided that tax shall have been paid on such profits when distributed
by the subsidiary.
The law does not include exemptions for personal considerations, Ihe tax is
collected at source on the payment of any incomes that are subject to it. Companies,
business un ertakings or bodies of persons liable to pay any taxable income are
required to furnish the Revenue Authorities with all documents and records relating
to the income paid.
The b sic principles governing the imposition of this particular tax is the
principle of political allegiance with regard to Egyptians, wh rever they reside,
and the economic allegiance for foreigners domiciled or habitually residing in
Egypt.
2. Tax on Income Derived from Debts. Deposits and Guarantees:
The rate of this tax is 11% and it is levied on interest on all privileged,
mortgage and ordin&iy debts and on all deposits of sums of money or currency
3
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guarantees due to Egyptians or foreigners domiciled or resident in Egypt, even
if such interest is pa, able in respect of capital invested ahroad.
Interest accruing from all capital invested in Egypt is also liable to this
tax even if the persons entitled thereto are foreigners having no actual or legal
domicile in Egypt.
Interest on debts or deposits which ere its of professional nature is exempt
from the tax in so far as it is proved that such interest is included in the
accounts of enterprises situated in Egypt which are subject to the tax on commercial
and industrial profits.
The tax is at the sole charge of the person entitled to the interest and it is
payable on the gross amount of Interest and becomes due by the mere fact of the
payment of the interest, however effected.
The tax is sometimes withheld at the source, while in other cases the creditor
has to pay it to the Revenue Authorities. Some declarations are required to be
filed by both the debtor and the creditor in order to ensure the collection of the
tax.
3* Tax on troll is Derived from Commerce and Industry:
The rate of the tax is 17^ and is annually 1 vied on profits derived from
commerce, industry, comnercial professions or exploitations, mining or other
concessions or undertakings, without exception, other than such undertakings as
are specifically exempt by law.
The provisions of this tax apply to the profits of joint stock coiipanies
whatever the object of such companies.
In addition the law enumerates some different cases to which the tax also
applies such as, the persons and companies who habitually purchase buildings or
businesses with a view to resale, stockbrokers, exchange brokers, agents working
on commission, persons and companies who sell their land in plots after introducing
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xareiiiaia-ry works or let on lease consiarcial or industrial premises supplied
with the furniture or plant necessary for their use, or rent agricultural land
and give it on lease to a third party wholly or in lots.
The tax is chargeable to the profits made by all establishments operating
in Egypt.
The exemption lirrdt varies from £E100 to ££150 according to the marital
situation of the taxpayer, (single, married and without children, or married
with children). If the net profits are more than double the limits of these
exemptions, the taxpayer will not benefit by any exemption.
Special provisions are enumerated to avoid double taxation within the
other Scheduler Taxes. For example, income derived from invested capital in
personal movable property, buildings or a ricultural land which forms part of
the assets of an undertaking, subject to the Commercial and Industrial Profits
Tax, may be deducted to the extent of its net amount when computing the net
taxable profits, after deduction of the proportion of expenses appertaining thereto,
-)
which is calculated at a fixed rate of 10^ on the amount of such income.
Joint stock companies and limited partnerships are entitled to deduct from
the amount of their taxable profits a sum equivalent to the amount distributed
2
and liable to the Schedular Tax on Movable Property,
The taxable income under this Schedule is fixed by the net profits realized
during the previous year after deduction of all charges and losses. Capital
gains or losses realized through the functioning of the business are treated as
ordinary gains and losses.^ Net profits subject to tax are established by the
general result of all business transactions carried out by the firm during the
financial year.
1. Law No. 14 of 1939, Article 36.
2. " " " " " Article 35.
3. " " " " Article 39.
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4. Tax on Waff. s. Salaries, and Sirailar Incomes:
Hiis tax is levied on wages, salaries, indemnities, emoluments, pensions
and annuities paid by the State, Municipal and Provincial Councils, to any
person residing in Egypt or abroad exoept cases exempted by special provisions.
Moreover, all wages, salaries, pensions and the like paid by individuals,
un ertairings, or any organisation to any person residing in Egypt or to anyone
who is residing out of Egypt in respect of services performed in Egypt, are
subject to this tax.
The assessment of this particular tax is based on the total amount of
salaries, emoluments, etc., and applies in addition to all privileges in money
or in kind. The tax is always collected at the source by the employer after
deducting contributions made towards pensions not more than 7»5/' of their
aggregate wages or salaries.
Workmen and employees on daily pay with wages up to P.T.30 per day are
exempt, in all other cases they are subject to a tax of on that part of
their wages in excess of P.T.30 and up to P.T.60, and to "2$, for that part of
their wages which exceeds P.T.60.
The exemptions limit from this tax range from ,££100 to ££150 according
to the marital status and children.
The rate of this tax is progressive and varies from 2$, up to 9% according
2
to the amount of income.
5. Tax on irofits of Hon-Comngrcial Professions:
This tax is levied on profits of liberal and non~commercial professions
exercised independently by the taxpayer where the principal source of income is
work. This tax is also levied on any profession or activity which is not subject
to any other tax. The following, however, are exenpt frm this tax:-
1. P.T.100 equals one Egyptian pound,
2. Law No. 14 of 1939, Article 63 (1).
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a) All associations of non-profitable object within the limit of their
social, cultural or sporting activities. Scholastic institutions are also
exempt from this tax.
b) Any agricultural ent rprise which is not constituted as a joint stock
company.
The rate of this tax is 11$ on the net profits realised during the
preceding year after deductions of all necessary expenses for the exercise
of the j>rofession.
Persons exorcising a profession which necessitates a University or
College degree are exempt from this tax during the first five years from
the time of graduation. On the other hand, these persons holding university
degrees are favoured by a new amendment which took place in 1955. They are
given the choice of being assessed according to their actual profits or
according to the period of practice which starts according to the law from
the elapse of the fifth year after graduation (1). On the other hand this
new legislation excluded those who realized £E1,000 or more as net profits
during the years from 1951 - 1954. Therefore, their profits arc subject to
ordinary assessment of this tax at a rate of 11$.
(1) law No. 642 of 1955, Article 1, states that the assessment of the tax
on liberal professions which require a university degree is as follows:
a. £1515 yearly for the professional who has been graduated for not i ore
than 10 years (the first 5 years after gr duation being exempted);
b. ££30 yearly for the professional who has been graduated for not more
than 15 years;
c. ,£E50 yearly for those who have been graduated for not more than
20 years;
d. £E80 yearly for those who have been graduated for more than 20 years.
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The basis for personal, marital and dependent reliefs are the same as in
the case of tax on wages and salaries, but with the exception of thos taxpayers
who chose to be assessed according to the fixed estimated tax.
B, The General Income Tax,
This tax was levied in 1949 to supplement the Scheduler Taxes. It is
Imposed on the total income of all Egyptians wherever they are domiciled, and on
foreigners domiciled in Egypt, even if their inc me is derived from foreign
sources. But foreigners who are not domiciled in Egypt, they are only liable
to the tax on that part of their income accruing within Egypt, The tax is
levied on the total net annual income received by the taxpayer during the
previous year. Thus the income is calculated on the revenue of real estate,
movable property, professions, salaries and the like. The determination of
the revenue of teal property, whether buildings or agricultural land, may be
fixed on the basis of the estimated rental value after deducting 20> in respect
of all expenses, or on the basis of the actual revenue received, as the taxpayer
may choose. The retraining items of income are determined according to the rules
prescribed for payment of the specific tax on each of them.
The law has exempted from the tax all members of Diplomatic and Consular
Corps on condition that reciprocity is regarded, and within the sphere of this
reciprocity. It also exempts foreign experts and technicians residing in Egypt
with regard to that part of their income accruing from foreign sources.
Special allowances for dependents and wife are provided in the law over and
above other allowances granted tinder the Schedule Income Taxes, The tax is
levied on all net incomes above J0B1,000 at a progressive rate reaching 80^ on
annual incomes nore than <££50,000.
Other Direct Taxes Levied on Income,
1, Excess Profits Tax.
In 1941 Egypt imposed a tax on the Excess Profits in order to fight the
inflation and to have its share from windfall gains realized and caused by the
break of the war. It was in the Belgian model, and charged on profits exceeding
a standard amount of the pre-war level or equal to 12$ of the income actually-
invested. The principle of progressions was applied and the rate ranged between
20% on the excess profits not exceeding a quarter of the basic figure, and 50%.-
on the excess profits exceeding one half of the basic figure. Two years later
the rates were increased reaching 75^ of the part of the excess profits over
three quarters of the basic amount.
The Excess Profits Tax was repealed in 1950 after being in operation for
exactly ten years during which time it suppli d an adequate yield to the Treasury.
2, Additional Taxes on Income Levied for Specific Organisations.
a) An add tional tax is levied on income derived from;-
Comiiereial and Industrial Profits and Immovable Property for Municipalities and
Sural Councils,
b) An additional tax levied on all sources of income for defence, This
tax is imposed on income derived from agricultural land, buildings at a rate of
3and respectively computed on annual rental value of the asset; or income
derived from movable property, industrial and comnercial profits, non-commercial
professions at a rate of 3g5? and, on wages, salaries and the like at a rate of 1%
on the first £E500 and 2%o on income bracket over £E500» The rules and regulations
determining the net taxable income fire those applied in the case of Scheduler Taxes.
This tax is also levied on the global income subject to the General Income Tax at a
progressive rate ranging from 2% on the first ,£E2,500 subject to General Income Tax
up to iQjfc on the income brackets above ££30,000.
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CHAFTVP. III
The Income Tax ;,s a Ucvonue-ftaiaer
1. Introduction
The rise of modern States has been accompanied by an increase in the number
of public functions and the more extensive and elaborate performance of thoso
functions# The functions of the State depend upon the stage of socio-economic
development and the prevailing social philosophy#
Public welfare was and is still the basic tar et of almost every modern
State. analysis of the functions of modern States will indicate the
development of the following services for public welfares (1) public a fcty,
both external and internal, (2) justice, (3) the regulation and control of
economic enterprise, (4) the promotion of social and cultural welfare, through
education, social relief, social insurance, health control, and other objectives,
(5) the conservation of natural resources, (6) and the ad inistration of
government financial systems, or expenditure, revenues, and fiscal control#"'
The expansion of the contenspsirsry State in raklertaking and performing the
Various unlimited services, if compared with that in medieval times, necessitated
a large source of revenues to finance such services# Governments usually prefer
a current find permanent source of revenue to cover current public expenditure#
On the other hand alternative sources of revenue could be easily utilised in
order to supply the Treaswy with the needed funds if such current source of
revenue failed to meet the State requisites. Taxes hove been long accepted
by most societies as a permanent and convenient source of revenue devised to
meet the current public eaqpte^iture. Public loans, internal and external,
are other alternative methods of raising revenue to support public e penciltore#
1# U#K# Hicks, "The Search for hevenue in Underdeveloped Countries", Gevenuo
de Science ct fle I.eidLolation Finoncieres. 1992
Borrowing has become a very important method, in securing funds to meet temporary
excesses of expenses over inco ,e and to finance public works, wars, and other
undertakings. One of the most significant developments in government borrowing
lias been its persistent increase. Several factors have contributed to the
growth of public debts. The great bulk of public indebtedness may be attributed
to war and public works. After the nations learned the art or financing wars
with loans, they soon acquired the habit of financing public works and other
costly services largely by borrowing.
The use of credit ha3 also been invited because there has often been less
public resistance to borrowing in the financing of an expenditure than to
immediate tax increases. The eventual repayment of a loan out of tax
collections is f're uently so remote as to be of little immediate concern to the
taxpayers. But nevertheless an ample amount of tax revenue has to be in hand
to pay the debt expenses at least if not in redeeming the debt itself.
As to the relative share of taxation and government borrowing in the fiscal
structure, few general principles can be stated. Taxation should at least
cover current expenditure on norra&l government services. Borrowing is
particularly appropriate to finance government expenditure which results in
the creation of capital assets or which is otherwise directly productive.
Experience varies as to the relative degree of control over expenditure from
proceeds of taxation, as compared with expenditure of borrowed money. In some
countries, it has been found that borrowed money is more carefully and efficiently
spent than tax money. In so far as borrowing is restored to, proper techniques
of efficient debt management may become an important factor in lowering costs
of financing economic development.
1, P,A. Van Philips, Public Finance and Less Developed Economy with Reference to
to Latm America, pp. 100-111
Taxe3, direct arid indirect, were devised as an important revenue-raiser
re uired to meet the necessary cur ent expenditure, and to secure the general
credit of the government. Upon the power to tax the ability of overnments
to maintain their credit ultimately depends. Hence more taxable capacity
means credit capacity,
Within a developed economy the government finds it easy to borrow from
the public. This is due to the highly developed money markets and the
banking institutions in particular. The contrast could be easily emphasised
about an underdeveloped economy where money markets are imperfect and credit
institutions are in a low standard. Also any credit policy lias to be carefully
studied taking into consideration the low rate of saving which is a well known
characteristic of a subsistence economy.
Income taxation has developed and become one of the fundamental sources
of revenue especially in highly developed economies such as in Britain and the
U.S.A. Egypt as a less-developed country does depend mostly on indirect
taxation in raising revenue as income taxation is not fully developed. This
chapter is a study of the role of t e Egyptian income taxes as revenue-raiser.
A short comparison of tax revenues especially income taxes in developed and less-
developed countries will take place as an introduction for the forthcoming
analysis.
II* Income Taxes as a Revenue-Raiser in a Less-Developed Economy;^
Taxation has been the main resource of public revenue besides other resources
such as the revenue from the government domain, public enterprises and other fees
1. A less developed economy a3 compared to a developed one could be defined accord¬
ing to the U.N. definition in its Report on "The Development of underdeveloped
Countries" as "countries which per capita real income is low when compared with the
per capita real income in the U.S.A. and Canada ... ar.d Western Europe .../
end donations# Direct as well ©b indirect taxes oo-operate in sup lying the
Troaaury with revenue, but mostly in different proportions. She reliance on
direct or on indirect taxes differs from one country to the other depending
primarily on the structure of the economy* In moat less-developed countries
indirect taxes supply a lar;® proportion of revenue while direct taxes are
considered a low revenue-raiser* Custom duties and excises ore the principle
sources of revenue in less-developed countries* iixport taxes in primary product
producin countries are highly developed and nowadays form a major source of
revenue to governments* Before the Second World War export taxes were not
rolled upon in underdeveloped countries as well as in developed countries bemuse
the then widespread belief in free trade and the 1S30's depression which resulted in
a sharp decrease in the primary products prices* ^
During and after the Second orld War, an ©norm us pressure was concentrated
2
upon public expenditure of the less-dcvelolod countries due to the folio ingi
footnote contimed from previous p.agc*-
In this sense , an ade uate synonym would be poor countries% This definition represents
only one of the characteristics of the underdeveloped countries and therefore it seems
insufficient for the purpose of real income is not an accurate moans of oooparison as
some countries enjoy high per capita real income and are still considered underdeveloped,
vis* Kuweit* A single and comprehensive definition of the less-developed countries could
be reached through enumerating the major character! sties of these countries} they are*
1) Low per capita income due to low productivity ami the scarcity of capital#
2) Low rate of savings and hence:, investment resulting from low income,
3) Imperfections in the market such as immobility factor, price rigidity,
Ignorance of market conditions ••• etc#
4) Lad; of entrepreneurial ability and business administration*
5) The large gaps in the distribution of i. come an' wealth*
6) The r ates of tax to national ncorns is low. It is between 10, and If)/' in less-
developed countries and 30- and 40$ in developed countries*
1* U#K, Hides, op# cit#
2* U.K. Hicks, op .-it.
Source: U.N. Statistical Yearbooks, 1950, 1952, 19570
table 9
Income Tax Receipts in percentage of Total Tax Receipts, Total Government Revenue and of National Income Years 1939 or 1940
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U.N. Statistical ^National income estimated by M.A, Amis, A Study of the National Income of Egypt, Ph.D.,
YpnrhnnV 1QRD Thesis, University of London, 1950. , , „ „T n ™
no iea^DOOK, ^ Economic Department in the Middle East, 1956/1957. The original source is the National Planning1952, 1yDl» Commission of Egypt.
^ ^
/ Direct Taxes on income and wealth. // No informtion is available before 1948.
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1) The increase in the cost of administration which is largely in money
terms but if considered against the rigidity of the tax structure the cost is
real# ■*"*
2) Difficulties in borrowing, due to the imperfection of capital market
and low rate of savings.
3) The sharp increase in social and economic expenditure due to the
Second World War.
These three phenomenon are widespread in most of the less-developed countries.
To complete the foregoing discussion, it is highly desirable to illustrate
the role of taxation, direct versus indirect, as revenue raisers in both developed,
and underdeveloped economies. Various countries have been chosen as a sairple at
2
random for the illustration. * For comparative reasons the following table
(Table 9) embraces one highly developed country, U.K., and seven underdeveloped
countries including Egypt. (Emphasis is given to direct taxes on income.)
The basic characteristic which could be observed from the above mentioned
table is that in underdeveloped countries income taxes ratio to national income
(at factor cost) is relatively very small if compared with a highly developed
country such as U.K. Income taxes, as a general rule, became an important
source of revenue and has developed widely since the 1930's. This situation
applies to both developed and underdeveloped countries. Before the Second
World War income taxation was of minor importance as a source of revenue in
underdeveloped areas. Various countries, especially Egypt, did not introduce
income taxation until later years of the 1930's and the first years of the War.
1. Inflation increases prices, but at the same time, the rigidity of the tax
system cannot increase the tax revenue at the same rate.
2. The choice of these countries are based on the availability of date converning
income taxation.
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On the other hand taxation in general in underdeveloped countries represents a
ratio which lies between 3% to 1S£ of the national income. In advanced economy
this ratio varies from 23?« to Direct taxes, especially taxes on income,
represents a smaller proportion of the total tax receipts in underdeveloped
countries, while taxes constitute a bigger proportion. This is due to the
low income per capita and mal a dministration of taxation which is of an over¬
whelming feature of a less-developed economy. The dependence of less-developed
countries on indirect taxes as an important source of revenue cannot be disputed.
The main reason is the convenience and the relative efficiency in the assessment
and collection of indirect taxes especially import and export taxes. Less-
developed countries have also sought refuge in income taxes for social and
economic as well as political reasons. The need for revenue to meet the
increasing public expenditure, either for current expenses or capital formation
and development necessitated the introduction of income taxation during the last
thirty years. Political and social motivations depending on the doctrine of
equity were an important stimulant for adopting and enforcing income taxation in
such relatively poor communities.
It was apparent when poor countries first introduced income taxes that the
revenue from these levies would be of snail amounts due to various factors
mentioned above, viz. poor system of administration, low income per capita.
Through time income taxes proved to be an important source of revenue in those
countries even with the existence of corruption and poor administration. Talcing
Egypt as an example in the first year of the introduction of income taxes, 1939,
income tax receipts were negligible, l»0£j$ of total government receipts and
1.55S of total tax receipts. The ratio to national income was 0.23/5 for 1939*
Later in 1950 income taxes produced about 10,of total government receipts and
14-»l/t of total tax receipts while its ratio to gross national income increased to
2.1$5.
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Such increase in income tax revenue is of considerable importance if we take into
consideration the relatively short period of its function,, almost 10 years (1939-
1950), In recent years, in 1956 and 1957, income taxe3 produced about 9,2-5 and
10.5/' of total government receipts respectively. The participation of the
Egyptian income taxes in aggregate public revenue is low compared to the situation
in other underdeveloped countries. From the data provided in Table 9 the average
percentage of income tax revenue to total government receipts in most selected
underdeveloped countries lies between 14/2,as the case in Greece, find 33/2, as in
Chile. Countries such as Venezuela where natural resources i.e. oil, participate
with a big percentage to the national product, royalties are considered as the major
source of revenue to the Treasury. In the case of Venezuela it is about 30}l of total
public receipts, while income tax contributes on average about 20/."" Other
countries which are basicly producing primary products levy export taxes on their
major products directly or indirectly through tax on income derived from dealing in
the primary products such as the case in some of the Latin American countries, namely
3
Cuba, El-Saivador, Brazil and others. Egypt levies an export tax on cotton and
rice, but generally speaking, the revenue derived from such tax could be considered
as of a very small percentage to total tax receipts. It is estimated that total
export taxes will supply about £E7« 3 million during the financial year 1958/59 > or
about 1$ of total estimated tax revenue.^
The general trend of the income tax after the end of the Second World War in
less-developed countries shows a steady increase if compared to the pre-war period.
The ratio of income tax receipts of total revenue, as previously mentioned has
doubled and multiplied since 1939, although the significance of indirect taxes
1. Statistical Pocket-Year Book, Egypt, 1957 (in Arabic).
2. U.N., Statistical Yearbook 1957, p. 532.
3. In Cuba there is a tax on the sugar mills, on its production, Coffee tax is levied
on income derived from growing and trading in coffee in El-Salvador, in lieu of
income taxes.
1 for* the vear 1958/59. Ministry of Treasury, Southern Begion,
especially customs and excises preserved its position as an important source of
revenue to the Treasury.
111. The Egyptian Income Taxes as a Revenue-Raiser durin;; Two Decades:
(A) Relative Revenue Importance. Income taxation has been in force
for almost two decades during which is ha3 supplied about 1C$> of the aggregate
1
public revenue and about 16,: of total tax yield in the average.
Indirect taxes, especially customs duties and excise, were the major components
of the total tax yield. The proportion of these taxes to total tax receipts was
ab ut in the average. This percentage decreased during the War period due
to the shortage of imported goods. This phenomenon could be simply deduced if
we conpare the yield of direct taxes to the total tax yield during the War years
O
especially 1942 to 1945, with post-war period. In general, indirect taxation
composes about two thirds of total tax revenue. The fact that indirect taxes
supply a major part of public revenue in Egypt is also a common and vddespread fact
in most underdeveloped countries, while income taxation is still in a developing
stage.
When a new tax is imposed it is always expected that its yield would be below
the normal level if both the taxpayers and the administrative body were unfamiliar
with the tax. This was the case in Egypt during the first five years of the income
tax imposition.^ The tax raised small sums during the first five years a3 the
whole structure of the country was unprepared to accept such new taxation vMch
penetrates into most of the individual's affairs. This state of affairs resulted
in the accumulation of back, as ess ents which the administration has not yet
4
recovered.
1. See Table 10 and Figure 1.
2. Conpare column (2) with column (3) of Table 10.
3. This does not mean that after the first five years both the taxpayers as well as the
tax administration were in complete co-operation and full understanding of the tax.
The contrarv could still be said at aresent in a moderate sense-
4. This point will be elaborated later when discussing the effect of administration on
the yield.
TABLE 10
The trend of the Egyptian Income Taxes in relation to Direct Taxes,





























0.4 7.07 26.18 37.62 5.6 1.5 1.06
1940 2.69 9.06 27.60 39.40 29.6 9.9 6.8
1941 2*05 9.71 26.26 43.68 21.1 7.8 4.6
1942 3.76 11.29 33.22 56.33 33.3 11.3 6.6
194-3 11 .34 18.98 42.46 67.14 59.7 26.5 16.8
1944 14 .05 21.16 48.05 77.77 66.3 ' 29.9 18.0
1945 13 .44 21.04 56.51 87.73 63.8 23.7 15.3
1946 14 .20 22.33 70.23 103.50 63.5 20.2 13.7
1947 13 .18 21.24 77.03 109.96 62.0 17.1 11.9
1948 11 .08 13.42 71.81 98.93 60,1 15.4 11.1
I 1949 17.72 23.20 106.37 142.48 76.3 16.6 12.4
1 1950 16 .52 24.76 121.27 153.54 66.7 13.6 10.4
1951 16 .69 28.79 ia.89 191.80 57.9 13.6 8.7
1952 22. 94 43.42 136.12 204.07 52.3 16.8 11.8
1953 23. 03 46.40 130.96 198.14 49.7 17.6 11.6
1954 20 .33 42.06 144.70 206.37 47*8 13.9 9.7
1955 20 .0 39.80 141.71 219.71 50.2 14.1 9.1
1956 23.63 47.45 154.99 267.50 49.9 15.2 8.8
j 1957 26.35 47.69 139.05 240.43 56.5 19.3 U.2
1953 E 26. 35 61.15 175.39 300.50 43.0 15.0 8.7
1959 E
_1
23 . 71 61.09 168.41 366.36
, ,| ■ I-H-- .
46.9 17.0 7.2
El budget estimates
1* Taxes on income include: Scheduler income tax of 19391 Excess Profits Tax levied
in 1941} and the General Income Tax of 194-9*
2, Direct taxes include: taxes on income, taxes on land t nd buildings, stamp duties
succession and estate duties*
3. The fiscal year is 10 months, started 1st May 194-7 to 29 Fob. 1948*
Sources: U.N., Public Finance Information Papers, Egypt, 1951} U.N. Statistical
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Income taxes as percentage of direct taxes.
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" " i " total tax receipts.
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Later in 1943 the yield of income taxation started to rise steadily#
This was primarily due to the introduction of the Excess Profits Tax in 1942#
B ring the first full year of the Excess Profits Tax, year 194^43» it yielded
£E5»55ku nearly the same amount the Scheduler income tax yieldeds s£E5»79eu
The steady increase in tho Schodular income tax oould he attributed simply to
the partial efficiency aoQuired by the adminlatr&tion as well as to the
increase in the tax rate and to the collection of a fraction of arrears#
Another fact was that prices and subsequently profits had sharply increased due
to the inflationary pressure prevailed during the War period and also during
the post-war years# From Table 10 the yield of income taxes during the
fiscal year ending in 1949 was relatively higher as the rate of change was
about 49/ compared to the previous year# The basic reasons behind this
apparent increase was the ©nployment of about 600 new tax officials curing
the fiscal year of 1947/48.^"
Another sharp increase in the revenue- was realised in 1932 which was
caused by the introduction and full implementation of the new tax global
income which came into being in 1949 but its fruits were available in relatively
considerable sun© in 1931/52J its yield during t at year was JCE3.6 million
2
compared to £EL,4 million.
In the fiscal year 1953/54 a decrease in income taxes and revenue was
observed as it dropped about £E3m# if compared to the previous year. Such
a decrease was apparent in the yield of the General income tax due to the
enforcement of the Land Reform introduced later in 1932 and its effect was
felt especially on landowners in later years especially in t e fiscf.il year
1# -Total tax officials cnoloyed in that year was 1823 compared to 1233 in the
provio s year 1946/47»
2, Statistical Pocket year-boo , 1954, Table 48, p# 63«
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1953/54- up to 1955/56; during this period the G-.I.T. yield was at a standstill in
the limits of JJE3nw
The general trend of the income taxes revenue importance if compared to total
receipts^ could be easily identified as decreasing in spite of the general steady-
increase in the income taxes yield. The trend will reach its lowest point in 1958/59
(Budget Estimates) at 7.2/. Nevertheless, it is not quite astonishing to find such
contradiction, an increase in income taxes yield acc mpanied by a decrease in the
proportion to the aggregate receipts. The analysis of the revenue items shows
that the sharp increase in the receipts during the last five years could be
attributed to the increase in the property taxes yield due to the increase in the
Building Tax rates since 1956; the increase in the yield being about £232m. More¬
over, the Revolutionary Government, following a planned economy policy, made the
Government receipts from public undertakings to increase, due to the increase
in the share of the Government in many enterprises. On the other hard, the
increase in other receipts paid in return for public services and goods undertaken
semi-autonomous organisations provides an artificial increase in the aggregate
revenue. This fact is due to the accounting methods applied in formulating and
preparing the Budget. The total receipts of these organisations are included
within the items of the different receipts while the expenditures occurred by such
organisations are classified under the Government expenditures. The result is in
fact a superficial increase in both receipts and expenditures. Therefore, the
ratio of income tax yield to total receipts as shown in Table 10 is actually higher
for the last two years. Consequently it could just as easily be agreed that it has
been constant during the post-war period.
1. See Table 10 and Figure 1.
\
Various faots could be deduced from the foregoing analysis which have caused
the yield from income taxes to increase} a) the relative increase in the efficiency
of administration due either to the increase in the number of employed personnel or
to the continuous increase in their capacity to assess and collect the taxes; b) the
increase in the tax rate (discussed later) even it might not have a direct effect on
the following year's yield; c) the introduction of a new tax, such as the General
Income Tax, or the Excess Profits Tax, but on the other hand, the abolition of the
Excess Profits Tax in 1950 caused a loss of about £E5m. in the average which was
compensated by the yield of the General Income Tax and the collection of a considerable
percentage of Scheduler Income Tax arrears.
(B) The Flexibility of the Income Tax:
The reaction of the tax revenues to fluctuations in national income is an
important phenomenon to the Government. In a depression, revenues are, of course
bound to shrink, and in prosperity they are very likely to increase, but the magnitude
of these fluctuations in revenues can be anticipated only on the basis of detailed
analysis.
Income taxation, personal and business, are easily affected by the fluctuations
in the national income if compared vdth rigid and inflexible taxes such as a property
tax levied on the rentals value fixed periodically."'" A progressive income tax is
bound to be more sensitive to fluctuations of national income due to its built-in
1. This is the case in Egypt regarding the land tax where the rental value is estimated
every ten years. The last estimate of the whole country's agrarian land took place
in 1948-49. This means that the previous estimation was carried according to
agricultural products prices prevailing in 1958-39, just before the War. Therefore
the land tax lagged behind the shar} increases in crop prices especially cotton and
wheat. Total revenue loss from tie land tax could be estimated at £$m, yearly for
ten years, a total of about £E90m.
/ X-
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flexibility if compared to a proportional one*' The degree of flexibility is, therefore,
greater in a progressive tax than in a proportional tax.
The Egyptian income tax system during its first decade of performance was of a
proportional nature with the exception of a Schedular tax on wages and salaries.
Later in 191-9 when the General Income Tax was first imposed the whole structure of
the tax gained a farily small rate of progression. Beftre discussing the built-in
flexibility of the Egyptian income tax a few words have to be said about the different
types of cyclical flexibility of any tax in general.
The measurement of the cyclical flexibility of the tax revenue is a difficult
if not hazardous task, especially in underdeveloped countries where data concerning
the national income and the assessment and collection of the tax is scarce and yet if
handy it is mostly unreliable because of inaccurate estimation. On the other hand
maladministration of the tax system implies a great problem in calculating the proper
tax collections concerning a speoific year. This is due mainly to the fluctuating
collections of arrears.
Two separate aspects are involved in the measurement of the tax flexibility:
l) the flexibility that consists in the capacity of revenues to fluctuate in response
to a fluctuating national income at existing tax rates, which technically is referred
to as the "built-in-flexibility" of the tax systems, and 2) the flexibility that
consistsin the capacity of the tax rates to be modified, with a greater or less ease,
1. Built-in flexibility is frequently referred to as to denote the relationship between
tax collections and other economic variables, particularly money expenditures. Witt
built-in flexibility in the tax system, a pound change in national income results in
less than a pound change in disposable income. A personal tax with a flat rate of
2Q$ providing no exceptions increases the tax liability by £200 if income increases
by £1000 and thus to a net increasec£ £800 in the taxpayers1s disposable income.
See O.H. Brownlee and E.D. Allen, Economics of r*ublic Finance, 1954, pp. 73-75.
o
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by the action of the administrative and. of the legislative apparatus, within the
generally stable framework of the revenue system. Shis second conception may be
called, for simplicity, the "administrative flexibility".
In the past considerable emphasis has been placed upon the desirability
of revenue stability which denotes the relative absence of flexibility. The
purpose, at that time, was to protect the governments against the arbitrary
imposition of high tax burdens. In recent years, however, a different concept
has gained ground, particularly in industrialised countries, which favoiir built-
in-flexibility as a means of compensating fluctuations in national income. If
public expenditures are kept reasonably constant, a tax system with built-in-
flexibility 'will produce a surplus during prosperity which serves to check the boom,
and a deficit in the depression which could be expected to stimulate the lagging
activity,
In order to study the "built-in-flexibility" of the Egyptian income tax, it is
necessary to observe actual fluctuations in revenues and to the extent they are the
result of administrative and legislative changes in rates, to eliminate the effects of
such changes,
1. R. Musgrave and M. Miller discussed the role of the "built-in-flexibility" of taxes
in a compensatory fiscal policy. The main essence of the argument is that the"built-in
flexibility" is an important factor in maintaining stability over the long run if taxes
in general, take a large proportion of the national income. See: The American Economic
Association, Readings in Fiscal Policy, pp. 379 - 386.
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Therefore, it is possible to establish the relation between national income and the
yield at constant tax rates* The period for which data is partially available, i.e.
the income tax yield, for studying the built-in-flexibility of the Egyptian system,
covering the years 1939-1957 is one of almost constantly rising prices. This data
therefore perrait an analysis of only one phase of the cyclical trend, the phase of
expansion. One cannot say with assurance that during a contraction precisely the
same tendencies would be felt in reverse.
It is difficult to measure the "bui]t-in-flexibility" of the Egyptian income tax
due to the lack of accurate data concerning the actual tax collections of the various
years. But on the other hand, one could measure -what we can call "over-all-flexibility",
which includes changes in tax rates as well as the introduction of new taxes on income.
Table 11 is an attempt to reach such an objective. The data for the years 1939 and
1945 were included just for illustration as the structure of tax systems in 1939 differs
from that of 1945 and both from the tax in existance at 1950. But since 1950 we could
consider that the income tax system is relatively stable. In other words, no new taxes
have been levied on income since; while the Excess Profits Tax was abolished in that year.
Income Tax rate3, Scheduler and General, have been increased during the 1950-1954 period.
The ratio of the income tax to the national income (col. 16), Table 11)
fluctuates within two limits; as a maximum and 2.4^ as a minimum. To be more
precise we have to concentrate on the 1950-1954 period where the income tax structure
was constant, (rate changes are taken into account), and tisu3 the range of fluctuation
is limited between 2*$$s and 2»i$»
1 The various types of data either concerning national income or the income tax
in earlier years, e.g. 1939/50, could be only considered as "guesstimates". The
Division of Statistics in the Taxation Depart ent wa.3 established in 1952 and
started its real job later in 1953* From my experience in this Department one
could say that the only and most accurate data which is produced by the Departsen
is that concerning tax collect! ns. This is due to the severe auditinr svstem
provided/
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Remarka:( )Column4showstheadjustedyieldfinco et xb sfivy arav ge.T i methodofcalculationisbasenthassumptiont txa s ssme ti el tifivy ars (Statutelimi a ion)andthereforehexli sobass ssedbefoi ff fthy ar;v z. tocomputeheaxf r1950wein ludaty arandtff llowingrsdt kave age.I believethatisisemostconvenientandlog calw yfl ulatingthxtu lcollection (col.12)d esincludetaxespaidnbelialffth rreviousy ar .Iisv ydiff cultd almostimpossibletfiguruthexcoll ct drin omefp cificy aranod r available.Th sisduetotlackfassessmentsndl d-:tar gardingrre ri assessmentforeachy ar.Col.(3)icalculatedbyubstractingol.2frcndcdi g theadjust©!yi ldofIncomeTax(c l.4)(b)Estimatesofthnationalincomerabs ract dfr :M.Anis,"AStu yfthNa alI co e ofEgypt,"Ph.D.T esis,UniversityfL ndon,1950. Sources:U.N.StatisticalYearBooks,195027?PublicFinanceInform tionapers,Egypt1J EgyptianBudgetRepor s,1957/58cud1 58/59;StatisticalPocketYe r-Books.
This ratio could be considered as fairly constant, and this means, in absolute terms,
that cGanges in income tax revenue have responded to the changes in national income.
In order to test audi an outright judgment one has to calculate the rate of cliange
of the income tax revenue and compare it with the rate of change of the national
income. Comparing col. (7) with col. (9), Table 11, we find that when the national
income changes at a rate of 200 for 1945, the income tax changes at a rate less than
that of tiie national income, 176 for the same year. This phenomenon is observed
in almost every year vdth the exception of 1952 where the national income decreased
1
while the income tax receipts increased.
(c) The administrative flexibility of the income tax:
The "administrative flexibility" of the tax is main;y caused by the changes in the
tax rates and the changes in the efficiency of the ad inistrative machinery of the
tax system. The reaction of the tax yield to the change in the rates, i.e. the
relationship between the rate changes and Hie yield, measures the "administrative
2
flexibility. The rates of the Schedular income tax are of three basic categories:
l) A proportional rate for the tax on immovable poverty and for the tax on commercial
and industrial profits.
footnote continued from previous page 70:
provided by the Accounting Department of the Treasury and also by the Audit Court.
Other data produced by the Department is mostly rnenufactures and based on aggregation
of partial data. For example, if we wanted to know the uncollected taxes at a certain
time it would be impossible to provide the accurate figure, as up till now the Taxation
Department does not keep individual accounts for each taxpayer showing the amount of tax
assessed and that collected every year and the balance unpaid.
1. The decrease in national income was mainly in the Business sector, especially in
agriculture where the drop amounted to £E78m. This drop is basicly due to the fall in
cotton prices in 1952 and to the political disturbances of that year. This fall in the
agricultural sector did not affect the yields of Income tax as agricultural profits are
immuned from the tax and that the inelastic land tax is the only tax on agricultural land
which was unaffected by this decrease, (Land tax rates are constant for 10 years).
For the classification of the national income see: U.N., Statistics of National Income
and expenditure. 1957.
2. The degree of ease or difficulty with which the tax rates can be adjusted could be
described,as above mentioned, as "administrative flexibility ". The terra is used in this
context to denote the responsiveness or elasticity of the income tax vita respect to
given amounts of legislative as well as administrative pressure.
I c.
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The rate has beer: alxmys the same for both Scheduler Taxes. As a temporary measure
the rate applicable to the above Schedule was f/o for the year 1933 (1.5.38 to
31.12.38) and for 1939* The tax was increased to 1C$ from the beginning of 1940.
Later in 1942 the rats was increased for the second time to 12$ from the beginning
1
of that year. Eight years later, in 1950, the rate was increased for the third
p
time within a period of ten years to ll$>t effective from 1.1.50. The rate became
-z
17$ in 1952 and is still at that level up till the present day, 2) A progressive
rate applicable to inco ae derived from wages and salaries, starting at 2$ on trie
first taxable amount to SE120 and graduating to 7/s on annual income over £E1200.^
The rates were subject to a change in upper brackets in 1950 where the rates on
5 \
income above £E800 were increased. 3) A flat rate of 7.5$ on the rental value
of the practice place of the individual deriving his income from non-commercial
professions. The basis of calculating the tax was c3ianged in 1951 and the net
income became the taxable base. The rate was then 10$ on the net income effective
from 1.1.51, In 1952 the rate was increased to 11$.
The general income tax progressive rates were increased in 1952 especially
with a higher degreein the upper income brackets.
Fron the foregoing survey of the basic ohjjnges in the rates of the Egyptian
income tax system we find it difficult to follow its effect in
1. Law No. 19 of 1942.
2. Law No. 146 of 1950.
3. The rate was increased to 16$ in 1951 by Law No, 174 of 1951 and. to 17/', the
present rate by Law No. 147 of 1952.
4. The rates are; 2$ on the first £35120, 3$ on the second £E180, 4 on the
following £E200 , 5$ on the following £E300 , 6$ on the following £E400 and 7$ on
income over CF.1200,
5. It became 7$ instead of 6$ and 9$ insted of 7$ on annual income above £E1200.
6. Basic changes occurred in 1955 concerning the choice of two ways in assessing
the tax. See appendix to Part 1.
1 4
money terms, on the yield. This difficulty arises from the great diversity of the
rates in force and s all time lags between the various changes. The tax yield in
a specific year could not be recognised as the actual yield for that year, as I have
mentioned above, for the huge percentage of arrears and the difficulty of attributing
any increase to the change in the tax rate only as there are other factors which affect
the yield. These factors are mainly related to the increase in the administrative
efficiency of the tax system.
P. The effect of income tax flexibility on t e tax system ar, a whole:
Daring World War II the Egyptian income taxes receipts increased gradually in
money terms. The ratio of incoxe taxes to total tax yield increased at the same time.
1
Prom Table 10 the ratio was 9»9^ in 1940 and increased to 29.9^- in 1944. This propor¬
tion decreased after the War mainly due to the increase in import duties and partially
to the relative decrease in business profits. Income taxes are considered one of the
most flexible taxes which introduce a high degree of "overall-flexibility" to the tax
system. This is basically caused by the fluctuations in money as well as in real
incomes and profits subject to tax. While this phenomenon is c;early observed in
any income tax, either proportional or progressive, the reverse could be said when
considering the flexibility of property taxes based on the rental value. However,
custom duties and excise tax are liable to direct government control on the quantity
as well as the quality of imported goods which in turn will have a direct affect on
import taxes yield on the assumption that the rates are constant.
In underdeveloped countries where indirect taxes, especially customs and excise,
compose most of the aggregate tax yield, any moderate change in the yield of income
taxes will have a small effect on the aggregate tax yield. An increase of &7f<- in
income tax yield as in 1942 is reflected by an increa e in the total tax yield by
1. Page
12.
The Yearly Rate of Change in Incor.,e Tax. Direct Taxes,











































1939 - mm 5.6 mm 1.5 1950 -1 \ 7 66.7 14 13.6
194C 570 28 29.6 6 9.9 1951 1 x 16 57.9 0.5 13.6
1941 -24 7 21.1 -5 7.4 1952 38 50 52.0 12 16.8
1942 83 16 33.3 27 11,3 1953 0.7 7\-5
49.7 wl 17.6
1943 202 68 59.7 27 26.5 1954 -13 47.8 10 13.9
1944 24 11 66.3 12 29.9 1955 —0.6 -5 50.2 ~2 14.1
1945 —4 —0.6 63.8 18 23.7 1956 18 19 49.9 9 15.2
1946 6 6 63.5 24 20.2 1957 13 0.6 56.5 -10 19.3
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Source: Table 9»
? 6
27/5 only.1 On the other hand an annual decrease of 24/' in the income tax yield of
1941 had a moderate effect on the rate of change of the total tax receipts of the same
year; 5$. While this phenomenon is observed in many years (Table 12), another
contrasting phenomenon is apparent. In various years, such as in 1945» 1947, 1954
and 1957 there had been an annual decrease in the income tax receipts while the rate
of change in the aggregate tax yield was positive.
The general conclusion we can derive from the foregoing analysis is that income
taxes in Egypt so far had a minor effect on the flexibility of the tax system as a
whole from the yield point of view. This, as above mentioned, is due to the depend¬
ency of the country's fiscal system on indirect taxation, i.e. customs and excise
taxes, more than on income taxes and direct taxation. Nevertheless, the yield from
the income taxes has increased more than that of any other tax, especially during the
2
War period and also in the early 1950's. This is partly a re.ult of the progressive
character of the tax, especially after 1949 when the General Income Tax was introduced
in t -e income tax system, and the increasing number of persons who hive become subject
to the tax as money incomes have risen while the exemption limit remained constant
during the whole life of the income tax. It is, howeve , also due to the greater share
of profits in the national inco-e, and to the few important reform's in the tax adminis¬
tration.
E. Factors Affecting the Yield.
The e are various and diversified factors which affect the amount yielded through
1. See Table 12.
2. This does not exclude the fact that the income tax: yield has decreased in some
years while other taxes yield increased. We are only emphasising the general
outlook of the trend in the various taxes yield. See Tables 9 and 12.
income taxation. Considering the effects of such factors on the tax yield we could
reach the optimum efficiency in the enforcement of the income tax system leaving for
the time being the other criteria of efficiency such as economic and social efficiency
which will be subject to later discussion.
Therefore our main object now is to elaborate and shed some light on the
administrative and partly legislative factors which are closely related to efficiency
of the income tax system as a revenue-raiser.*
The study of these factors is discussed un er three headings, these are:
(l) Factors related basically to administrative efficiency, such as: the assessment
of arrears, the existing capacity of the administrative power to meet the gradual
increase in the number of taxpayers, and the analysis of the cost of tax assessment
and collection compared to V e actual yield {the maxim of economy); (2) the lack of
tax consciousness as in most underdeveloped countries; (3) the widespread illiteracy
and also the lack of book-keeping.
Tax evasion and its effect on the efficiency of the tax as a revenue-raiser is
considered in less-developed economies mainly as an administrative problem due to
the immaturity of the tax consciousness and tax compliance.
(1) Administrative factors:
It is very important to the Treasury to prepare an adequate and well organised
administrative machinery when introducing a new tax. In most underdeveloped countries
1. What is meant here by partly legislative factors are those loopholes found in the
tax legislation which affect the proper assessment and collection of the tax and
hence stimulate legal evasion, i.e. avoidance. Other legislative aspects of the
tax which affect its economic and social efficiency will be discussed later when
discussing the equity concept and the role of the Income taxes in Egyptian fiscal
policy.
the standard of the government administration is low compared to that found in highly
developed countries. The deficiencies in the administrative body are mainly caused
by the widespread corruption and illiteracy of the majority of the population.
The Egyptian income tax administration suffers from many drawbacks which renders
the enforcement of the tax inadequate. The following is a brief analysis of the
Egyptian income tax administration. The basic object of the analysis is to elaborate
and illustrate the various immanent imperfectionsof the tax administration which affect
the tax yield directly and indirectly.
(a) The inadequacy of the assessment and collection machinery:
This results in the ever increasing number of accumulated arrears. In order to
give a clear picture of the existing deficiency in the tax assessment it is desirable
to state briefly the procedure in assessing and collecting income taxes.1
The procedure of assessing and collecting the various Scheduler Taxes differs
according to the Schedular tax. Firstly, the Scheduler Tax on immovable property is
assessed and collected at the source and, therefore, no administrative compile tions
are hardly involved. The banks and companies paying the dividends are responsible
for collecting the tax and paying it to the Treasury. Secondly, the Schedular tax
on commercial and industrial profits is considered the most complicated and difficult
to assess. The taxpayer has to submit Ms return to the Department three months after
the end of his financial year and has to pay the tax on the basis of his return a month
later; i.e. four months after the end of the financial year. Then the return is checked
by auditing the taxpayer's books. Later a notification of the proper taxable income is
sent to the taxpayer who h-s to pay the difference if there is any. If he does not
approve of the Department's assessment he has the right to appeal to a special commission
1. The Taxation Department is responsible for the enforcement and administration of
the following taxes: the Schedular Income Taxes of 1939, and the General Income
Tax of 1949, the Stamp Duties, the Estate and Succession Duties, and the Excess
Profits Tax which was repealed in 195G.
within the Department. Such appeal could be carried forward to Courts of First
Instance and also to the Appeal Court. This prolonged procedure resulted in the
accumulation of thousands of cases before the courts and, therefore, affected the
collection of enormous amounts of taxes."1 Thirdly, the tax on wages and salaries
is collected at source by the employer who is responsible for the tax payment.
Ouch responsibility does not free the employee from the liability; he also shares
the responsibility for paying the tax due on his total remunerations if bis employer
2
fails to collect the tax. Fourthly, the tax on non-commercial and liberal professions
is assessed on the net income. The taxpayer has to submit the tax returns before the
end of February and pay the tax accordingly not later than the end of 7 arch. In Case
of disagreement between the taxpayer and the Treasury, the taxpayer has the right to
appeal within the procedure above mentioned in the case of the Schedular Tax on
commercial and industrial profits. Finally, the General Income Tax is due at the end
of April while the submission of the return has to take place not later than the end
of iarch.
From the foregoing sv.vve, one co ..Id see the various and different procedures
followed in the assessment and the collection of the Schedular and the General, income
taxes which render the administration of these different taxes a difficult task to
begin with. In many cases the individual taxpayer is subject to three or : ore taxes
levied on his various sourc s of income plus the general Income Tax, if his income
exceeds £E1,0GG a year. This necessitates the filing of several returns and paying
1. The tax is not collected if the cane goes to Courts and the collection is legally
postponed pending a final decision.
2. The tax is collected mo thly but calculated on a yearly basis. There is a
similarity between the British P.A.Y.S. and the Egyptian Schedular Tax on
Salaries and Wages concerning the calculation of the tax.
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the tax at different tiir.es according to the rules and regulations of the various taxes
he is subject to.
On the other hand, from the Department of Taxation side every return is checked
and verified by a different tax inspector. The result is that co-ordination and
harmonization in assessing and collecting the various taxes imposed on a ce tain
individual's income are lacking. This deficiency is rnainl. due to the tax legislation,
but other administrative deficiencies could be recognised as the main cause behind
inefficient tax enforcement.
"Egypt's accumulated heritage may be described as a heterogeneous compound of too
much economic poverty, personalized government, centralized bureaucracy, inelastic
methods, irresponsible civil servants, nonfucctlonalization, diffused responsibilities,
noncreative task assignments, low production goal, uncoordinated supervision and
uneconomical office layouts This description of the features of the existing
tax administration has greatly influenced the enforcement of the tax system in general
and the income taxes in particular. The outcome has always been delay in assessment
and the accumulation of arrears. The following statistics offer illustration of this
2
point.
1. Quoted from the report on "Egyptian Taxation: the Tax System and its organization
and Mministration". by 0. F, Traylor, United Nations Public Finance Expert to the
Egyptian Government, August 1955, p. 92.
2. The main income taxes which cause a considerable difficulty in administration are:
the Schodular Tax on Commercial and Industrial Profits, the Schedular Tax on non¬
commercial professions, and the General Income Tax. The other Schedular Taxes
are basically collected at source.
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TABLE 15.
The I-ag in Assessment of various Income Taxes, 1951-1955 (Scheduler
Tax on Commercial and Industrial Profits, Schedule Tax on non¬
commercial professions, ami the General Income Tax).
(The situation as surveyed at 31/3/57)






















1951 376873 56475 15 20000 8819 44 35618 19932 56
1952 395144 89304 23 20233 10150 50 36069 23865 66
1953 399056 97431 24 20610 11083 54 36430 26342 72
1954 397038 100043 25 20927 12790 61 36425 29209 80
1955 414176 394638 95 20915 17441 83 37456 34236 91
Source; Audit Court, Report on the Egyptian Gov rnmont Final Accounts
for the Foscal Year 1954/55 (in Arabic).
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Prom Table 15 It is very obvious to t there are an enomous nusber of arrears,
and this situation has always existed since 1935.^ To salvage taxes from being
unasoes 'ed, due to the statute licit- tions, the Tre nury had to seek legislative
2
re-cures to extend, such limitations.* In spite of those legislative mearures several
million pounds of un&soeseed taxes were legally unrecoverable and became bad debts
from the Treasury point of view.
The e erience. other countries indicates, in general terms, that"as to the
efficiency and completion of tax collection, the latter is greatly improved if the
period that elapses between the receipt of income and the payment of taxes thereon
3
is curtailed." This is perfectly tr e in the case of Egyptian income taxes. During
the Second World War, business- profits reached their peak and consequently the tax
liability increased sharply both regarding the Scheduler ta on Coocr.eree and Industry
profits a- well as the recess r, fits Tax, but the a'uinist ative machinery lagged behind
and the accumulated unasoesoed taxes increased trere d.; sly. This state of affairs
permitted the extension of the statute limitations several tir.es. The result was that
part of the tax on 1943 profits was assessed in 1950 and paid in instalments in later
years an most taxpayers were not in a position to pay the accumulated amounts of taxes.
• 1. The ana nt of uncolle ted taxes was £E11,799,SIC at the end of the fiscal year
1949/50 and it has been increasing since. It was estimated that at the end of
the fiscal year 1954/55 the amount of unasr,eased taxes vac £E33»471,326.
Audit Court, op. cit., p. 33.
2. Tax if not assessed before the end of the fifth year frocs the elapse of the last
date of submitting the return the taxpayer escapes the payment of the tax and
legally he has the right not to say the tax for this specific year. Article 97
Taw ho. 14/1939 and Article 24 Daw Ho. 99/1949.
3. U.K., Technical Assistance dro. ramre, Revenue Administration and l-olloy in Israel.
First Report, p. 18.
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As a matter of fact, many taxpayers disposed of their income either on ordinary
consumption goods or on fixed assets and, therefore, cash or liquid assets were
unavailable to pay tax debts. Consequently considerable amounts of taxes were
lost as several businessmen liquidated their businesses or became bankrupt espec¬
ially during the few years aft r the War when the extraordinary wartime circumstances
ceased to exist.* The outcome of this situation was the unlimited loss of public
revenue caused by the obvious inadequacy of the administrative machinery.
(b) The Second major deficiency in the tax administration is the relatively
small capacity of the administrative body, i.e. the inadocuacv in the number of
personnel and their working ca acitv. In spite of the sharp increase in the number
of the Taxation Department personnel, it is believed that such a number is still too
iovj. The following table (Table 14) shows the growth in the number of ersonnel
since 1939 up to 1956•
TABLE 14.
lumbers of the Taxation Department's Employees 1939-1955.
Year Number Year Number Year Number
1939 397 1945 1,162 1951 2,318
1940 394 1946 1,235 1952 2,469
1941 478 1947 1,823 1953 2,776
1942 478 1948 1,889 1954 2,772
1943 720 1949 2,044 1955 2,705
1944 790 1950 2,218 1956 2,718
Source: 0. P. Traylor, Report on the Egyptian Taxation, op. cit., p. 139.
But in order to obtain a fair judgment of the working capacity of the Department
since 1939, we have to compare the amount of tax collections in real terms and the
1. Bankruptcy after the War rose considerably, from 21 cases in 1944 to 54 cases in



































; 1959 400 397 1.00 1948 4,204 1,889 2.22
: 1940 1,882 394 4.78 1949 6,774 2,044 3.31
| 1941 1,678 478 3.51 1950 5,846 2,218 2.63
1942 2,378 478 4.97 1951 5,247 2,318 2.26
1945 4,976 720 6.91 1952 7,832 2,469 3.17
1944 5,284 790 6.68 1953 8,453 2,776 3.04
1945 4,846 1,162 4.17 1954 8,224 2,772 2.97
1946 5,389 1,235 4.36 1955 8,431 2,705 1 3.11





* Tax Collections deflat d by the Wholesale Price Index (U.N. Statistical Yearbook, 1957).
Tax collections include the various taxes collected by the Department of Taxation, viz.
the Scheduler Income Tax, the General Income Tax, Estate and Succession Duties, and the
Stamp Duty.
Sources; 0. F. Traylor, op. cit., and Personnel Section, Department of Taxation.
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number of employees. Table 15 shows tax collections per employee since 1939 and up
to 1956. The general trend w1 ich ap ears from Table 15 and Figure II indicates the
declining capacity of the administrative machinery from the point of view of number
of personnel and their capacity. This imp ies the quick need to reinforce the
Department with more working power to cope with the increasing delayed assessment and
uncollected taxes. During the last five years under comparison, 1952 to 1956, the
administrative ca acity of the Department's personnel appears to be con tant, an
average of about £83,106 a year per employee.
(c) Collections versus expenditures: the maxim of economy in taxation-.
Economy in taxation calls for efficiency of administration. The administrative
costs of governments and the book-keeping and accounting costs placed upon taxpayers
by taxation should be kept at a minimum. The Treasury should receive as large a
portion of tax collections in excess of expenses of collections as possible.^ The cost
of collecting the taxes differs from one country to the other, but generally s eaking
it is lower in most developed countries than in less-devel.o;.;ed countries. In Britain
the percentage cost to total gross collections (taxes collected by the Inland Revenue)
varied between 1.04$ in 1948/49 to 1.33/ in 1957/58. Since the fiscal year 1951/52
1* Data concerning the number of employees engaged in the enforcement of income taxes
is unavailable though it is possible to estimate roughly this number by talcing the
average of employees working in the income tax administration in a sample of district
offices in Cairo, Alexandria, Tanta (in Nile Delta/ and Aayut (Upper Egypt).
Accordingly the aver ge is found to be over 75$ of total personnel. The majority





Gross Tax Collections and Expenditures, 1939/40 to 1957/58.
























1940 2,786,257 71,305 46,348 39.1 2.5 65.0
1941 2,719,883 69,250 60,460 39.1 2.5 87.3
1942 4,686,459 87,037 70,145 54.4 1.8 80.5
1943 12,440,902 104,014 86,647 49.6 0.8 83.3
1944 15,482,990 149,248 126,403 103.8 0.9 84.6
1945 15,023,506 210,412 186,877 71.4 1.4 88.7
1946 16,329,825 244,377 210,320 66.8 1.4 86.1
1947 15,496,736 383,850 266,976 40.3 2.4 69.5
1948 13,032,541 449,714 286,545 28.9 3.4 63.7
1949 19,847,172 605,448 458,448 32.8 3.1 75.7
| 1950 18,706,800 635,716 525,352 29.4 ; 5.3 82.61
\ 1951 18,889,879 853,363 706,659 22.1 4.5. 82.8
1952 27,412,566 902,009 786,959 30.3 3.2 87.2
! 1953 28,150,030 1,006,858 881,185| 27.9 3.5 87.5
1954
i 26,157,380 1,068,840 892,971 24.5 4.1 83.5
j 1955 27,824,526
31,994,252
1,066,010 935,011 26.1 3.8 87.7
! 1956 1,201,095 1,029,430 26.6 3.7
J
85.6
] 1957 36,291,062 1,292,725 1,142,953 28.0 3.5 88.4
\ 1958 43,690,234 1,363,150 1,197,077 32.0 3.1 87.9
jTotals 376,961,990 11,665,221 9,896,766 1 772.6 | 2.8 (2) 81.9 ^
1. Collections and expenditures of the Department of Taxation only.
(2) Ageraves.





the tendency was towards the continuous slight increase in the percentage cost of
1
collections. The coot of collecting- taxes in the U.S.A. is tauch lowor than in
2
Britain; it was approximately 49 cents per $100 of revenue in 1951.
On the other side, underdeveloped countries suffer fro:., the high cost of tax
collection due to the inefficiency of administration and to the low standard of
tax compliance, e.g. lack of book-keeping due to the illiteracy of the people ... otc.
To take Egypt as an example, from the information provided in Table 16 we can see an
agerage performance of requiring around 3 per cent of total actual tax collections to
meet departmental expenses over the period 1939-1958. The cost percentage shows a
steady decrease for the last four years, 1955-1958• The general outlook of the tax
collections per £L expended by the Taxation Department is a decreasing one if compared
to the period before 1948, although the present trend, i.e. the last four years, shows
a steady increase. In eneral, this situation suggests that "the Department is not
"5
making as good use of its increasing funds for administration".'
1. 0. Brownlee and E. D. Allen explained the maxim of economy within the U.S. tax
systems that "most simply expressed, economy as an administrative goal means
that a minimum amount of resources should, be tied up in collecting and complying
with any given amount of taxes. Our present complex tax system cannot expect to
achieve this goal. Overlapping federal and state taxes mean a considerable
waste of resources in the collection of taxes and in the taxpayer effort to comply
with ... the taxes Imposed on him ..." Economics of Public Finance, p. 201.
2. The latest available data. The cost of collections varied between 89 cents in
1941 and 31 cents per $100 in 1944. See U.S. Treasury Department Annual Report
of the Colx.assignors of Internal Revenue. Fiscal fear ended June ?0, 1951. p. 11
and also see, Brownlee & Allan, op. cit., p. 202.
3. Cols. (4) and (5) Table 16 confirm this conclusion. See, 0. F, Traylor,
op. cit., p. 136.
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As mentioned before, about three quarters of t tal cost of the Department of
Taxation expenditure is expended on the enforcement and administration of the
Scheduler Tax on Commercial and Industrial Profits and, therefore, the collection
cost of this tax is extremely high if compared with other taxes. According to the
above rough estimate, the cost of collecting that tax v: ries from 11$ as in 1955/56
to about 1% in 1956/57, to afcwut 9/- in 1957/5 -• This percentage suggests the need
for a quick revision of the legislative as well as the akrdnistr- tive structure of
that tax in oruer to eliminate the causes of this notoriously high cost. If such
causes were eliminated, which is the main element in the relatively high cost of
collection of the taxes, we could roach a favourable percentage.
(2j The hack of tax consciousness arid tax morality:
Several public finance experts have devoted much discussion to the possibility
of controlling public expenditure by snaking the public "tax conscious" either through
the deliberate choice of particular taxes in raising revenue or through the propaganda
of private organisations concerning the high cos s of goverraaent. Governments naturally,
try to avoid resistance to taxation by launching a propaganda campaign praising the
taxa ion as a means of reaching over-all social and economic welfare.
Closely connected with the ield capacity of a specific tax is the question of tax
consciousness. In this relatively narrow context, tax consciousness means the desirab-
itity of making taxpayers more or less aware of their own contributions and those of
others to the financing of the Government. Since only a relatively s all proportion of
the total tax receipts in underdeveloped countries, are paid directly by the p rscn upon
whom the burden of the tax falls, e.g. the percentage of direct taxes in Egypt is about
30$; tax consciousness i3 probably not very highly developed in these countries.
It would be unfortunate if lack of awareness of the tax burden should lead to presure
upon the Government for the expansion of public services without regard to the resulting




The desirability or unde Inability of a high degree of ta* consciousness is
largely a question of what may be called tax morale. Without a certain amount of tax
morale, tax consciousness is not an advantage. It is difficult to devise methods of
raising tax morality but there are certain factors that undoubtedly affect it, and with
respect to those factors wither administrative or legislative action, or both, can be
taken.
Generally speaking, the creation and the development of tax morale and ' a sense
of tax responsibility ' in Egypt would take a considerable time.'*" But considering the
corrupted political and social circumstances which prevailed for over three centuries
and also the short experience of the population with income taxes, one should not lose
hope that in the relatively near future Egypt will attain a modest level of tax morale
2
and tax consciousness.
1. P. A. M. Van Philips, Public Finance and Less Developed Economy with Special
Reference to Latin America, p. 125.
2. To achieve a modest level of tax consciousness we sliould eliminate the
discrimination among various taxpayers, such as between employees and self-
employed. We also need an exact accounting of Government expenditures, not
only through the annual report by the Audit Court, but perhaps also through
proofs of real performance in the form of public reports and discussions on
the Government activities. Finally, a more vigorous prosecution of tax
evasion and tax delinquency would no doubt contribute to the gradual improvement
of tax morale.
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(3) High level of illiteracy and lack of book-keeping:.
The high percentage of illiteracy in underdeveloped countries renders the
enforce ent of the law a difficult task for the Government. Tax laws suffer
from sea situation considerably as taxation affects mo t of the population.
Direct taxes, especially income taxes, require a higher standard of education
and eneral knowledge. Therefore, in a country such as Egypt where the percentage
of illiteracy is almost about 77$ or a little less, the situation becomes alarming
if wo want to attain a high standard of efficiency in the income tax enforcement.^
But if we take into consideration the number of income taxpayers in comparison to the
total population we find that the e centage of illiterate taxpayers is far below the
ove -all percentage, as most of the illiterates a e farmers not subject to income
taxes.^
Closely related to illite acy is the lack of use of book-keeping techniques
arong a considerable percentage of taxpayers. In quite a few cases where book-keeping
3
exists in Egypt, we find that dishonest and unreliable accounting records prevail.
The average businessman in many cases neither keeps organised books nor applied cost
accounting with any degree of efficiency. Entrepreneurs in general, other than those
in corporations, are not aware of the importance of good administration for the efficiency
1. The percentage of illiteracy was exactly 77.23 according to the population census
of 1947. This percentage is believed to be lower at present due to the expanding
education policy adopted during the last decade. See, Statistical Yearbook,
1955/56. Egyptian Government.
2. Data is not available to show the nercentage of illiterate tax ayera in Egypt.
Most far ers are not subj ct to income taxation either because their income is
below subsistence level or because agricultural profits are inmuned.
3. In soe cases two or more sets of books are maintained. One set is correct and
honest which is kept to show the actual profits of the firm, while the other set
is dishonestly kept to be presented to the tax officials. This is a widespread
phenomenon in underdeveloped countries. See, Van Philips, op. cit., p. 125; and




The prevalence of low standard of literacy and the lack of honent book-keeping
diminish the yield of the income tax and decrease its efficiency a a revenue-raiser.
(4) Tax Evasion:
This last factor, i.e. tax evasion, is closely connected with the above three
factors and actually those factors are considered as elements or s urees of tax
evasion. Evasion, the sign of administrative failure, curtails tax productivity
sore effectively than any of the factors previously considered. Tax evasion,
breaking tax law provisions outright, may result from legislative shortcomings. Ho
tax law which outrages the sense of fiscal propriety can be well enforced. Twists
of taxpayers' psychology as-ure the easy administration of some taxes and create
difficulties in others. Most frequently, however, taxes are evaded because the law
has not provided proper administrative machinery or because the organisation and
technique of the administrative machine are themselves erroneous.
In Egypt fraud and tax evasion are prevailing in full sway. The people as yet
are not taxation-conscious, and this defect accompanied by their hazy understanding
of the conception of the State contributes to the widespread evasion. When the
Scheduler income taxes are first imposed the Government made a very limited effort to
explain the fiscal change to the people, but was merely satisfied in promulgating the
law. In fact, there are several causes for this widespread evasion; they could be
summarised in the following:
1) The deficiency of the administrative machinery to survey and assess adequately
all incomes subject to tax;
2) the ambiguous formulation of tax laws and regulations;
1
3) the instability of tax laws and regulations;
1. It happened several times that some articles in the Scheduler Income Tax Law




4) the taxpayers' defective compliance wit the tax regulations regarding the
keeping of honest books and the submission of a correct declaration of his taxable
income;
5) the dive sity and variety of the assessment procedure;
6) the ineffective punitive methods applied in tax fraud cases; and
7) the abuse of political influence in the past stimulated evasion of certain
taxpayers. At present such influence is negligible under the new Regime and the
non-exi.3tence of political parties.
Several other affiliated social and political factors intensified the tendency
towards income tax evasion and, generally speaking, the widespread evasion in Egypt
results in a maldistribution of the tax burden, penalising the most conscientious
people and those who were liable to pay at source?"
It is imp ssible to estimate even approximately the amount of the leakage of
revenue for the shortage of data and the large-scale assessments based on estimates
by the Tax Inspectors either because incomes are understated or because of the non-
2
submission of returns.
1» Another reason, a psychological one, for the widespread evasion, which took place
during the last war, was the desire for easy and quick enrichment. Such a press¬
ing desire, accompanied by the understanding that no one was obliged to conceal the
means by which he produced Ms wealth, has driven a large number of taxpayers to
fraudulent evasion. The Government in its turn did not -eet this sweeping tendency
by the swift measures needed, such as intensifying the investigation of the taxpayers'
accounts or imposing a capital penalty besides increasing the material penalty on
tax evaders.
2. Mr. G. J. Craddock, once an a viser to the Kgy tian Ministry of Finance, emphasised
his opinion about income tax evasion in Egypt b\ saying, in his report; "It is
obvio s from a large number of the estimations I have investigated that a regrettably
high proportion of the declarations were not intended to disclose the truth; a constant
struggle is in progress between many taxpayers on the one hand who do not keep books of
account, or keep duplicate sets of books, doing all they can to conceal the facts, and
Mamours (Arabic word for tax inspectors) on the other, who endeavour to construct
estimations on very unreliable material, or almost none at all, and yet have to maintain
a balance of fairness between the individual and the State." Report upon the Egyptian
Taxation Department, Government Press, Cairo, 1948.
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In 1954, Kr. Traylor, the D.N. advisor to the Taxation Department, estimated
- 1
that the tax evasion in Egypt ranges between 25/' - 30;'. Ho basis for such
estimation could be traced and the writer believes that such an estimate is
groundless. In order to estimate the percentage of evaded income and thus the
evaded tax we should have the amount of assessable aggregate income which is
impossible to obtain at the moment for the lack of data. Also, within the limits
of national income data, personal income figures are absent and no attempt has yet
been made to calculate the e figures.
This brings us to the end of the first stage of o r investigation into the
performance of the Egyptian income tax. We have examined the income tax system from
the view point of its efficiency in rising public revenues. However, in highly
developed countries whore efficient tax administration and tax compliance prevail, the
flexibility of the tax as a revenue-raiser depends basically on two factors: (a) the
tax rate; and (b) the size of tax exemptions and reliefs. Both factors affect the tax
liability. A decrease in the tax rate implies an indirect exemption of part of the
population's income. The difference originating from any reduction in the rate includes
a partial exemption of the taxpayer's income if we compare his liability before and after
the cliange. On the other land, changes in the size of exemptions and reliefs do have
a direct effect on the tax base; i.e. net taxable income. By and large the net result
in the tax yield depends on the flexibility of the two basic 'tools' of the income tax;
the rate and the size of reliefs.
While one could achieve more tangible results in the tax revenue through the 'tools'
mentioned in a highly developed society, we found ourselves unable to apply this approach
to underdeveloped countries where inefficient tax a ministration and lack of honest tax
compliance predominate. This unfortunate feature has been demonstrated throughout our
analysis of the Egyptian income tax system as a revenue-yielder. Therefore, the change
1. National Income of Egypt for 1953» Ministry of Finance and Economy, Republic of
Egypt, 1955 p. 28.
in the tax base on the tax rate through the medium of exemptions and reliefs, does
not have the effect intended on the tax revenue. This conclusion raises important
natters of policy. In order to make the tax nore flexible, ministration has to
be Improved and the various existing loopholes in the legislation have to be covered.
The u lie has to e provided with a clear picture of the public policy and the role
of taxation in achieving a better standard of living.
o> o
CHAf TK R IV
Equity in Income Taxation
I. Introduction?
In Chapter III we have considered the role of the Egyptian
income tax an a source of public revenue and now we continue our inquiry into
the performance of the income tax from the equity viewpoint.
Equity in taxation has been widely discussed by many economists as
well a3 politicians. But on the whole all such discussions are controversial
and do not help very much in practice. However, in popular discussions of the
equity concept the fairness in the distribution of the tax burden is usually
regarded as an important, if not the outstanding, teat of a tax system, and its
ability to inspire that confidence in the fiscal, basis of government which sustains
public morale and promotes productive effort and economic progress. An elementary
application of the equity concept requires the equal treatment of persons in similar
economic circumstances. But the economic position and circumstances of individuals
vary widely, and the range of equity secured by the application of the concept is,
therefore, not very wide in its operation. Now the most commonly accepted
application of equity is found in the principle of levying taxes according to
relative 'hbility to pay". "Ability to pay" includes and necessitates some degree
of progression if fairness in relative treatment of persons with unequal incomes
is to be achieved. No formula underlying the scale of progression could be
considered equitable from the distribution of the tax burden point of view, as any
scale will ultimately include a kind of arbitrariness which in turn renders the tax
inequitable. However, the degree of progression depends on the goals of the
public policy the Government is aiming at. The degree of progression is usually
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one of the flexible tools of the public policy which should aim at lessening income
and wealth inequalities without decreasing the incentive to invest and to product.
In other words a balance should be maintained between economic equality and the
incentive effects of the tax system.
The main object of this chapter is to study the equity criterion and
its application to the Egyptian income tax. The theme of the analysis is divided
into two main sections; first, horizontal equity, i.e. the equal treatment of equals,
which necessitates the provision of certain personal exemptions and other reliefs;
1
and secondly, vertical equity of the tax; i.e. the rate system and its progressiveness.
Theories relating to the equity principle, such as the 'benefit
theory' or 'ability to pay', have been the subject of innumerable discussions.
There is no need to recall these discussions, as they are controversial on the one
and
hand,/on the other, such discussions are, in our view, not very helpful in our
analysis.^
Generally speaking, the determination of equity in taxation rests to
a certain extent, - and we think the forthcoming analysis will demonstrate this -
1. The question of equity in distributing the tax burden has two major aspects, as
aforementioned, but in reality they are two sides of the same coin. See R.A.
Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance, p. 160.
2. For the classical views on the theories related to equity in taxation see the
following references: A.C. Pigou, A Study in Public Finance: F.Y. Edgeworth,
Papers Relating to Political Economy. Vol. II, London, 1925; E.R. Seligman,
The Income Tax: and for English translations of early European economists on
this topic, see R.A. Musgrave and A.T. Peacock, (Eds.), Glassies in the Theory
of Public Finance: International Economic Association, London, 1958; C.F.
Bastable, Public Finance. A.De Vite De Marco, First Prlnciplea of Public Finance. London,
For more recent revised views based on the classical theories, see R.A. 193b.
Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance. New York, 1959; N. Kaldor, An Expenditure
Tax: G. Myrdal, The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory.
London, 1953•
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upon value judgements relating to the pattern of income distribution which is
reagrded as most desirable. Accordingly, the most equitable tax system is that
which is most closely in conformity with standards of equity in the distribution
of real income which are accepted as most desirable from the society's viewpoint.
Any further discussions of the question of equity in taxation must largely involve
an exploration of general attitudes towards the nature and the level of an
equitable distribution. These discussions are, however, beyond our principal
object.
II. HORIZONTAL EQUITY: The ecu; 1 treatment of equals.
In a welfare economy income plays a significant part as a measure
of ability to pay taxes. According to the principle of equity all individuals
having the same income and being in the same circumstances; e.g. dependants, nature
of the source of income, etc., must be charged the same amount of tax. The
implication arising out of this principle might be overlooked if one were careless.
The equal treatment of equals encounters several inevitable problems which have
to be solved in order to attain a realistic standard of equity between the taxpayers
who are within the same income level and within the same circumstances.
Income as a measure of economic well-being and therefore as the
tax base has to be defined carefully.^ But it is difficult to
find an adequate definition of income for tax purposes for various reasons, especially
1. Arguments have been developed to find an adequate measure of economic veil being
by many economists. Consumption expenditure and wealth were advocated as
suitable measures of aconomic well being. As we are interested in income
taxation it is desirable to neglect, only for the sake of our investigation which
is of primary importance, other measures. For an excellent analysis on the
choice of consumption expenditures as a measure of economic well being, see,
N. Kaldor, An Expenditure Tax.
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especially if we have in mind other definitions of income tax conception of
various economists, classical, and contemporary.
(A) The Tax Base: The Income Concept:
What i3 meant by income? The answer to this question is the usual
outset of this study. Different economists define income in general terms and
others define it from the taxation point of view, Several definitions of income
were offered by several economists from time to time. But such definitions should
not be interpreted as suggesting that taxable income, apart from ordinary income,
rests on any well framed academic formula. The differences in the definitions
applied "are due to different conceptions of the nature of income, constitutional
limitations in the legislature, political or economic considerations, and conventions
*1
with other countries. That does not mean that academic concepts have had no
influence in determining any practical income formula. In reality, they help to
clarify the confusion in legislation about income and make it easier to differentiate
between the product and its source in a way that does not hamper the process of the
economic machinery.
Income could be defined as a persons consumption plus the increase
in his wealth during a specified period; or in other words consumption plus savings.
Consumption should include services as well as commodities, and savings should not
include the inherited or bequeathed wealth.
Strictly speaking, income as contracted with capital denotes that
amount of wealth which flow3 in during a definite period and which is at the disposal
1. H.8. Spalding; The Income Tax in Great Britain and the United States, p. 19.
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of the owner for purposes of consumption so that, in consuming it, his capital
1
remains unimpaired.
A general definition of income is hard to attain, therefore it is
always difficult to reach a complete perfection within any definition. Income,
in absolute term, could be defined as the flow of services and commodities during
2
a certain period, which is usually a year. These services and commodities should
be measured by an acceptable medium - such as money. To make this definition
more 3ound within the framework of taxation, e.g. income taxation,and to prove it
is both conceivable and practicable the following basic criteria have to be
elaborated:
i. Psychic income and income in kind}
ii. Income as a separate entity from capital}
iii. Gross and net income}
iv. Time concept.
i. Income in kind;
To impute the actual income of a person, money income as well as
income in kind has to be taken into consideration. Income in kind in many countries
comprises an important part of the individual*5 aggregate income. In a less-
developed economy, where the non-monetary sector is large, income in kind in the
form of home-consumed agricultural products constitutes a large proportion of the
country's national income. In a highly industrialized country income in kind in
the shape of free recreation centres, free or cheap meals supplied to workers, free
transportation and health care etc., are considered of relative importance especially
1. E.R. Seligraan, The Income Tax, p. 19.
2. A.C. Pigou, op. cit., pp. 77 - 78.
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in computing taxable income.
Two opposite arguments are involved in the liability of income in
kind to taxationj the first is against the inclusion, i.e. the exemption of such
income from the tax basej and the other is in favour of its inclusion. Exclusion
has been defended on the grounds that such income is in fact a part of special
compensation for unfavourable working conditions and that these services and
commodities offered to the employee, within the industrial sector in particular,
are not what he would like to obtain if he is left a free choice. The advocates
of the inclusion of such income founded their reasons on the basis that these
services and commodities are rendered free or at a low price, which the employee
otherwise has to purchase from the free market at a higher price. Therefore, the
difference between the market price and that paid by the employee should be taxable
as a part of the individual imputed income.
One of the basic problems is the difficulty of evaluating such
income. What is the value of free community facilities when there are comparable
public facilities which are better? What is the value of a three-shilling lunch
to someone who would ordinarily buy a two-shilling meal?
1. Under the influence of a more scientific approach to worker psychology and
motivation, industry has realised that productivity of the worker i3 influenced
by many factors other than his wage or working hours. The employer's interest
in the worker as a person has often been more of a spur to the worker than an
increase in wages would have been. In addition to aiding the employee morale
certain fringe benefits are aimed at increased production through decreased
absenteeism by free or reduced-price meals, living quarters, free health
services, recreational benefits and the like.
2. W» Vickrey, Agenda for Progressive Taxation, p. 35.
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Connected with this problem of assessment and evaluation, is the
difficulty of collection, from the atandpoint of both the employer, who presumably
will have to withhold for many of these benefits if taxed, and the revenue
authorities. The administrative difficulties often become prohibitive as these
benefits could nob be assimilated to the payroll where the number of employees
who receive or use the benefits varies from month to month.
A third, and most significant, administrative consi eration is the
amount of revenue which can be collected. If the cost of evaluating is larger
than the revenue, the government should not make an effort to tax.
The following basic non-conclusive criteria should be considered
in imputing income in kind subject to taxations
a) The extent to which the employer and the employee consider the benefit to
be a substitute for each payment.
b) The extent to which the benefit is actually or potentially a substitute for
an expense which has otherwise been incurred.
c) The extent to which the employee has freedom of choice with regard to the
service or commodityi
d) The extent to which the benefit i3 available to a specific class of employees.
By and large, each type and even each case of these benefits has to
be studied separately as it sometimes is difficult to set up a general rule. This
resolution is unattainable for its impracticability and for its administrative
difficulty, and therefore, some degree of arbitrariness might be involved in any
alternative resolution."*"
1. The writer believes that it could be possible for the revenue authorities to
set up schedules for the evaluation of income in kind taking into account the
above mentioned four basic controls.
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To ignore the inclusion of 'income in kind' or even 'leisure
income' in the tax base will serve to increase the real exemptions and also the
1
effective degree of progression. Moreover any discrimination against thai
inclusion of income in kind in the tax base could easily facilitate avoidance and
mo3t probably evasion.
Consequently, it is very important to eliminate unwarranted
exemptions involved in evaluating and considering the taxability of any service
or commodity offered in kind to taxpayers in order to achieve equity in the
distribution of the tax burden.
Income-in-kind in an underdeveloped economy?
A closely related problem to the above analysis is the predominating
factor in many underdeveloped countries where non-monetary transactions take place
in a sort of primitive economic conditions. Barter trade and payments in kind,
via. to workers, is of widespread character for the lack of inefficient and very
limited monetary institutions in such countries and also for the high level of
illiteracy between the people.
As most underdeveloped economies are mainly of agricultural nature
and therefore the majority of the population is engaged in farming, it could be
easily emphasised that most of the farming population, who are just agricultural
labourers, enjoy an income around the subsistence level due to the low income
1. Simons wanted to tax 'leisure income' as ho stated "income for consumers'
capital is often a large part of total income for individuals in the upper
brackets". Its inclusion would introduce a bias inconsistent with the system
of progression, differentiating against people of similar financial circumstances
and opening the door for evasion. This view might be important when direct
employment is more urgently required to balance the economy of the community.
But Simons does not provide any accurate measure to calculate this 'leisure
income' for taxation. See, H. Simons, Personal Income Taxation, pp. 113 - 14«
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per capita and to the unequal distribution of personal income. Accordingly the
subsistence farmer cannot be satisfactorily reached by an income tax because the
greater part of his real income cannot be adequately and efficiently assessed.
It has been stated by the United Nations experts that "even highly skilled
administrators have made little progress toward including the value of home-
produced and consumed foods in the taxable income of the farmers"."*" It is believed
that these groups which make up for a major fraction of the population are usually
the poorest of the society, and the failure to tax them "may not bo seriously
2
objectionable from the equity point of view". Besides, it would be uneconomical
to collect taxes on their income as the tax yeild would not compensate the cost
of collection from the administrative viewpoint, if ways and means were discovered
to assess the tax feasibly.
Other taxes, however, might be able to reach such income. But
such taxes might include an element of arbitrariness which violate the equity
principle. A poll-tax, for example, might be the only solution in this context
for the simplicity it involves in its administration. The poll-tax here, would
ignore the relative differences in income and civic circumstances, e.g. dependents,
etc. But on the other hand one could easily say, with caution, that the farmers'
income in an underdeveloped country does not vary widely from one person to another
as the majority of them enjoy income; cash income and income in kind; below or
just around the subsistence level.
In order to make the proposed poll-tax relatively equitable
regarding the differences which exist in the civil conditions; dependants, we could
1. U.N., Taxes and Fiscal Policy in Under-developed Countries. New fork, 1954» p.20.
2. Ibid. p.20.
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simply allow a deduction from the tax of a small fraction for each dependant.
The administrative feasibility of this tax is its basic advantage.
ii. Income distinguished from capital:
Income as a tax base should be clearly distinguished from capital,
but a clear cut distinction might be hard to attain. An ideal income tax should
interpret clearly what is income liable to taxation and if any doubtful items are
included these must be stated in the legislation without any absurdity or hesitation.
Income distinguished from capital, should bear the label of
continuity. This rule is not always applicable as there are items which could
be regarded as capital but are income in reality, e.g. speculative profits, other
capital gains, windfall gains, etc.
Capital on the other hand, is recognised as that part of wealth or
property that at a given time is employed in the production of future goods, and,
therefore their production function is their main character.
However, one can describe income as the net product of capital.
This product could be an incorporeal or material one. The former is obtained from
the possession of commodities such as pieces of art, pictures, antiques and precious
stones, while the latter is derived from labour, money producing assets, the
consumption of durable goods and other assets.
Qonsequently, in the science of public finance, we can consider
income as the net accretions to one's economic strength which could be measured by
money or other means, during a specific period.
There are, in most cases, three basic characteristics v/hich distinguish
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income from capital:
a) Income usually accrues periodically, like the trees which bring fruits each
year, but this is not always true, e.g. the case of a person who buys a cei'tain
amonnt of securities or other commodity with the intention of selling them and
then sell3 his stock at a profit: therefore, this profit could be considered as
1
income liable to taxation, even if profitable transaction occurs once and for all.
b) Durability of the source of income is another major principle derived from
the first one, the principle of productivity. This as long as income accrues
periodically the source should be in existence* The income source may take one
or more of the following shapes; 1) Corporeal sources such as buildings, land and
other tangible sourcesj 2) incorporeal sources such as business goodwill, shares
to bearer; or 3) the source might be non-ranteriali3tic such as personal talents,
2
physical strength and the like.
c) The maintenance of the source is important for its productivity; therefore,
the acquisition of income requires continuous care paid for the restoration of the
source in order to guarantee its periodical productivity and thus to distinguish
income from bequests, windfalls and inheritance. On the other hand maintainance
cost of the source depreciation must be token into account so as to accumulate
a reserve for the replacement of the asset in the case of wear and tear, or
obsolescence.
A difficulty arises from any definition of income a3 a separate
1* Periodicity of the income subject to tax has been denounced as an important
criterion in defining taxable income; this was clearly stated in the Minority
Report, (Memorandum, of Dissent), Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits
and Income, final Report 1955, p. 353; as follows "The old boundary-line
afforded by the regulatity or recurrence criterion has been discarded in judicial
decisions (in Britain) which have established that casual or isolated gains are
taxable provided that they are not of the character of "capital profits"."
2. Seligman made it clear that "neither the permanence of the source nor the regularity
of the receipt any longer forms a necessary part of the concept of taxable income."
Encyclopedia of Social Science, Art, Income Tax.
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entity from capital; capital gains for example is neither an income nor a
capital, so what is the fiscal treatment of such gain? For the Importance of the
question of the taxation of capital gains and losses, an Investigation in this
dilema within the fiscal structure has to be attempted. What kind of fiscal
treatment should such gains receive in a less-developed country? Our analysis
of this question will be confined to Its relation to the equity principle.
We consider that it is important to discuss the taxation of capital
gains and losses especially in less-developed countries. The discussion of this
question had therefore to be tackled from all angles as the fiscal treatment of
capital gains and losses does have a direct effect on the economy, where economic
development is of the utmost importance. This is the reason why this part of the
theoretical analysis is lengthy.
Capital gains and, taxable income:
There has been considerable discussion of whether capital gains
and losses should be included in income for taxation, or exempted."'" Capital
gains and losses occur when a person sells for a profit or loss what is ordinarily
retained as a source of income. Moie specifically, they arise as a rule when an
owner sells real estate or securities. They may also occur when the owner sells
a factory or a machine.
Various arguments have been developed in favour of and against the
inclusion of capital gains in taxable income. Any reason for the inclusion
could be met by a counter-reason for the exclusion. Most arguments on this subject
1. For a comprehensive discussion of the problem of capital gains taxation, see
Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income. Final Report (Memorandum
of Dissent) pp. 365 - 382, Cmd. 9474-.
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are highly eontroversary and need therefore a careful analysis regarding the
economic effects and administrative problems encountered in any results obtained
from such analysis.
The principle reason for the taxation of capital gains is that the
capital gains increase the power to spend and to save of the individual and hence
increase his taxable capacity. Capital gains are usually concentrated and
distributed among small portions of the community find therefore, the exemptions of
such gains, which are considered as an increase in the economic power within a
specific period, would result in a sever© violation of equity. This treatment is
considered a3 "a serious discrimination in the tax treatment of a particular class
of tax payers."^ Consequently the basic argument for the taxation of capital
gains rests on the equity principle.
On the other hand, the main arguments habitually used in justifying
the exclusion of capital gains from taxation arei
1) Capital gains might tie illusory due to an inflationary trend in the economy
and therefore such gains do not represent real gains. The taxation of such
illusory gains means the over-taxation of a special group of taxpayers, and this
in turn conflicts with the principle of equity.
This argument could be easily counter-attacked on the basis that
taxable capacity is principally a relative concept. Therefore, property owners
who realise capital gains during on inflationary period ore "in a better position
2
than those who own fixed interest securities". From the equity point of view
1. The particular group of taxpayers in this connection fire mostly property owners,
real estate owners, owners of equity shares and the like. Ibid., p. 365.
2. Ibid, p. 366.
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any exclusion of capital gains made during an inflationary period is a strong
violation as changes in the relative taxable capacities of taxpayers are ignored.
2) Any fall in interest rates might result in illusory capital gains to some
investors and therefore, if such gains are taxed thi3 would cause injustice as such
gains are not real and do not increase the investor's future income.
To meet such objection, the appreciation of capital values due to
the fall in the interest rate does represent a real gain to the property owner and
therefore, it increases his capacity as an individual to spend and to save. His
taxable capacity, however, is stronger than others. Furthermore, the experience,
1
as Kaldor and others emphasised, that periods of falling inte-rest rates alternate
with periods of rising interest rates and the result is a little net change on
balance.
3) The irregularity of capital gains excludes it from any sound difinition of
income concept and accordingly it does not represent the same taxable capacity as
a regular income.
As mentioned above, any increase in the taxable capacity due to the
realisation of capital gains does increase the economic power of the individual
to spend and to save. The ultimate aim is the measurement of the taxable
capacity of the individual in a specific period in order to assess the appropriate
tax on his total power or ability. In other words capital gains do increase the
individual's command over goods and services within a given period. Any failure
to tax such excess taxable capacity represented in the increasement in the economic
power is not consistent with equity.
A) The administration of any tax levied on unrealised capital gains seems
1. Ibid. p. 367.
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unfeasible and also unequitable.
For practical reasons any tax on unrealised capital gains is
extremely difficult to administer. I believe that this reason is of fundamental
significance for not taxing unrealised capital gains even if it might be due to
the appreciation in the value of capital assets and the failure to include such
appreciation in the taxable capacity is a breach of equity principle. In many
case3 equity is violated for practical reasons beyond the control of human beings
and therefore, to exempt unrealised capital gains from taxation would not be
strongly opposed by other taxpayers on one hand and by the government on the other.
According to the principles of business accounting account must not
1
be taken to include accrued gains into taxable income until they are realised.
But, the taxation of realised capital g ins only means the postponement of liability
as compared with taxation based on accrued gains 3ince property owners may not
realise some of their assets during their lifetime at all or not for some years
2
after the appreciation has taken place. In fact a basic argument against the
taxation of either realised or accrued capital gains is that such gains might have
occurred during several years and to assess the tax within a specific year where,
for example, realisation has taken place does mean the overtaxation of the individual
and thus infringing the equity principle. Consequently, a practical device ha3
to be discovered in order to average these gains over the period during which the
appreciation in value accrued.
1. This principle has an exception especially in the valuation of inventory at
the end of the trading year according to the principle of "cost or market
value whichever is the less", and therefore unrealised losses are taken into
account when stocks are valued at market prices, when market prices are below
cost.
2. Ibid. p. 372.
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A further argument could be developed if unrealised capital gains
are untaxed; the individual might be able to arrange the realisation of capital
gains as well as losses so as to avoid the tax or minimise its effect to a great
extent.
These arguments, the pros, and cons.; to include or to exclude
capital gains and losses from taxation does leave the reader in a hesitating state
and renders the job of making one's own mind reach a decision which sounds feasible
and expedient from equity as well as economic efficiency point of view, very hard.
Before an attempt is made to reach any decision we have to discuss
very briefly the economic effects of taxing capital gains.
The main economic argument against the taxation of capital gains,
realised or accrued, is that it does discriminate against risk-bearing, saving
and capital formation. Under a progressive income tax the charging of capital
gains at the full rate as ordinary income would have an effeet on the incentive
1
to save and encourage capitalists to dissipate the capital. In general, according
to this argument, property owners who make capital gaino will do their best to
evade, or avoid, the tax or at least for the new investors not to invest their
savings in risky ventures.
A second important argument is that a capital gains tax is
necessary in an inflationary economy. A capital gains tax will reduce the boom
spending because it reduces the extent to which an individual's position on capital
1. Ibid. p. 371; and also N, Kaldor, An Expenditure Tax, p. 114 - 115. Under
the British income tax, for example, if capital gains were subjected to both
the standard rate and surtax rates, the effect would be that a great part of
these gains is taxed at an extremely high rate, e.g. 17/9 in the £.
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account is strengthened by the boom. This argument is attacked by. the allegation
that capital gains, on the whole, are saved during the boom as most property owners
enjoy a high income and need not spend such gains. Therefore, the taxation of
capital gains would not be effective in controlling the inflation. This
allegation seems groundless to some extent, as many individuals who realise
capital gains during the boom do come from the middle and upper-middle classes as
well as the high income groups. Thus the tendency to spend their gains is high
and consequently such expenditure would increase the inflationary pressure. The
degree of effectiveness on the inflationary pressure depends on the aggregate
amount of net capital gains realised during the period under investigation.
In a developed economy, a highly industrialised one, the amount
of net capital gains is far greater than that in a less-developed economy where
La
the individual sector is relatively small. On the other hand real estate owners
in underdeveloped countries have realised considerable amounts of capital gains
due to the rise in the level of prices during and after the Second World War.
In most underdeveloped countries capital gains realised from the sale of capital
1
assets, apart from the sale of business assets, are not subject to income tax.
The immediate effect of this tax exemption is to favour speculative transactions
as against ordinary productive investment. Sometimes this form of speculation may
be beneficial to the economic process of production and distribution, even though
investment aimed directly at these purposes would normally be more effective.
At other times speculation may be downright harmful, as for instance during the
1. Reviewing the recommendations of Selected Technical Assistance Missions 4of
the United Nations, it is observed that most countries visited by these missions
do not tax capital gains especially those realised from speculations. See
U.N., Taxes and Tiscal Policy in Under-developed Countries; pp. 43 - 111,
New fork, 1954.
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war years, when it served to accentuate the inflationary pressures. At such
times, some anti-inflationary effects might have teen produced tlirough the
imposition of a capital gains tax. A capital gains tax, moreover, would help
somewhat to redress the increasing inequality in the distribution of income and
wealth that usually accompanies inflation. On the other hand a capfcal gains tax
in an unde~ -capitalised country, as most underdeveloped countries are, might
have an adverse effect on capital formation. Therefore, it may be wise, in these
cases, to avoid interfering with the process of capitalisation even at some
sacrifice on other respects such as equity.
While exemption of capital gains of speculative nature might be
beneficial, we should try to tax gains realised from the transfer of property,
e.g., buildings, land, and other tangible assets. . ome countries already tax
these gains through a tax on the transfer of the property either through sale,
gift or at death. "The Danish practice of periodically taxing the increase in
value of land was commended as an example which might well be followed in
underdeveloped countries, especially where values of properties rise due to public
1
works." However, a net worth tax based upon the sales value of the assets is
also another alternative of property taxes in reaching capital gains.
Finally, f om the foregoing analysis, it is believed that the
taxation of capital gains through direct tax or through another medium such a3 a
tax on the transfer of property, is not undesirable for accomplishing specific
economic or social goals in an underdeveloped economy. Therefore, we should not
depend on a capitalg ains tax for raising revenue but only as a regulatory tax.
1. Ibid., p.35
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The question of administrative feasibility is of great importance in an underdeveloped
country where maladministration predominates. But the inefficiency of administration
should not stop or hinder the government from levying the tax on capital gains
realised from the sale of real estate, and not from speculative ventures,^" if the
government see3 that there is a pressing need for such tax to reach a certain social
2
or economic objective.
On the other hand, speculative capital gains should not be
completely exempted. Capital gains of this nature should be taxed if it becomes
a habitual act to the individual and therefore it should be recognised as income
derived from his job as a speculator in the stock market, for example. What we
should stress on is not to create a disincentive element for investment in under¬
developed countries where capital is scarce and initiatives or stimulants have to
be chanelled to stimulate investment. Therefore, any capital gains tax on the
appreciation in the value of securities, especially in the case where the majority
of shares are owned by the natives, will have a disincentive effect to invest,
even if such treatment conflicts with equity.
iii. Gross versus Net Income:
Income as a measurement of equality between taxpayers is a
misleading medium unless we find the relationship between the aggregate amounts
received by the person during the period, and the amounts comprehend net gain to
hira. Therefore adjustments must take place in thejarnount of gross income to acquire
1. By speculation in this context is meant that type of speculation which takes
place everyday in Stock Exchange dealings in shares and other securities.
2. Taxation normally is not directed to real values; it i3 always levied in terms
of monetary amounts. Therefore, there is no justification for exempting
inflationary, as against other gains on income. In fact all incomes in an
inflationary period are inflated, whether they are derived from sales, from
services or from work, with the exception of fixed income such as civil
servants, etc.
not incoiae. According to all tax legislations, deductions are allowed for
various items in order to arrive at true not income which represents the real
gain or the net increase in the individual's economic strength during a specific
period. The determination of net income involves two major problems. The fir3t
is the differentiation between expenditure necessary to earn income and consumption
expenses. The second is the allocation of expenses among specific periods.
Changes in the price levels will likewise involve a difficult problem in computing
net income through the evaluation of inventory or, in dealing with depreciation
and depletion allowances.
Briefly, it is rather difficult to differentiate between expenses
necessary for earning income and those for consumption or, in Vickrey's words,
"whether the return on the expenditure will be a direct non-taxable service to
2
the individual or will be in the form of taxable income." However, the revenue
authorities should find an appropriate solution by dividing these expenses into
classes for every type of business or profession. This solution is not simple to
administer and would include arbitrary elements to a limited extent. But it is
the usual practice in most income taxes that government tries to set up the
necessary regulations in order to distinguish between the two types of expenses as
adequately as possible.
The second problem relates to the principles of accountancy. Some
business expenses, such as advertising expenditures; business establishing
expenses occuring during the pre-production period, and other similar expenses,
prove to be useful for the establishing and the flourishing of business for several
1. J.?. Due, Government Finance, pp. 161 - 165«
2. W. Vivkrey, Agenda for Progressive Taxation, p. 121.
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years. Thus such expenditure must be allocated among the various years during
which the business has benefited.
Another problem related to the allocation of expenses is the
allocation of depreciation allowance of capital assets and equipments are usually
used for more than one year; therefore, its cost (depreciation charge) must be
distributed among the years during ivhich the asset is technically useful. Taxation
laws 3hould, as far as possible, ensure that the enterprise or the individual
property owner is not taxed upon the capital but on the return.
iv. Time Concept:
The time concept is an indispensible criterion in determining
taxable income. It is observed in almost all income taxes that income is usually
appropriated into one year periods, ^nd that each year is assessed independently
of the previous years. This generalisation should be modified as many income
taxes admit the deduction of previous losses from the current years profits or
carrying back losses to be deducted from previous profits. The carrying back and
forward of losses is an acceptable proceedure in modern fiscal systems as an
incentive as well as a relief for business, Moreover, the deduction of losses
from profits does coincide with equity considerations on the basis that the taxpayer
should be able to average his profits over several year3 in order to reach his
real ability to pay, i.e. his true taxable capacity.
One of the basic problems in determining the period of taxable
income is fixing the time during which income is considered to be realised or
created. Profit or loss realisation provides that such loss or profit has occurred
and arc tangible. Therefore, any gain or loss accrues during the taxable period
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which is limited by the liquidation of the business, should be taken into account
in imputing the tax.
The time concept also effects the method through which the inventory
is to be valuated. Methods of inventory valuation are mainly connected with
accountancy. If prices of goods purchased or produced change during the fiscal
year the problem of the evaluation of goods in stock at the end of the year arises.
The assessment of the income tax on a yearly basis involves in many
cases tax avoidance by providing a chance for shifting part of income from one
year to another. This is quite clear in the case of undistributed profits and
in cases concerning the calculation of depreciation and depletion.
Within a progressive tax system, the individual, whose income
fluctuates from Jrear to year will be taxed heavier than another person whose income
is the same in the average but distributed mote evenly. As a result of income
fluctuations under a progressive rate, a progressive income tax creates an
unjustifiable distribution of the tax burden as the ability to pay of the individual
with a fluctuating income is the same as the other who enjoys a steady income
though the first pay3 more taxes than the- second.
The solution of this problem is to give the taxpayer the option
of recalculating his tax liability over previous years and. taking the average as the
1. W. Vickrey, op. cit., p. 166.
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taxable income for each year. Thereafter the taxpayer could aoply for a refund
or credit of this difference between the tax computed according to this method
and that actually paid. This method seems impracticable and far beyond the
administrative feasibility in unaerdeveloped countries, due to the inefficient tax
administration.
To conclude the analysis of the income concept, any theoretical
2
definition is usually different from what is actually found in practice. In mo3t
cases, the practical definition is formulated according to various factors depending
on political, social as well as economic conditions.
In practice, many income tax laws do not define clearly the concept
of income, but they do define in the legislation arid interpreting regulations
what is the gross income and what allowances and reliefs are deductable from the
gross income to reach the net taxable income. This is the case in Britain,
France as well as in Egypt. By and large the elasticity of the income concept,
as a tax base, is an important and effective device in the hands of the Government.
It can be and is used to accomplish various economic and social objectives.
1. See H. Simmons, Personal Income Taxation. Chicago, 1955, p. 154-.
Another method has been developed by W. Vickrey known as the "Cumulative method".
The main structure of this method is that at the end of each ye fir the taxable
income of the current year would be added to the cumulative figure of income
from the date the individual started earning his income or from the date of the
establishment of the enterprise. Under this method the tax burden remains
independent of shifts within a specific period called the 'averaging period'.
But, on the whole, this method does not curtail the effects of non-responsiveness
of the tax yield to changes in either incomes or tax rates. The main
disadvantage, therefore, of the "cumulative method" is that it lags behind any
effective fiscal policy implemented in the boom or depression. In inflation,
for example, this method would not be of any tangible significance in absorbing
the excess purchasing power. Bee. W. Vickrey, Agenda for Progressive Taxation,
pp. 172 - 195.
2. Income according to Simons "would be readily and accurately measurable only in
a world where goods and services fell nearly into a small number of homogenous
classes." C.F. Simon, op. eit., p. 103.
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Factors affecting horizontal equity:
Civil status, temporary and permanent income, dependants and various
other factors have a substantial impact on the distribution of the tax burden
between individuals injoying the same amount of income. The following is a brief
account of these important factors which are indispensable if we want to reach an
equitable treatment of individuals according to their real ability to pay.
a) Civil status: A bachelor with the same income as a married man is obviously
in a better position. Therefore, a married person has to be favoured regarding
his income tax liability. When we are/faced with the problem of easuring
the difference between these two persons, the basic question is what amount of
1
taxes should a married person pay as compared to that payable by a bachelor? A
married couple with no dependents living together have a taxable capacity greater
than that of a bachelor having half of that income as it is cheaper for a couple
living together than a bachelor living alone who has to hire a person for domestic
help which is usually free in the case of a married couple.
Statistical data have to lie provided in order to obtain the required
resultsj i.e. the cost of living of various income groups in the community under
consideration, amount of income sufficient to satisfy the normal needs of a bachelor
within a specific income group and the relative income for a married couple with
no dependants, the net income a^ter taxation in each case, arid if the tax provisions
include the domestic work of the housewife in the taxable income or not. If it
is not included, do these provisions offer a special allowance for a housewife in
1. W.J. DeLangen, "The Assessment of Member of one Household", Public Finance.
Vol. XI. pp. 130 - 145.
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the case of an unmarried man, e.g. a divorcee or a widower?
Generally speaking, all these details should be taken into
1
consideration whenever the question of equity in the treatment of equals is discussed.
b) Dependants: A specific exemption for dependants is established on the basis
that each dependant requires a certain part of his supporter's income for his
existence. A person with three dependants needs a satisfactory income larger than
another who has just one child. Therefore, if both enjoy equal incomes, the
latter's capacity to pay taxes is bigger than that of the former. To achieve
equal distribution of the tax burden between these two persons each one has to be
granted a special allowance regarding the upkeep of the children in proportion to
their number. But a significant problem arises. It is possible that a child of
three years old does not need the same amount of income for his existence compared
to a dependant studying at a university. The latter needs a greater part of his
supporter's income than the former, therefore, it is always considered that the
differ? nee in the age of dependants, the increase in age, should increase the
allowance deductable from the taxable income.
Taking age differences into account will complicate the tax
assessment and will increase the administrative work as it would be necessary, if
these differences are considered to build up various scales which will depend
mostly upon the consumption figures of individuals in various income groups
according to their age. Another alternative solution is to take the average
1. It was proposed that "every income tax Act should have at least one scale of
rate indicating the amount of tax due for certain age groups of income. The
correct solutions, taking into account the composition of the family, can now
be found by means of
1. Various scales of family assessments...one scale for each size of family
2. Separate scale rates, in addition to those for bachelors.
3. The use of a general 3cale, the income of root taxpayers being increased or
decreased by a certain amount...before this scale is applied.
4. A combination of 1,2 and 3, namely of several scales with several increases
and/or decreases of the income. Ibid., p. 141.
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consumption figure of a child from his birthday up to 21 years (the normal date
of university graduation). This figure would be. based on a somewhat arbitrary
foundation, but I think that the age problem has to be solved arbitrarily in order
to facilitate the administrative job of the revenue authority. Consequently, a
clear rigid definition of dependants has to be provided in the tax legislation in
order to eliminate tax avoidance, and tables of each type of dependants have to
be drawn up in a way to avoid the misinterpretation of the dependancy status,
c) Earned dersus unearned incomes Should a distinction be made beWeen earned
and unearned income \Jith a view to achieving equity in distributing the tax burden?
on the principle of ability to pay it is clear that the sacrifice of paying an
income tax will be generally less on these incomes that result from the ownership
of property without the labour of the taxpayer than in the case of those incomes
derived almost entirely from such labour. The earned income is assumed to be more
precarious or unstable than that unearned. Therefore, earned income has to be
favoured regarding income taxation through granting special allowance for such
2
income. A clear definition is required for terms 'earned' and 'unearned' income.
Consequently, it is difficult to draw a demarcation line between
earned an' unearned income and the legislator has to depend on a semi-arbitrary
way of differentiation.
1. Earned income favourable tax treatment is discussed at length in Chapter 6.
2. In Britain, for example, the Select Committee on Income Tax of 1906 which
discussed the British Income Tax, and especially earned and unearned income,
stated that it is difficult to provide a completely logical and satisfactory
definition, but it was found that a rough working distinction which would
probably meet with general acceptance would be to regard the profits of private
traders as earned and those of public companies and similar undertakings as
arising from investment...the owner of the land who cultivates it himself would
be regarded as earning his income..., but the owner of an estate who lets it to
others to cultivate would not be regarded as earning the net income which he
derived from the land3 of that estate, although he might act as his own steward
and devote much time to ite supervision. See. Report of the Select Committee
on Income Tax. 1906, Cmd. (365) ix 659.
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To sum up, horizontal equity does not require only the equal
treatment of equals, but also it should consider some very important criterion in
order to achieve its purpose. The criterion are:-
1) The nature of the income conception as distinct from capital and the
differentiation between earned and unearned income.
2) The status for marital status allowances, including dependants.
3) Depreciation, depletion and other allowances from gross income to arrive at
net taxable income.
U) The adoption of any averaging method applied to a specific period of time.
It should not be left to the taxpayer's free will in choosing such period.
5) The valuation of inventory should be carried out in a uniform basis.
6) Losses to be carried out not more than one year backward and five years
forward in order not to complicate the administrative structure.
7) Exemptions should be subject to an averaging method, thus, they should also
be carried forward as most lower income taxpayers suffer a substantial loss of
being below the exemption level for several years and suddenly they may enjoy
large incomes afterwards. The solution, therefore, is to allow these taxpayers
1
to carry forward the unused exemption from one year to another with a time limit.
8) The incidence of the tax should be relatively determined in advance as it
affects the real distribution of the tax burden. An analysis of the economic
process which begins with the collection of variable taxes reveals that some taxes
tend to remain with the persons paying them to the govern!®nt, while other taxes
tend to be transferred or shifted entirely or partially. In order to build up
an equitable and productive tax system, precise studies are required to determine
who ultimately pays the tax, since the fiscal payment of taxes may be quite contrary
1. Due, op, cit., p. 181.
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to the opinions of the majority of the public. Therefore, it is essential,
before constructing a tax system, to study the shifting and the incidence of every
particular tax included in the tax system separately, according to the economic and
social conditions of the country.
Conclusion to the theoretical background of horizontal equity.
The foregoing analysis of the equity criterion has demonstrated
that any interpretation of this criterion is almost absurd and also involves a great
deal of arbitrariness. The various arguments which have encountered the equity
question have proved inadequate for one reason or another. What we could say is
that any choice or any selection in matters related to equity, is essentially,
more or le3S, a matter of value judgement. These judgements are usually based on
morale and political aspirations prevailing within a specific period, as the idea
of equity changes continually end developes with cultural, economic and social
conditions, and, therefore, it Is relative find historical. As a matter of
historical experience, the concrete meaning of this abstract concept has changed
from age to age. Therefore, we cannot simply accept what earlier times have
considered to be equitable but we must ask which system of taxation is compatible
with our present idea of equityj or in other words, with our present political,
economic and social environments.
Matters related to the theory of public finance in particular are
1
largely nationalisation of political attitudes. Political value judgements
should be based not only on pure political considerations but also on the economic
and social impact of the tax system, on the structure and activity of the community
as an integral unit. In many cases political considerations conflict with economic
1. P.A.M. Van Phillips, Public Finance and Less Developed Economy with special
reference to Latin America. The Hague, 1957, pp. 120 - 121.
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objectives or with social airasj therefore, the legislator, the economist and the
politician has to reach a sound and practical compromise which would render the
optimum benefit to the country as a whole.
In a less-developed economy revenue needs for economic growth usually
conflicts with equity principle. The government for financing development
programmes may increase tax rates, introduce new taxes, widen the tax base. This,
most probably includes an increase in the fiscal burden of the poor strata which
constitutes the major part of the population. Without impinging on low-income
groups the Treasury would be nearly paraliased in raising a sizeable amount of
revenue. Within the framework of income taxation, in order to meet both social
justice and government financial needs, income taxation should start from a
reasonable minimum level below subsistence if a wider base of tax is required and
it should be steeply progressive. Any scale of progression is closely linked
1
up with government financial needs and stability rather than with equity principle.
Moreover, along with economic progress steeply progressive income taxes should limit
the increase in the inequality in incomes. But on the other hand the rate of
progression of the tax should be limited by its effect on the incentive to work,
to save, invest and produce, as any increase in the scale of progression might have
an adverse effect on the economy as a whole through the disincentive effect of the tax.
Consequently, it is inevitable in underdeveloped countries seeking
to accelerate their economic development that their tax systems must suffer some
departure from the strict basis of ability to pay, if the targets of economic
development which form the imperatives of their national policies are to be attained
at a reasonable period. Though the criterion of equity cannot suitably be applied
to the tax system as a whole during the phase of development, this does not imply
that it is not possible to correct specific elements of inequality in some parts
1. xbid. p. 121.
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of the tax system.
By and large, equity is an illusive conceptj it is also highly
relative, particularly in judging any tax system. To form tiny judgement on the
equity of a specific tax we should take into consideration not only the distribution
of the burden of the tax under consideration alone, but we should judge the overall
burden of the tax system as one unit. Again we may say that any judgement of
the equity approach within the tax system is merely a value judgement closely
related to the question of taxable capacity along with the question of the incidence
of the various taxes comprising the tax system.
Finally, the burden that taxation imposes upon the economy is
balanced, or should be, by the benefits that the economy derives from government
services. But while it is possible to appraise with some degree of plausibility
the tax burden at different income levels, it is much more difficult to estimate
the value of the benefits that different inco® groups derive from government
services. A comparison of the burden of taxation with the benefits derived is
therefore a highly tentative and uncertain undertaking. Nevertheless, it is clear
that a country with a democratic form of government such a comparison i3 somehow
constantly being made by the voters. The economist therefore has little excuse
for not attempting it in analytical terms.
The difficulty of comparing burdens and benefits lies in the fact
that the services of the government are largely of an "overhead" character -
notably administration, security and justice - and that the benefits flowing from
them cannot be allocated convincingly to various income groups. Moreover the
degree to which individuals with equal incomes avail themselves of particular
services, such as highways, law courts, etc., varies widely. On the other hand,
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it has also been pointed out that the tax burden of similar individuals varies
considerably according to whether or not, through smoking, drinking, or otherwise,
they pay "avoidable" taxes. The lack of uniformity of incidence is therefore a
problem that exists on both sides of the equation.
To attempt a comparison of tax burden and government benefits by
no means implies the suggestion that the government ought to aim at equalising
burden and benefits. It has sometimes been urged that taxation should be made
equal to benefits, but in the thinking of economists, the "benefit theory" of
taxation has long played only a subordinate role. Moreover, the practice reflecting
the "benefit theory" employed by some governments, of earmarking certain revenues
for the benefit of the payers of the specific tax (a petrol tax for highways), is
generally regarded as undesirable because it breaks up the unity of the budget.
Consequently, no accurate method has yet been discovered to calculate
the distribution of the actual benefits of public services among the population.
Thi3 fact lenders the problem of measuring the distribution of the tax burden more
difficult. However, if any measurement were reached it would definitely include
an element of arbitrariness.
Horizontal Equity And The Egyptian Income Tax;
Now, after discussing the question of the equal treatment of equals
from the theoretical point of view and the problems related to the definition of
the income concept, an at empt will be made to analyse the Egyptian income tax
system from the horizontal equity viewpoint. Accordingly the analysis of this question
will be basically concentrated on the definition of income as the tax base and the
problems attaehed. The tax base has to be studied, in turn, from two separate points;
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a) What is income subject to tax?
b) Who are the individuals and enterprises liable to the income tax?
The Egytian Scheduled income tax, like its origin the French system,
does not ineludd any straightforward definition of taxable income. But on the
other hand a clear and simple classification was adopted by the Egyptian Scheduler
Tax, if one compares it with the British income tax. The classification of the
Egyptian Schedule.® income tax is based, primarily, on the differentiation of the
various types of income according to source: i.e., income derived from capital,
income from labour, find income from the combination of both sources. The Act
ermumerates the taxable items as well as those exempt, while in a few cases it
leaves the matter vague and to the interpretation of the Revenue Authorities and
to Court decisions. Moreover, the legislation provides us with special cases which
are subject to tax where it would, otherwise not be considered as income and thus
untaxable•
The Egyptian income tax Act followed the French interpretation of
the term 'income' which considers income as the product of capital. In other
words, income is defined as the periodical product or as a susceptible to periodicity
of a durable source which consists of personal activity, work or other material
1
wealth. In order to keep the source of income intact a depreciation allowance
should be deducted from gross income and accumulated over time to provide for the
replacement of the exhausted source. This basic interpretation which is followed
within the Egyptian legislation has some exceptions. To give a comprehensive
1. This is what is called the theory of "utilisation" (these d'explotation).
Bee E. Allix & M. Lecercle, Impots bur le Revenues they stated (p. 351)
"le revenue, avons-nous dit est 1c produit periodicque on susceptible de
perlodicite d'une source durable, qui peut consistcr dans l'activitle
personnelle, ou travail, ou dans certains beins materiels ou incorporals".
TOOX l«a/ 1.5
analysis of the Egyptian income tax system from the viewpoint of its base, it
seem3 desirable that the analysis should follow the same classification of the
Income Tax Acts.
1
From the background of the Egyptian income tax system, we find
that the Scheduler Taxes are levied on the different sources of income, taking into
consideration the income concept in its narrow difinition, as its main object while
paying little attention to the personal situation of the taxpayer. Per contra,
the General Income Tax recognises the taxpayer's personal and civic conditions as
an important factor in determining income subject to tax.
a) Income derived from negotiable property.
Under this schedule the term taxable income includes all types of
dividends, interest and other profits derived from all sorts of shares and other
securities, whether such profits are periodical or not and whether the distribution
is -tffected or granted in the form of gratuitous shares or in any other form.
Drawings on account of profits made by companies in favour of directors or members
of the Board of Directors, or of any other party receiving a share in the profits
and also a renummeration paid in whatever kind to the member of the Board of
Directors, such as attendance fees, gratifications, or other emoluments of any
kind. These provisions are not applicable to profits due either to managing
directors or other directors, over tnd above the sums payable tothe other members
of the Board of Directors, in return for administration work undertaken by them;
Hot more than two specially designated directors of any one company, however, may
benefit from this exemption, provided that the total sums accruing to each
director, either in the form of fixed renummeration, or as a percentage of the net
profits or otherwise, should not exceed £E3,000 per annum. This also applies to
redemption premiums paid, to creditors and prises drawn in lottery bonds paid to
bondholders.
1. See Appendix to Part 1.
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Any type of the above mentioned income '.ihieh is paid to an
Egyptian or a foreigner resident or habitually residing in Egypt is subject to the
tax, whether they are actual individuals or legal entities and whether such income
is paid in Egypt or elsewhere. Therefore any Egyptian or foreign enterprise whose
activities extend to countries other than Egypt, and even if their head or
administrative offices are out of Egypt, are considered as carrying on a business
solely in Egypt and thus any interest, dividends, or any sort of profit paid to
any Egyptian individual or company residing in Egypt are subject to tax. Moreover,
if any foreign company, any public authority or any other foreign service pays
such income to an Egyptian or a foreigner residing in Egypt it is taxable.
Consequently, there are two basic rules which govern the liability
of income under this Schedule;
i) The political allegiance, which comprehends the liability of all interest,
dividends and the like paid to Egyptians living anywhere, and to foreigners residing
or domiciled in Egypt, to the Egyptian tax.
ii) The economic allegiance indicates that any kind of Income derived from any
capital invested in negotiable securities in an Egyptian or foreign enterprise
carrying business in Egypt is subject to the Egyptian tax.
b) Incomes derived from interest on all privilege, mortgage. and ordinary debts
and on all cash deposits and guarantees due to Egyptians or foreigners resident
or domiciled in Egypt, even if such interest is payable in respect of capital
invested abroad, are taxable. Therefore interest accruing from all capital
invested in Egypt is also liable to tax even if the persons entitled thereto are
foreigners having no actual legal domicile in Egypt.
c) Corrrrcial and industrial profits:
The Scheduled? tax levied a separate tax on profits derived from
ISO
commerce and from industry, including profits derived from mining and other
concessions or undertakings. Joint stock companies, Whatever the object of such
companies, are liable to tax.
The Act ha. ennumerated other categories of taxable income while
it would not otherwise be taxable according to the narrow interpretation of
"income conception" within the framework of the theory of 'utilization' (those
d'exploitation). Profits realised by persons, and companies acting as brokers
for the purchase of buildings or businesses, or who habitually purchase buildings
or businesses for their own account with a view to resale are subject to tax.
Profits made by stockbrokers, exchange brokers, agents working
on commission, and ir genera] every person, company, agency or office acting as
brokers for the purchase and sale of all goods or valuables whatsoever, are also
subject to income tax.
be
Other profits which could not/easily identified as commercial or
industrial profits, were also taxed according to the legislation otherwise, as
above mentioned they become automatically exempted. Such profits are those
realised by persons or companies who sell their land in lots after laying out
1
roads and other works to prepare it for building or other establishment.
Under this schedule although taxable income is defined according
to the utilization theory other taxable elements fire also taxable which is not
considered according to this theory as income but the legislator -indude
1. Profits realised by persona or companies who give on lease commercial or
industrial premises supplied with furniture or plant necessary for their
use, whether or not the lease comprises all or part of the necessary
in tellations for such business, are cubject to income tax under the
provisions of Art. 32. Lav? No. 14. of 1939.
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had to include it as taxable income as a precautionary measure against evasion
if the individual tried to undertake large commercial operations within a
prolonged time lag between each operation,and, therefore, the periodicity of
1
income could not easily be proved.
Capital gains and losses are considered as ordinary gains and
losses under two conditions; the first when a business sells an asset, e.g. a
machine, for a price above the written value; the second case is when capital
profits are realised by a broker, who undertakes stock-brokerage as a profession,
from speculations in the stock exchange. Other types of speculative gains or
losses are outside the scope of inocma taxes if realised by an ordinary person.
The folbwing are the most important and basic problems encountered
in the enforcement of the Tax on Commercial and Industrial profits;
i) The dilemma of taxing capital gains:
Here the question of taxing capital gains, other than the above
mentioned cases, arises. Is it possible to tax such gains even if they result
from the changes in the price levels? Egypt has four exchange markets, two
stock-exchange, one in Cairo and the other in Alexandria, and two markets dealing
with Egyptian cotton at Alexandria, a future cotton market and a spot cotton market.
1. Under the Tax on Commercial and Industrial Profits, the Act stateu many
peculiar items as taxable income regarded a3 commercial or industrial profits,
but in fact they are of special type, 'suis generis1, and, therefore, it was
most practical to consider them as taxable income to alleviate the misinter¬
pretation of the terms 'commercial and industrial profits'. The question
of interpreting these terms is the most debatable question within the
Egyptian income taxe3. Thus to decide whether a certain profit is a commercial
or industrial profit we have to refer to the provisions of the Civil Law
and the Commercial Law as well, even though it would still be difficult to
draw a sharp line between what could be considered as a commercial or industrial
profit and between what could be notified as non-commercial profit. Accordingly,
the legislators tried their best to interpret such debatable items in order to
draw a line but they could not. Therefore, a state of conflict between the
different laws was created and the Administration as well as the Legislative
Authorities (courts) still suffer from such miscomprehension.
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The dealings in the stock exchange markets ore open to the public through a
medium; i.e. the broker, while dealings in the cotton markets are relatively
restricted to traders and exporters. This does not mean that individuals are
not allowed to carry on transactions or speculations. The basic fact is
Governmental restrictions are imposed on transactions in the cotton markets to
secure the price of Egypt's major export crop. Minimum and maximum price levels
are imposed for daily transactions. Other restrictions are imposed to eliminate
1
the interference of outsiders in the cotton markets. Briefly, profits or
losses from the speculation in the cotton, at present, are of minor importance
due to the limits and restrictions imposed on the daily price fluctuations. On
the other hand, gains find losses realised from dealings in the stock-exchange are
considered of some importance as it amounts sometimes to large amounts per person,
as the transactions are almost free from any governmental interference (other
than an overall supervision by the Government Representative at the Stock-Exchange).
A3 previously mentioned when discussing the theory of the taxation
of capital profits in underdeveloped countries, especially those profits realised
2
from speculation in the stock-exchange, we believe that even the exeiaption of
such profits from taxation may violate the equity principle, it is more beneficial
to the country to exclude such profits from income taxation on the grounds of
stimulating investment and increasing the rate of capital formation in the long
run. Equity has, therefore, to be partially neglected for economic and also
for administrative reasons in this case.
1. Before the 1952 revolution, the cotton markets, especially the Futures market,
were considered as the only place in the country where quick gains from
speculation could be made. This resulted, in 1951 and early 1952, in huge
capital gains realised by several persons who were considered outsiders.
At 1951 and 1952 the price of the Egyptian cotton was almost double its
price in the international market and the outcome was a decline in cotton
exports due to high prices.
2. See pp.
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Yet gains from transactions in real property 3uch as houses and
land, have to be taxed when transferred through sale, exchange or bequeathed.
Administrative problems might arise when enforcing this tax. At present, a
is
proportionate fee is paid when the asset/transferred and, therefore, it would
be a relatively easy procedure for the Authorities to introduce the new proposed
tax on that amount in excess of the selling price, i.e. capital gain. Severe
penalties must be provided in case of fraud and false statements concerning the
sale or the purchase price. Generally speaking, it seems relatively feasible
and administratively convenient to levy a capital gains tax on profits from
speculations in immovable property than on that realised from transations in the
stock-exchange•
The rate of the proposed tax has to be fixed according to the
socio-economic policy being adopted by the Government. A rate of 20% on such
gains would sound reasonable if we compare it with the rate of the U.S.A. capital
gains tax. Why not 10%, for instance? A relatively high rate,as 20%,in
comparison to the proportionate rate of the Scheduler Tax on Commercial and
Industrial Profits, 17%;is desirable for economic reasons. This rate would help
in eliminating the amount of investment in housing and land. Therefore, a shift
towards more beneficial investment, e.g. industry, mining, etc., would have a
high rate of economic return to the community which would help in raising the
national income in a relatively higher rate. In general terms, this tax with
its high rate could be rationally considered as a disincentive to invest in
immovable property which is of minor importance to economic development.
ii) The non-taxation of agricultural income and non-monetary Income.
The second important problem which renders the definition of taxable
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income equitable is the exclusion of agriculture! income from taxation unless
it is realised by a joint stock company.
One of the most favoured sections in the Egyptian community is
that which derives its income from agriculture. Agricultural profits are exempt
from Scheduler taxes. In 1950 an amendment took place trying to put things into
order and to eliminate the inequity in the distribution of the income tax burden.
It emphasised this exemption and brought the profits realised by the individual
1
who rent3 a piece of cultivatable land and sublets to others into taxable income.
This amendment did nob change much of the fact that agricultural profits are
immune from income taxation. Besides, when the tax on aggregate personal income
is applied, agricultural profits are calculated according to the rental value
(minus 20: for maintenance and administration), which is already underestimated.
Such favourable treatment which increases the inequality in t he distribution of
the tax burden was mainly due to the political power enjoyed by the landowners in
Egypt.
Deriving from the above question is the problem of taxing the
non-monetory income enjoyed by the agricultural population in the form of the
comsumption of home produce.
Theoretically, non-monetary income should be included in the tax
base in order to reach an equitable treatment of equals according to their relative
taxable capacity. In actual income tax legislations, however, the tax base is
ordinarily restricted, because of administrative considerations to income that is
1. The difference between the rent paid to the owner and the rent collected by
the first tenant from the second grade tenants is the taxable income. Art.
32 Law No. 14/1939, amended by Lav/ No. 14-6/1950.
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realised by the individual through exchange transactions, and hence this results
in exempting from taxation the value of goods find services produced and consumed
by the same household.
In most underdeveloped countries where the agricultural sector is
of great importance, compared with other sectors of the economy, the proportion
of home-consumed farm products amounts to about a half of the total agricultural
1
income. Moreover, there are other types of non-monetary income of widespread
character in the agricultural sector such as the imputed value of owner-occupied
dwellings, fuel gathered by the household and other types. Although these latter
types of non-monetary income should be included in the tax base as it represents
an increase in the taxable capacity of the individual, it is believed that to
ignore the inclusion of such types would not violate seriously the equity
2
principle as it represents a relatively small fraction of the aggregate income.
On the other hand the reasoning behind the exemption limit which i3 usually offered
to income earners in the industrial sector could be met in the agricultural sector
by exempting the non-monetary income which is, in nearly all cases, earned by
individuals below the subsistence level. Therefore, the exemption of the non¬
monetary income in the agricultural sector is almost equivalent to the exemption
limit offered, for example, to the wage earners within the industrial sector.
Accordingly, such exemption doea not infringe th equity approach.
Needless to say, we should not ignore that part of agricultural
1. The proportion of home-produced food in total food consumption in India, for
example, is 63%, See, Report of the Taxation inquiry Commission. 1953-54)
Vol. 1. pp. 63-66. Government of India.
2. H.R. Wald, Taxation of Agricultural band in Underdeveloped Economies, p. 113
Cambridge, Mass., 1959.
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products which does not reach the market. Income from mon< tary transactions
should be taxed according to the 'net income' criterion of taxation. Some
difficulties might involve the taxation of cash income in the agricultural
sector of the underdeveloped country because of the inefficient administrative
apparatus and the widespread illiteracy among farmers.
Finally, the taxation of non-mon tary income of the agricultural
sector in underdeveloped countries is considered a very difficult if not remote
from the administrative point of view. We need not worry about equity
consideration in case of exempting such income as the majority of the farming
polulation enjoy income below subsistence out of which the home consumed products
compose a large proportion. The exemption in this case is more, or less, based
on humanitarian motivations at the one hand and on administrative infeasibility
on the other.
Egypt, as most underdeveloped countries, does basically enjoy
an agricultural economy where the agricultural sector comprises about 35% of the
national income."*' Non-monetary income is represented to a large extent in
2
home-consumed farming products. It was estimated that out of the foodstuff
grown in Egypt before World War II and early years of the War, " -f- of it never
3reached the market, being retained for consumption by producers." If
we assume that the above estimation is still valid, if not (the percentage) being
increased as the population increases by a rate higher than the increase in
1. According to the Official Estimate of the National Income of Egypt for 1954,
the agricultural sector amounted to £E310,153,000 out of the total figure of
the national income of £E867,504,000. statistical Pocket-Year-book. 1955.
2. Agricultural population amounts to over 78% of aggregate population in Egypt}
Op. cit.




agricultural food products, we could deduce that in 1954, for example, where
the agricultural foodstuff produced amounted to about £E132 million (this figure
includes basic foodstuff usually consumed by the average farmer, such as maize,
wheat, rice, onions, and other products). Accordingly the amount homely
consumed would amount to about £E100 million. The per capita consumption of
home-produce within the agricultural population would be mound £E12 a year
which is considered a very low figure (compare it with the exemption limit in
the Schedular Tax which is £E10Q a year for a single person).
Consequently, the exemption of the non-monetary income in the
Egyptian agricultural sector does not represent any violation of equity. Moreover,
any argument in favour of the inclusion of such income in income tax base could
easily Ixj defeated on humanitarian principles even if administrative difficulties
could be surmounted.
(iii) Estimated versus actual income from a viewpoint of equity:
The Egyptian Schedular Income Tax, especially the Tax on
Commercial and Industrial Profit, has always been a mystery to the administration
for the various difficulties and problems it has faced, especially in dealing
with the assessment of arrears. Several legislative measures have been taken
to overcome such difficulties but it seems that such remedies are not enough to
cure the illness. To make the above statement clearer we have to emphasise that
according to the provisions embodied in the Lai/ the tax should be assessed annually
on the net profits of the business after a careful auditing of the taxpayer's
accounts. Therefore, the basic principle in the tax assessment is that every
year has its separate autonomous character from any other year. The only
1. The year 1954 was chosen because the latest data available for national
income estimates is confined to this year.
exception to that rule, as we will see later when discussing the question of
exemptions,"1" is the carrying backward of business losses for three successive
year3.
As a result of administrative difficulties the capacity of the
Taxation Department lagged behind the assessment of the accumulated returns.
Therefore, legislative measures were sought in a trial to overcome such problems.
Several laws were enacted fixing the profits of the year 194-7 as a taxable base
for the following years up to 1954/ The arbitrary and vigorous fixation of
the tax base without talcing into consideration fluctuations in profits due to
changes in t lie economic or political environments, is a severe bLow to equity
doctrine which entails the equal treatment of equals according to their taxable
capacity. On the economic basis the year 1947 was relatively a year of high
level of profits compared to 1943 and 1949, while the level of profits increased
3
in later years due to the Korean Warj in 1950 up to 1952. But in 1952 the rise
in profits was mainly due to the sharp increase in cotton prices. On the other
the
hand political instability of the later years, especially the year after/July
Revolution,has affected the level of profits to a certain extent. These
fluctuations in profits resulted in unequal distribution of the overall tax
burden beWeen taxpayers. Consequently sevei*al protests were lodged by the
taxpayers. These provisions were abolished giving way to new legislative measures
which are considered by the administration as more logical and equitable if compared
1. Chapter 6 of this work, p p, 2 3 1 • ' '
2. Laws Nos. 240/1952, 587/1954 and 206/1955. These laws are applicable only
in case of taxpayers who do not keep accurate accounts. Therefore, joint
stock companies are not subject to these laws as they are obliged by the
Comapnies Act to follow a sound book-keeping system and to publish its final
accounts and the balance sheet every year.
3. Budget Reports. 1949/50, 1950/51, 1951/52. Egyptian Government, Ministry of
Finance and Economy.
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with the previous measures. However, the new act has chosen the profits of
the year 1955 as a base for assessing the tax for 1956, 1957 and 1950 profits if
the base (1955 profits) is not over £E150j and only for 1956 and 1957 if the
base year profits is over £E150 and does not exceed £E500. These provisions are
only applicable to taxpayers who do not keep accounts. The tax authorities
as well as the taxpayers have been given the choice of not being committed to the
new measure if the actual profits (or losses) have been increased (or decreased);
in other words the right to change the method of assessment depends on the choice
of either the Taxation Department or the taxpayer according to the fluctualions
which might have occurred in the taxpayer's profits.
This method oP assessing the Tax on Commercial and Industrial
Profits is advocated basically on administrative feasibility. On the other
hand it could be attacked on equity grounds. Although the new provisions gave
the right to charge the tax base of 1955 if a change in the taxpayer's profits
occurred, it is a fact that this new provision would raise various administrative
2 I
problems which would in turn affect the efficiency of legislation enforcement.
It has been emphasised that, according to empirical data, over
60$ of taxpayers subject to the Sehedular Tax on Commercial and Industrial
Profits earn an amount of profits below the exemption limit (£E100 for a single
person, £E120 for a married person with no children, and £E150 for a married
person with children) and that 30$ of the taxpayers enjoy a profit of over the
1. Law No. 102/1958 effective from 21/7/58.
2. From my experience as a Tax Inspector in the Taxation Department, I found
that it i3 very difficult to discover any change in the taxable profits due
to lack of information and to the poor existing machinery of assessment.
Therefore, it is rather difficult to trace any increase in the taxpayers
profits which might necessitate the change of the 'base'.
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the exemption limit and not mere than £E5G0 a year. Consequently only IOC
of total taxpayers subject to the mentioned Schedular Tax will become unaffected
1
by this new legislative measure. This fact stimulated the authorities to
bring into being the above measures to save wasted administrative efforts without
severe violation to equity.
According to the above mentioned legislative measures, joint-stock
companies, partnerships or any other form of company, are excluded from such
measures, as these companies are supposed to keep regular accounts and follow
a sound book-keeping system; besides they usually make profits of over £E5Q0 a
year. The importance of joint-stock companies in supplying a sizeable yield of
the Tax on Conr ercial and Industrial Profits is quite obvious from the following
data; these type of companies yielded over 56;.; of the aggregate yield of this
2
specific tax in 1955/56. The aggregate number of taxpayers tuxi r this schedule,
Including all types of companies, amounted to 397344 at the beginning of 1956
out of which 1334 are joint-stock companies ? It. otv.eras, only 0.4^ of the
tital number of taxpayers supplied a revenue of 56'^
My conclusion to the foregoing analysis ia that the new amendment
seems to be beneficial and feasible from the administratis viewpoint, while it is
clear breach of equity. The pracitoal judgewent should be based on the
experience gained from the performance of this legislative measure. As this
measure is newly bom any factual or basic judgement has to be postponed for the
time being. I believe that to ensure an adequate enforcement of such measure
1. Almost all taxpayers with profits under £"500 a year do not keep accounts and
therefore it would be difficult to assess the tax which would in turn,be
relatively small compared to the administration.
2. £E4,514>693 out of £E3,Ol4,550. Statistics Div., Depart?®nt of Taxation.
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a special information division should be immediately established to enquire
into the various cases where the taxable capacity of taxpayers represented in
their respective profits have changed from that of 1955, the base year. This
would curtail the element of arbitrariness in the tax assessment which, in turn,
would decrease inequity embodied in this measure.
d) Income derived fr m wages, salaries, pensions and other emoluments:
The SchedulaT income tax subjects a3 1 types of emoluments of work
other than that done by a self-employed person to a special Schedule. Income
subject to this Schedule might be paid by either:-
a) A Public Authority, which includes the State, Municipal and Provincial
Councils, or
b) Any Company, private individual or any other concern or organisation.
In the first case all wages, salaries and similar income paid to
any person resident or domiciled in Egypt or elsewhere by any of the mentioned
authorities is subject to tax. In the second case one has to discriminate
between the following in order to determine the tax liability:-
i) If the Egyptian or the foreign enterprise pays a salary to a person resident
abroad in respect of services performed abroad, such salary would not be liable
to the Egyptian Scheduler Tax.
ii) If the services are performed in Egypt, whether the employer is resident in
Egypt or abroad, his renummeration is subject to tax. Ships flying the Egyptian
flag, Egyptian Embassies and Consulates, and also Egyptian territorial waters
are recognised as Egyptian territories. Thus any services performed by any
individual, whatever nationality he is, are reckoned as services performed in
r* x 1Egypt.
1. Lay Mo. U of 1939, Art.. 61-
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iii) If a foreigner who obtains any type of renummeration is resident in Egypt,
even if such emoluments are paid by a foreign enterprise and even paid in respect
of services performed out of Egypt, such income is taxable.
The basic problem which usually faces the Administration is the
interpretation of the term "resident" and "domicile". These terms will be
1
elaborated when discussing the problem of d uble taxation.
(c) Income from non-Commercial Professions:
Income derived from profits of liberal professions and other
non-commercial professions practi ed in Egypt either by an Egyptian or a foreigner,
2
is subject to the Schedule Tax. Moreover, any income derived from any profession
or activity not subject to any other Schedule is subject to tax levied on non-
3commercial professions. Thi3 tax, for its widespread field of operations
concerning its base; e.g. the diversity of persons liable, is called the "general
tax" of the Schedular Income Tax.
The liability of individuals to this tax is mostly confined to
those exercising non-commercial professions independantly; i.e. self-employed,
where labour is the main source of income.
The tax under this Schedule was firstly assessed on the rental value
1. See Chapter VII, p. 2 ^ 0 *
2. Liberal professions are those professions principally based on the personal
activity of exercising an art or science, such as a physician, surgeon,
accountant, scupton and others.
3. The Law provided some exceptions which are exempted from this schedular tax,
they are: a) All associations whose objects are not pecuniary gain, within the
limit of their social, scientific and sporting activities, and also scholastic
institutions, b) Any agricultural enterprise which is not constituted as a
joint-stock eamppny. (This is to affirm the exemption of agricultural profits
of private enterprise and partnership.)
4-. This is apart from the "General Income Tax" on total personal income by a
separate Law. No. 99/1QA9.
of the jfo.ce where the professional exercises his profession. (This provision
was abolished later in 1950 and the tax was levied on the real income of the
individual. This amendment took place after a prolonged criticism of the most
favourable treatment to a special class of the community which was an obvious
violation to the equity principle. There was a great relief to other taxpayers
when the amendment came into force in 1951 and it seemed, however, that a fair
balance in the distribution of the income tax burden is in sight. But such
optimism did not last long as in December 1955 a peculiar Law (Law No. 642/1955)
came into force offering special favourable fiscal treatment to professional
1
self-employed university graduates. They are given the choice of being assessed
according to their actual profits or according to a fixed amount of money which
increased according to the j«riod of practice which starts from the elapse of the
fifth year after graduation , (persons exercising a profession which necessitates
a university or college degree are exempt from this tax during the first five
years from the time of graduation).
On the other hand this new legislation excluded those who realised
£E1,000 or more as net profits during the years from 1951-54, and, therefore,
they are subject to tax on their actual net profits. Moreover, the new legislative
measure provided another privilege bo those who pay the tax on their net actual
profits, that is the tax assessed on 1954 profits will be the same amount for the
two successive years, 1955 and 1956, and so on.
These above mentioned special privileges given to a certain class
of the community could be simply considered as a straightforward breach of equity.
There is no apparent reason, administrative or socio-economic, for such privileges
1. See appendix to Part 1.
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end for the discrim' nation in fiscal treatment of the intellectucl gi*oups,
seIf-employed, of the Egyptian community. The only reason which could be deduced
from the events which were behind this Law is more or less political. The power
enjoyed by self-employed professions through their respective unions put a
pressure on the Government to revise the income tax on liberal-professions and
to introduce the old way of tax assessment; that levied on t he rental value of
the place of practice. Consequently, I strongly oppose the applies ion of this
amaendment on equity grounds and I believe that an immediate abolition of such
privileges is imminent in order to acquire fiscal justice. The tax should be
levied according to the individual's taxable capacity measured by hi3 net income,
f^ The General Income Tax:
Following the Italian Income Tax structure, the Egyptian General
Tax is levied on the total annual net income earned by the taxpayer and determined
on the basis of income from, real estate, movable property, professional earnings,
indemnities, emolumentsj commercial or industrial profits, pensions or annuities
and other types. In general, all income subject to the Schedular Income Tax is
also subject to this tax with some exceptions:
a) While some types of income realised abroad are exempt from the SchedulaiJ tax,
they are subject to the G.I.T., e.g. commercial and induetrial profits realised
by an Egyptian carrrim? business abroad is exempt from the Schedular tax, while
he is subject to the U.1.T, on the basis of"Political Allegiance",^
b) According to'Buildings' Tax, the taxpayerJs own house is subject to tax.
But according to the provisions of the G.I.T,, the assessment does not include
the net imputed income of the house occupied by the taxpayer.
While the dominating outlook of the Schedular Income Tax
1. While the Schedular tax on wages and salaries exempts any remuneration paid
by a foreign authority to an Egyptian residing abroad, it is subject to
the G.I.T,
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is objective, it is different in the case of the G.I.T. It is the subjective
outlook which dominates the latter and thus the individual taxpayer is the major
factor in determining the liability to the tax. The following are the basic
principles ruling the liability of individuals to the G.I.Ts-
a) The political allegiance, a3 for all Egyptian nationals.
b) The principle of Domicile, as for foreigners domiciled in Egypt.
c) The economic allegiance, as for foreigners not domiciled in Egypt in respect
of that part of their income which is realised in Egypt.^
The G.I.T. also exempts agricultural profits and therefore, it
increases the fiscal favouritism to landowners who have long been immune from a
2
re. 1 income taxation on their net agricultural profits.
In general, the Egyptian tax structure and the tax returns are
clear indication of how the system is based, partially, on a kind of political
and socio-economic favouritism. A clear example is that the holders of State
securities are completely immune from income taxation, present or future, with
the result that every increase in the demand for public revenue has to be borne
by other sections of the community; i.e. those who pay taxes through "the
at
stoppage/source" mechanism (wage and salary earners and receivers of income from
movable property). The Imposition of the tax on general income does not seem
to have improved such a situation; i.e. lessening the inequality in incomes
1. The Act provided two basic rules in considering the question of domicile of
a foreigners (a) if his principal place of residence is in Egypt; or
(b) if his principal interests aise in Egypt. The question of domicile,
however, is still not solved by these two rules. As the Egyptian Laws could
not inumrnerate all cases of foreigners domiciled in Egypt, he left the burden
for the Courts to study each debatable case separately.
2. The/ only pay the Land Tax on the rental value which is estimated every ten
years.
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and wealth, even the later increase in the rate of progression which took
ploce in August 3.952, after the Revolution, and the sharpening of the sliding
scale did not result in an effective change; as in 1958 the yield of the G.I.T.
was about 20$ of the total yield of income taxation.
Any successful application of the equity principle, which are objective
and quantitive considerations, can be judged with reference to four factors:
a) The volume of national income and its distribution among individual and
institutional taxpayers, and as between different sectors? e.g. rural and urban.
b) The aggregate tax load in the community.
c) The direction and extent of tax shifting.
d) The distribution of public services and commodities.
For tho purpose of estimating the distribution of public benefits,
the simplest but obviously least satisfactory assumption would be that all people
share equally in the benefits of government services, irrespective of income or
social status. The weakness of such an assumption is that many of the services
that the Government renders aim at the protection, not only of the individual,
1
but also of his income and wealth.
The services rendered by maintaining order and providing protection
may reasonably be regarded as being distributed in direct proportion to eadh man's
wealth and income.
The benefits of social find cultural services provided by the
Government rseem to accrue, predomim ntly to the classes possessing power which
obtain education and medical care in hospitals free of charge or below coat.
But it would be wrong to assume that the members of higher income groups do not
benefit from these services. If, for instance, the Government did not free
1. See footnote on next page.
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education, the higher income groups would no doubt resort to private education,
but since the Gov eminent educational facilities are available to there, their
own expenses for this purpose are reduced. Moreover, the upper classes also
derive indirect benefits from the social and cultural services rendered to the
lower income groups since an overall Improvement of education and health raises
the productivity of the economy as a whole.
The benefits of economic development, finally, are probably
distributed among the members of the community in proportion to their 'stake'
in the economic life of the country; i.e. in proportion to their income and wealth.
This will certainly be true if develppmental expenditures raise total national
income without changing its distribution, which is in fact the most plausible
assumption in the absence of special policies designed to aid specific social
groups.
Generally speaking, in Egypt as well as in most less-developed
countries, data concerning the distribution of personal income, the distribution
of the tax burden among various income groups and also the distribution of
Governmental benefits are either not available to all or,if part of the data
is available, are incomplete and guesstimates. Besides, income tax incidence
within the Egyptian fiscal system is very difficult to arrive at. This fact is
not only applicable to the Egyptian tax but is also found in advanced countries
Footnote £ from previous page.
The value of this protection accorded to a person with a higher income or
with more wealth is obviously larger than that rendered to a person with
a lower income and little or no wealth. In order to arrive at a basis for
a more adequate appraisal of the distribution of Government benefits, it
appears, therefore, useful to distinguish between the following three types
of benefits: 1. The maintenance of order and protection against interne!
and external disturbances; 2. Social and cultural services), and 3* economic
benefits.
14 8
where any measurement of the shiftabiltiy and incidence of taxation is based more
be
or less on arbitrary assumptions which could/easily turned down if such assumptions
are inapplicable in our real life.
Accordingly, it is regrettable that, for the above reasons, one is
unable to measure the distribution of the income tax burden in Egypt in order to
judge accurately the equity of t he t ax.
III. VERTICAL EUIITf JTIMUL.--.TES PROGRESSION IN TAX RATES.
Taxation is commonly used, besides producing revenue, to reduce
irregularities of income and wealth. This is mainly achieved, by applying a
progressive system of taxation which places a heavier rate of charge on large than
small incomes, since the ability of the subject is assumed to increase in a more
rapid ratio than the increase of his income. At the beginning of this century
the idea of progressive taxation was elaborated on the ground -hat "the loss of
a portion of wealth by a rich man is generally regarded as a very slight evil
1
or as none at all, while to a poor one it causes cuttailment of real enjoyment."
The changing of the centre of political gravity during the
nineteenth century towards democracy has brought about the tendency to alter the
distribution in favour of the most powerful class, which usually has a numerical
majority. As the numerical raajoidfcy of the people were poor and from the middle
classes the burden was heavier on the wealthy by means of progressive taxation.
Moreover, progressive taxation tends mainly to exempt a limited amount of income
or wealth from taxation a3 a necessity for the upkeep of the community. Basically
1. C.F, Bastable, Public Finance, p. 305
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speaking, the diffusion of socialist ideas assists the .movement towards
progressive taxation.. The socialistic movement inclined most of the recent
economists to favour the relieving of the poorer classes from the rigidity of
excessive taxation. Therefore, a moderate progression was approved and highly
advocated. At the same time income or wealth below a certain level was exempted
from taxation, on welfare basis,of the poor class.
Progression can be found within a proportioned tax with the exemptions
of the lower income group. This merely refers to the progression in the effective
rate of the tax. Thus, proportional rate with a continuous exemption of the lower
income bracket produces progression. This fact could be almost obtained without
having progressive marginal, rates. ^ueh progression is apparent because taxpayers
have a progressively larger fraction of their i comes liable to tax as they are
just over the exemption limit. The effective tax rate will vary from zero at the
exemption limit up to a point nearly reaching the flat rate of the tax, but it
1
never reaches it. From tris statement, as the progression of the single rate
1. The following example illustrates clearly the progres ice feature of a
proportional tax with exemption limit. (A flat rate is 1D% abd exemption level
£100 for all incomes.)
Income Tax Liability Effective Income Tax liability Effective
£ £ % Rate £ £ Rate %
100 exempted 0 2,500 240 9.6
200 10 5 4,000 390 9.75
300 20 6.6 6,000 590 9.83
400 30 7.5 10,000 990 9.90
700 60 8.5 20,000 1,990 9.99
1,000 90 4#,0 100,000 9,$90 9.99
1,500 140 9.33
1 5 P
according to the exemption of the lower income is inescapable we have to adjust
the degree of progression through adding a certain amount of progression to the
flat rate. This will mean graduating the marginal hates of the tax upwards, or
in other words introducing a relatively steep progressive rate in the tax,^
If severe, progressive taxation could be viewed as a proportional
one, the flat rate is applied to the top bracket and a series of exemptions
2
graduated downward. Therefore, the larger the income the smaller the exemption.
In order to achieve the basic aim of a progressive tax, i.e.
eliminating inequalities in income and wealth, we have to find an answer to the
following problem: how to construct ' he basis of progressivity? What will be
the effect of the optimum degree of progression on the individual inequality of
income and also on the size of the national income?
To formulate a scale of progression we raust consider that the
individual should not be deprived of the incentive to increase his income or his
wealth through savings. Several economists tried to dsicover a formula for
3
graduating taxation mathematically. One of the folmulas proposed in early
years of this century was that of Crssel's. This formula is based on the
principle of equal sacrifice, which leads to deduct from all incomes certain
necessities and to tax the remainder at a constant percentage. The necessities
are not merely for physical subsistence, but also for perfect efficiency.
1..From the point of exempting subsistence income a System graduated rates
can always be approached a .a accepted as a graduate -.tries of exemption.
Thus exemptions, in particular, have defended and supported the general theory
of progression.
2. W.Blum & H. Kalven Jr., Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation.p.91.
3. G. Cassel, "The Theory of Progressive Taxation", Economic Journal. 1901, pp. 481-491
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Therefore, "equal sacrifice means deduction of the necessities of efficiency and
1
a proportional tax on the remainder." The question of the average necessities
for each class of taxpayers has to be considered on the basis that these
necessities increase with income, but more slowly.
Statistics of the distribution of personal income shouii be
available in order to be able to construct any scale of progression. Moreover,
statistics of the various necessities of the different classes of the community
have to be provided in order to determine the minimum and maximum of subsistence.
But it is not easy to ftind a true standard for maximum subsistence as it is usually
subject to various arguments which arise in deciding what elements should be
included; besides it is difficult, especially in underdeveloped countries, to
obtain accurate datea. The above mentioned method of scaling income taxation
would become complicated in case of changes in the taxpayer's personal status,
such as the increase in the number of dependants, deducting insurance premiums
for a new contracted insurance policy, end different other variables. Therefore,
new schedules have to be introduced quite frequently to consider the different
abatements. One should emphasise that, however equitable a progression appears,
any scale of graduation might involve a fraction of arbitrariness.
THE RATE STRUCTURE 0? THE EGYPTIAN INCOME I'AXs
The rate structure of the Egyptian income tax system varies and
diversifies according to the structure of the system itself. Within the
Scheduler tax the rates differ according to the Schedule; i.e. according to the
1. Cassel, op.cit., p. 485.
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type of income. As the Schedular income tax is of objective and impersonal
character the rates are proportional with the exception of the Tax on isfages and
Salaries which are progressive. On the other hand, the General Income Tax is
progressive on aggregate personal incomes over ff1,000.
Personal exemptions in both Schedular and General Income taxes
add a fraction of progression to the rate structure especially in lower income
brackets. This fact could be easily observed from Table I which shows the
effective and marginal rates of the Schedular tax, (see Figure III).
TABLE 17
1
Marginal and Effective Hates of the Egyptian Schedular Income Tax.
(Married couple with children)
Income
Income from Movable Property Coma.& Ind. Pr<jfits Wages,Salaries, etc.
Liability Effective Marginal Liab¬ E. M. Liab¬ E. M.
rate rate ility rate rate ility rate rate
% % % % % %
£E150 £E 25i5 17. 17 £E - - - £E - — —
180 30.6 ft tf 5.1 2.1 17 0.6 0.3 2
210 35.7 11 rt 10.2 4.8 17 1.2 0.6 2
240 40.8 tt it 15.3 6.3 17 1.8 0.7 2
270 v * y H « 20.4 7.5 17 2.4 0.9 2
300 51.0 tt t? 25.5 8.5 17 3.3 1.1 3
330 56.0 ft tt 55.5 16.8 100 9.0 2.7 19
360 61.2 « tt 61.2 17 19c 10.2 2.8 4
390 66.3 !! rt 66.3 M 17 11.4 2.9 4
420 71.4 tt rt 71.4 tt .< 12.6 3.0 4
450 76.5 n 76.5 It « 13.8 3.1 4
480 81.6 rt tt 81.6 If ✓ 15.0 3.1 4
510 86.7 tt rt 86.7 ft rt 16.3 3.2 4.3
540 91.3 n rt 91.3 tt tt 17.3 3.3 5
570 96.9 u rt 96.9 tf rt 19.3 3.4 5
600 102.0 tt rr 102.0 tt n 20.3 3.5 5
630 107.1 tt « 107.1 Tf tt 22.3 3.5 5
660 112.2 rt 112.2 ft rt 23.8 3.6 5
690 117.3 rt it 117.3 ft tt 25.3 3.6 5
720 122.4 tt " 122.4 t» 26.3 3.7 5
750 127.5 " - 127.5 " tt 23.3 3.8 5
1. Tax Non-Commercial Professions i3 excluded for the diversity of its rates due
to the new amendment introduced in December 1955. According to the amendment
the taxpayers have the choice between paying tax on hi3 net income at a rate
of 11% according to a fixed amount depending on the period since graduation,
(see appendix to Part I).
@. The rates applied in the Table are those in force at present. (Law Mo. 14/1939
Arts. 17 and 62.
FIGURE III.
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Effective and Marginal Rates of the Shedular Taxes
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Income from movable property (interest on securities, etc.) is
always proportional and the effective rate cquale the marginal one as there is
no personal exemptions ois any other reliefs to be deducted from taxable income
and thus affect the tax liability. In the case of the tax on Commercial and
Industrial Profits the effective rate (married person with children) varies
from 2.1% just above the exemption limit to 17% on income over £E330; while the
marginal rate, continues to be 17% up to £E30Q and then jumps highly to 100%
when the taxable income is £E330» then to 19% at £E360 and back to 17%. The
steep increase in the marginal rate from 17% to 100% is mainly due to the
withdrawal of the exemption limit when income reaches £E330. Actually the
1
increase in the marginal rate starts when income starts to increase after £E300.
In case of the tax on wages and salaries it is relatively different
as the tax rates .ore progressive (the progression is of little importance as the
rates vary from 2% on the first taxable £El20^to 9% on income over £E1,200; the
rate increases gradually by only 1 %). The exemption limit; e.g. £E150, does
al30 affect the rate of progression up to incomes of £E330 when the marginal
tate increases sharply and reaches 19% and then drops to 4-% on income over £E330
(e.g.,£E360 in Table17 ).
From the above data it is obvious, as in the case of the Tax on
Commercial and Industrial Profits, and on Wages and Salaries, that the critical
stage is when income exceed doubles the exemption limit; £E30C up till it reaches
1* If the net annual profits exceed the limits of the personal exemption, e.g.
£E150, but are not more than double these limits, the tax will only be
payable on the surplus. If the net profits are more than double the limits
of these exe-ptions, the taxpayer will not, by any exemption provided that
his profits after payment of tax is not less than that remaining to the
taxpayer whose profits are less than his. (Art. 41, Law No. 14/1939)•
X 5 5
£E330. From the equity point of view those individuals whose incomes fall
within the iacorae bracket £E300 to £E330 suffer an excessive burden from the
inadequacy of the rate structure. In case of the tax on wages and salaries the
effect of such inadequacy is more severe than in case of the Tax on Commercial
and Industrial Profits because in the former most of the middle salaried
employees fall within the critical range, while in the latter the taxpayer can
adjust his profits so that it would not exceed double the exemption limit, and
if it did exceed such limit he had to adjust his profits so as not to fall within
the £E300 to £E330 bracket.
The general outlook of the rate structure of the Exemption Scheduler
Tax is almost proportional with minor exemptions due to the role played by the
1
exemption limit. To adjust the inequity resulting from the functioning of the
exemption limit when it exceeds £E300 as in the above example, the tax rate has
to be changed; increased or decreased, in order to avoid the sharp increase in the
marginal rate. This problem eouls also be 3olved by introducing a decreasing
rate of exemption which attempts to smooth out the sharp increases in the marginal
rate.
Now we turn to the General Income Tax with its progressive feature.
This tax is levied on incomes over £E1,000 a year and allows £E50 a year for the
wife and each child with a maximum of £E200; in other words the starting point of
liability for a married couple with three children is £E1,200, From Table 18
and also from Figure IV we can observe that the scale of progression of the G.I.T
is relatively equitable as the marginal rate structure does not include any
sudden 3teep or sharp rises when income increases. One could say, in absolute terms,
that the rate structure of the G.I.T. is more or less equitable if we compare it
to the rate structure of the Schedular Tax.
1. With the exception of the tax on movable property where there is no exemption
limit.
-j- H-
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Effective and Marginal Rates of the General Income TaK













































































£E £E - - - £S20,000 £E 5,205 26 40
1,500 40 2.7 8 30,000 10,205 34 50
2,500 90 5.2 9 40,000 16,205 40.5 60
3,500 230 6.6 10 50,000 23,205 46.4 70
5,000 455 9.1 15 60,000 31,205 52 80
10,000 1,705 17.0 25 70,000 39,205 56 80
15,000 3,205 21.3 30 80,000 47,205 59 80
To evaluate the rate structure of both taxes, the Scheduler Tex
and the G.I.T, as one system, v/e C*ind that while the G.I.T. introduces progression
in the income taxation, the proportional rate of the Scheduler Tax has more
influence as most taxpayers who are subject to the G.I.T. enjoy incomes befew
1
££5,000 yearly. On the other hand the Scheduler Tax rates differentiate between
earned income and unearned income; it Is a flat rate of 17$ on earned income
from negotiable securities and a progressive rate starting from 2% on the first
££120 taxable earned income from wages, salaries or the like and reaches 9% on
income over £E1,20Q. The effect of the G.I.T. rate on such differentiation is
quite clear as it reduced the difference in tax liability under the Bchedular Tax
1. The aggregate number of G.I.T. taxpayers are 35,775, according to the latest
available statistics (end of 1956) out of which about 85$ enjoy a yearly income
below £E5,000; Taxation Department, btatiatics Division.
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rate structure. If two individuals earn an equal income of £E2,000 a year,
for example, the income of the first i3 from dividends and that of the second is
from a salary. The Scheduler Tax liability of the first will be £E34-0 and for
the second person will be £El30« The G.I.T. is levied on net income after
deducting the Scheduler Tax liability, and therefore, the liability of the G.I.T,
of the earned income will be greater} £E73»5 and £E54-»5 of the unearned income.
According to the above example, one could emphasise that the G.I.T.
has a redistributive effect on incomes subject to the Scheduler Tax which did not
exist before 19A9. In other words the G.I.T. does not differentiate between
earned and unearned income on the whole which, in turn, renders the G.I.T. rate
structure as inequitable from that point of view. But this argument is obviously
invalid as the G.I.T. is basically considered as a complementary tax on income
similar to the surtax in Britain, for example. However, we should take into
consideration the overall effect of both the Scheduler Tax and the G.I.T. on earned
and unearned incomes. The outcome would be that thero still exists a difference
in treatment diminished by the liability to the G.I.T. A reform is thus needed
in order to introduce a differential treatment in favour of earned income subject
1
to the G.I.T. The British experience would be of great help in this field.
CONCLUSION:
The enquiry into the equity viewpoint of the Egyptian income taxes
has shown various and diversified inequities which should be taken into consideration
when attempting to reform the income tax system. Such inequities either in the
1. The tax rates reform will be discussed when pointing out the major reforms
needed fcr the developraent of the Egyptian Income taxation (Part III). See,
the Finance Act, 1957 when the earned income relief was Introduced into the
British Surtax.
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tax base or in the rate structure have to be valued carefully according to the
socio-economic policy the country is planning. The policy maker has, in many
cases, to choose between equity and revenue. His choice would be made
according to rate of economic and social growth the country is aiming for. But
on the whole a compromise has to be reached between three major criterion; e.g.




The Economic Efficiency of the Income Tax.
Tc complete our investigation of the performance o. the Egyptian
income tax system w® have to analyse and inquire into its economic
competency. This chapter will be devoted mainly to the theoretical
analysis and its application within the Egyptian econouy of the effect of
income taxation on a few major points of the utmost importance to the
nation's economic welfare and development. The tax will be judged
according to its impact on various aspects of the economy- such as; on
the incentive to work, to save, and to invest.
Finally an analysis of the role of the Egyptian income tax as a
stabilizer will be the concluding section in our investigation.
Income taxation may affect th: functioning of the economy in two ways.
In the first place it may alter the supplies of the factors of production.
Secondly, it may alter the decisions of business firms ana thus the demand
for these factors. By and large, both these effects will alter the level
of the national income, its composition and its distribution. In other
words with these effects on the national income the tax may have a con-
ssiderabla affect on the economic incentives which are of great importance
to economic development.
In a less- developed economy like the Egyptian one, we believe that
an analysis of the effects of the income tax on the basic economic concepts
which are related directly to economic development should receive the lion's
share of the analysis. Therefore, it seems adequate and fruitful to dis-
xcuss the impact of the income tax on; (l) the incentive to work; (2) the
incentive to save, and (5) the incentive to invest.
1 € 1
A. The Sffecta on the Incentive to ffork:
Taxes on wages and on any type of remuneration from work were con-
jsidered at the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th
century as a disincentive to work, and even more as a cause of reducing
labour capacity through illness due to decreasing income. Such a way of
thinking has been proved a complete fallacy and exaggeration.
The classical ideology about the affect of income taxation on the
supply of labour is that it reduces the individual's ability to work, but
on the other hand it might induce him to work more in order to make up for
that part of his income absorbed by taxation. This is called the "income
effect" of the tax.
An income tax affects the relative gain from work and leisure by
reducing the rewards from work, and thus lessening the cost of leisure, in
the sense of the gain from labour which is foregone because of the failure
to workj this is usually known as the "substitution effect" or "Announce-
1
sment effect" in a relatively old-frshioned term. The choice of the
individual's scale of preference for income compared to leisure, differs
1. Pigou used this latter term in his analysis of the economic effects of
taxation. But latter economists such as B. Rolph Mu8grave, Phelps
Brown and others, use the term "substitution effect" to indicate the
same meaning. See, A. C. Pigou, A Study in Public Finance, London
1951» PP* 86-90. E. Rolph, The Theor.v of Fiscal Economics, Los
Angeles, 1958; and also B. H. Phelps Brown, A Course in Applied
Bconoiaics, London 1956 pp. 99-123*
The effects of an income tax upon the supply of labour have been
debated for many years with little conclusive evidence developed.
According to Richard Musgrave, a loss of leisure must be compensated by
a gain in income (an assumption) - or vice versa - if the worker is to
remain equally well off. In general, he argues that "both income and
leisure eariy positive utilities, and the surrender of either is a
disutility". Cf. R. Musgrave The Theory of Public Finance. New York,
1959, P* 233.
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from one individual to the other and also depends on several homogeneous
as well as exogenous factors.1 Generally speaking, the reaction of the
individual towards the tax depends on various factors:
(1) One of the moat important factors is the shiftability of the tax.
On the assumption that the taxpayer could shift his tax upwards or down-
:wards, he would not be inclined to increase his working' hours as his net
income is not reducedj and therefore, ha would not think of altering his
leisure hours. If we assume that the shiftability of the tax is unlikely
and that the demand on labour is constant, neither increasing nor decrees-
:ing, the labourers find it difficult to increase their income by that
amount paid in taxes through working overtime. Gn the other side, the
supply schedule of work might be inelastic and, therefore, any increase
in the deraand side would not be met by an increase in the supply schedule.
This latter assumption might be true in the case of skilled labourers in
under-developed countries while it is doubtful to be widely accepted in a
highly industrialised country where technical training is a high level.
(2) The second important factor limiting the freedom of the individual to
increase his working hours is the provisions included in the working ccn-
1 tract and/or by the rules set up through trades unions. The influence
of such provisions makes the worker unable to work overtime in order to
increase his income by the amount of the tax paid.
1. Reactions of workers to personal income taxes appear to differ
under wartime and peacetime conditions. The patriotic motive
may impel some workers to put forth their maximum effort to work
longer hours, even though they are not completely satisfied with
the marginal earnings after taxes. However, the experience of
the war years should not be regarded as conclusive evidence for
peacetime concerning the reactions of workers to taxation.
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(5) The choice between work and leisure,, or having a favourable ' income
effect' 01 the incentives to work, depends on the mobility of labour
between the various industries in the industrial sector, and also on the
mobility of labour between the various sectors of the economy as a whole.
The degree of labour mobility depends on different variable factors such
as the demand on the various types of work, the degree of skill the worker
enjoys, etc.
In a less-developed economy, unskilled labour is abundant especially
in the agricultural sector, while skilled labour is relatively scarce.
We also find that most of these countries suffer from the immobility of
labour due to the lack of housing facilities, and the sentimental attach¬
ments they hold to their birth place. Moreover, trades unions are still
in their developing stage and, therefore, their role in these economies
is far behind that existing in Western countries for example.
(4) The rate structure of the tax has a considerable significance in our
argument of tax effects on the incentive to work. A progressive tax
involves a higher marginal rate than does a proportional tax; hence it
involves a stronger substitution effect, adverse to work effort. In
general, we might find that work effort will increase if the average rate
of tax is raised while the marginal rate is reduced or left unchanged.
Needless to emphasise, a proportional tax reduces work effort while a
progressive tax of equal yield reduoes work effort further; and when a
proportional tax increases work effort, the increase is less under a
progressive tax.^
1. R. A. Mu3grave, op. cit., pp. 242-43*
2. Ibid. p. 242.
(5) Another important factor which might alter the reaction of the
individual towards increasing or reducing his work effort due to the tax
effect is the consequence or the final impact of public expenditure.
The benefits which an individual could derive from public expenditure are
usually confined to two basic categoriest (a) transfer payments such as
pensions, family allowances and the like; (b) public goods and services,
such as education, health and other social services.
Transfer payments are frequently considered as negative taxes like
any other subsidy, A proportional transfer payment has an income effect
which is adverse to work effort and a substitution effect which is
favourable to it. On the other hand, a proportional income tax has
inverse effects of that of a transfer payment.
Under a progressive tax as well as under a progressive transfer
payments i.e. transfer payments with declining marginal transfer rates
as income rises, the situation may differ. The marginal transfer rate
may not only decline to zero but become negative. "Where the marginal
transfer rate is negative and where leisure is not an inferior good, both
substitution and income effects work towards reducing work effort."*
On the other hand, expenditure on services, such as education, health
and othor social services. increases the workers' productivity and thus
increases his real wage. Therefore, the income effect in this case has
an adverse effect on the incentive to work, while the substitution effect
is favourable as the individual may be induced to increase his leisure
1. Ibid. p. 253.
time, However, no final behaviour could, be easily established.
Generally, public expenditure, especially on transfer payments and
social services, tends to decrease the disincentive effect of the tax on
work. Income tax exemptions and reliefs have a similar effect as trans-
»fer payments if one compares a tax system which does not provide for
personal reliefs with another which allows deductions for suoh reliefs.
As exemptions reduce the effective rate of the tax and by implication the
tax liability, the individual might not have the same incentive to work if
there were no exemptions. However, personal exemptions do have an income
effect which is adverse to work effort, especially within low and middle
income groups who benefit considerably from such exemptions.*
Now, before concluding this theoretical analysis, we turn to the
2
macro-analysis of this study. It is very difficult if not impossible to
establish a general criterion as individual behaviour differs from one
person to another according to their utility indifference curves for both
commodities, work and leisure. Two persons having the same income and
bearing the same family and other responsibilities, may differ in their
reaction towards the tax imposition.
If we divide the working population by income groups one might be
able to reach certain conclusions. Business executives and professionals
compose the high inoome groups of working population while ordinary
labourers form the middle and low income groups. The first category
1. This depends on the legislatio . in which income limits are stated
for those who benefit from personal exemptions and reliefs.
2. For a?i excellent concise over-all analysis, see the article by
B Goode, "The Income Tax and the Supply of Labour", The Journal
of Political Economy. 1949* PP« 428-42.
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might be more positive in their reaction to the tax than those of the
second category for the following reasons:
First both marginal and average rates of the tax are substantially
higher. Secondly, the range of choice between work and leisure may be
much higher than in the case of wage earners. Thirdly, these people
often have incomes from other sources that will increase their aggregate
tax liability and thus they may be induced to increase their income from
work if other sources of income tend to be difficult to increase. This
argument could be dismissed as it is frequently believed that individuals
with high incomes seem to have a neutral behaviour towards the tax
imposed on their inoorae from work. Rich people may suffer from the
reduction in their disposable income through the decrease in their savings
as they usually do keep the same level of consumption as before the imposi¬
tion of the tax. On the other hand, if the tax reduces the disposable
income of the middle and low-income groups to a lower level which would
have a direct impact on consumption expenditure on necessities, their
reaction would be in favour of the income effect and they accordingly may¬
be induced to work harder to increase their income.
Unreservedly, we could clearly emphasise that the formal and
theoretical arguments of the effects of income taxes on the effort to work
is inconclusive, Sapirical investigation could be of considerable help
to us in reaching a reasonable conclusion in this matter. In Britain
two empirical investigations were carried out in recent years to measure
•
4 C.1 b *
the effect of the income tax on the incentive to work.* Both studies
showed that the income tax has no tangible effect on the individual's
reaction towards the tax imposed on his income earned from work.
The Egyptian Case:
After setting out the theoretical background of the oase we now look
to its application within the S&yptian income tax. The Schedular Tax on
Wages and Salaries, and also the Schedular Tax on Professions enjcy a
relatively low rate. The first tax has a progressive rate varying from
2% on the first taxable £E120 to 9% on the income bracket over £E900 a
year. The rate of the second tax is a flat rate of 11% or (depending on
2
the type of profession and the taxpayer's choice) a lump sum annual tax paid
according to the period of practice.
For the sake of the analysis it is desirable to allocate the working
population into three main categories: (i) agricultural workers? (ii)
industrial workers, and (iii) professionals, including clerks and civil
servants.
(i) Agricultural workers do compose the majority of the working force in
Egypt? about ^Ofa where the average wage per year is under the subsistence
limit or what the tax provisions recognise as £E10Q for a single person
1. The first investigation was carried out for the Royal Commission on
the taxation of Profits and Income, in which 1429 industrial workers
earning less than £1,500 a year were interviewed about their reactions to
income taxation. The general conclusive eviaenoe of the investigation
was that most workers thought that income tax was neither a deterrent to
less work nor an incentive to increase work effort, See, Royal Commission
on the Taxation of Profits and Income, Second Report 1954 (Cmd.9105) P«92.
G. F. Break undertook another investigation in 1956 which is different
from the above mentioned one. The Royal Commission study was concerned
with a different socio-economic group from that of Break who carried his
investigation within a group of professionals in the London area. He
concluded that the income tax has no disincentive effect on work. See
article published by Break? "Income Taxes and Incentives to Work, an
Empirical Study", American Economic Review, 1957* PP» 529-549«
2. See Appendix to PART I.
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and £3150 for a married person with children. In 1947 the average
wage of the agricultural worker was estimated to be between £312 to £315
a year. At present it is believed to be higher due to the interference
of the Government in fixing a minimus wage of 2G piasters (4 s.) a day.
Agriculture is a seasonal occupation and thus the average working days
2
are estimated as not exceeding 17C days a year. This fact emphasises
that the minimum annual wage - which is by all means not much below the
average - is about £334 for the-adult worker.
Generally speaking, agricultural labourers are almost, if not
completely, non-taxable individuals under the Egyptian system of income
taxation. Thus the tax effect on their work effort is non-existent,
(ii) The second important category is the industrial workers (including
trade and various services such as those engaged in transport, public
utilities, etc.). According to the latest industrial census of 1957
the number of persons working in the industrial sector of the economy
1. The total labour force is estimated by about 10,600,000 in 1947 out
of which 7>550,000 were engaged in agriculture and fishing. See,
Statistical Pocket Year Book, 1957; and, U.N., Economic Development
in the Middle past 1945-1954. p. 27.
2. G. M. Said, lugyptian Economics. (Cairo, 1951 (in Arabic).
5* Egypt, as most leas-developed countries, depends mainly on agricul-
sture? children over 10 years to help their families by working
either on their own land or by offering their work in limited
seasonal periods such as during the cotton picking season or
during the season for collecting cotton worms (June to August).
The average wage per day does not exceed 10 P.T. (about 2 s.)
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amounted to 1,174,858 earning an average wage of £E2.38 a week (man
wage): or about £E125 per annum."'' Wages in some industries are above
the average such as in petroleum extraction and refining? ££6.96 a week
transportation, ££4.16 a week? and £122.95 & week in metal industries.
This general survey shows that in many industries workers are above the
exemption limit of the 3chedular income tax and thus a considerable number
of the industrial working force are taxable. For lack of detailed data
concerning the number of workers in each wage group, one cannot estimate
the number actually liable to tax.
Let us concentrate on the general division of labour in the indus¬
trial sector in order to reach a conclusion on the effect of income
taxation en the effort to work, without putting much emphasis on statis¬
tical data which, unfortunately. Is scarce. As in almost all industrial
sectors of any economic institution, the working force could be easily,
a priori, divided into three principal categories; (a) highly skilled
labourers; (b) sesai-skilled labourers? and (c) unskilled labourers.
1. The reasons for the lowness of wages are due mainly to the low
productivity of labour. This in turn is due to lack of training,
malnutrition, and poor equipment in some industries. There is also
the continual drift to towns from the disguised rural working force
resulting in a large reserve of unemployed unskilled labourers who
"depress wages: for low as they are, real wages in towns are higher
than the countryside". Cf. G. P. Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century,
London, 1954, P* 171 • For the above data, see, Statistical Pocket
Ye ,r Book, , U.A.R., and also, "Statistical Supplement",
International Labour Review, December 1958, P« 199-
2. Statistical Pocket Year-Book, op. oit.
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In Egypt workers of the first and second category are relatively
limited in number if compared with the third category where the supply of
unskilled workers is considered highly inelastic due to their abundanoy
and the persistent high level of unemployment. In most cases unskilled
labourers earn an average wage less than the exemption limit and, there-
afore, they are not subject to income taxation. In this regard they
could be qualified in the same way as the agricultural labourers.
On the other hand, skilled labourers in a developing country like
Egypt are relatively scarce and hence their supply is elastic. Accordingly,
their wages are comparatively high and usually are above the exemption
limit.* For lack of empirical investigation concerning the reaction of
this category of workers to the income tax, ono could not reach any con¬
clusive statement} but on the other hand we can hazard the opinion that
the average worker in Egypt is both unaware of the amount deducted from
his wage in taxes due to the high level of illiteracy, and pays a small
amount of tax so that again the effect of the tax on incentives is likely
2
to be small.
Collective bargaining through trades unions has not yet fully
developed as is the case in highly industrialised countries such as the
United Kingdom or the United States of America, This might be attributed
1. This fact could be easily observed from the Industrial Census of 1951>
The average wage in highly skilled industries such as mining, ship¬
building (repairs), electricity, etc., is above £3150 a year.
See, Statistical Pocket Year-Book, op. cit.
2. See Appendix to PAST I-
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mainly to political reasons. Up till reoently, employers used to hold
strong influence within the Government administration. Such a 3tate
of affairs created a strong bargaining position for the employers, oaring
to existing monopolies which the trade unions were unable to meet or
compromise with.'*' After the 1952 Revolution trade unions' bargaining
power increased duo to their surmounting political position in the con-
s struetion of the present politico-economic set-up. Favourable labour
laws were issued in an attempt to organise trade unions and also to
establish a boundary to protect the working force against the maltreatment
of the employers. Working hours have been steadily reduood mainly as a
result of the increasing influence of trade unions. This does net indi-
scate that the collective bargaining machinery in Sgypt is fully developed
if compared to the Brifcish one for example, but our emphasis is related to
the situation that existed in the country in the post-war period up to the
early 1950%.
Increase in wages which has been the major characteristic of the Egyptian
industrial sector since the outbreak of the Second World War was due basi-
scally to the increasing cost of living. No one could prophesy that the
reduction of the carry-home wage due to the tax did not stimulate the
unions to shift the tax backwards to the employers through increases in
wages; but as previously mentioned, income taxation has never been a
source of major complaint for wage increase. Finally, it could be said
that the 3chedular Income Tax on wages has neither a positive nor negative
effect on the incentive to work within the labour force of the industrial
sector of the economy.
1. C. P. Issawi, op. cit., pp. 171-72.
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(iii) Profeaeimls and/or self-employed individuals in Egypt who are
liable to the Scheduler Tax on non-commercial professions amount to about
23,000 according to the latest available data.'*' This class of taxpayers
has always been favoured regarding their liability to the Schedular income
tax. Up till 1950 they used to pay the tax according to the rental value
of their place of practice which resulted in the decrease of the tax burden
to the minimum. From 1950 to 1955 they became assessable on their real
net income at a flat rate, a relatively low one, of 13$. Such new treat-
xment aroused their unjustifiable anger and for political reasons, more or
less, the Government in 1955 issued new legislation granting considerable
2
inequitable privileges only for university and college graduates. On
the whole, it i3 presumed that the low tax rate on the one hand and the
obvious fiscal privilege enjoyed by a large proportion of this class of
taxpayers, did minimize the adverse effect of the tax on the incentive to
3
work.
In concluding our analysis on the effect of the tax on the incentive
1. According to latest available date of 1957, Department of Taxation,
Cairo.
2. This point has already been elaborated from the equity viewpoint in
Chapter 4.
3. Taxation of the self-employed depends largely on voluntary
compliance. In contrast, most wages and salaries are subject
to withholdings. It is commonly believed that independent
professional practitioners (and also small businessmen) have been
less fully taxed than others. In spite of the low tax rate
applied, and to the high standard of education, this category of
taxpayers enjoys there still exists a considerable percentage of
evasion within this class.
to work, there is a counteracting factor which remains to be considered,
i.e. the effect of the free availability of Government services upon the
incentive to work. While most Government services cannot be substituted
for privately purchased goods and services some of them can, as in the
cases of medical care and education. To the extent that the taxpayer is
able to get these things free from the Government, the pressure to work is
reduced.
Prom the foregoing discussion, we can assess that there are conflict-
sing forces affecting the incentive to work. Whether the net result of
these conflicting forces is an increase or a reduction in work effort
depends, of course, upon their respective magnitude. In Egypt, the
progressivenesa of income taxation, especially the ochedular Income Tax
becomes very lenient, the curtailment in marginal income brought about by
taxation ought not to be unduly discouraging to work effort. The total
income tax burden likewise is not heavy, but in so far as it has any
influence, it tends to increase effort. The counteracting effect of free
Government services should be of a small order, considering tho volume and
nature of these services.1 On the whole, it may, therefore, be concluded
that the Egyptian income tax minimises the adverse impact of taxation upon
the incentive to work.
1. Total Government expenditure on education, health and social
services was estimated to be about £E51 millions for the fiscal
year 1958/59 (this figure includes wages and salaries and other
expenditure on the administrative machinery.) See Budget
Report, 1958/59> Southern Region, United Arab Republic,
B. The Effects on the Incentive to Savei
A parson saves if he spends on consumption less than his income in a
given period. Each individual is restricted in the amount ho savos by his
income; and the size of his income is determined by other people's expen-
sditure on the goods he produces. Bach individual considers hi3 own income
as given and independent of his own expenditure, and, not being interested
in the effect of his expenditure in creating income for someone else, ho
sees no connection between income and expenditure. Generally speaking,
savings are dependent on consumption and on income simultaneously. Hence-
sforth, savings could be defined as the total amount withheld from con¬
sumption during a given period.
Savings take one of two shapes; either forced (involuntary), or free
(voluntary). The former type arises when a person produces something that
cannot be consumed, or when compelled by legal or conventional action to set
aside part of his income and not to use it for immediate expenditure on con¬
sumption; e.g. contribution to old age pension schemes, social security
system, etc. On the other hand, voluntary savings are only conducted by
the will of the individual and his choice of deferring the spending of part
of his Income for certain motives. Therefore, the last type, the voluntary
saving, is the type we will take into consideration when analysing the effect
of income taxation on the incentive to save.
An income tax reduces the disposable income inclined to be spent on
consumer goods and on capital goods through savings. Therefore, income
taxation has a direct effect on the consumption function and on the propensity
to save.^" The effect of the income tax depends primarily on the pattern upon
1. J.F. Due, Government Finance, p. 214 and J62.
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which the individual allocates his income after tax between consumption
and saving. The effect on either consumption or savings depends on various
factors which motivate the behaviour of the individual taxpayer. These
factors could be summarised in the following}
(1) The amount of inoome and its position in the income structure as a
whole. It is emphasised that individuals in low-income groups are mostly
affected by the imposition of the tax which reduces or eliminates their
ability to save, as they would not be able to reduoe their consumption by
the amount of the tax paid if such expenditure on consumption gives them
the bare necessities of an acceptable standard of living which could be
within the subsistence level. As the average individual will not approve
of a reduction in his standard of living beyond the subsistence level in
order to 3ave; or if he prefers an immediate enjoyment rather than future
benefit, he will try not to reduce his expenditure on consumption and reduoe
or eliminate completely his savings.
An individual in a well-to-do class, i.e. the middle and above the middle
classes, is considered to be in a relatively different situation concerning
his personal behaviour towards the tax. If such a person is thrifty and
tries to keep his savings rate at a certain level in spite of the tax effect,
he will reduce his consumption expenditure. This might not be the case of
another individual in the same income group, as thriftiness is a oharacter-
listic phenomenon not widely experienced. Persons, however, differ in their
behaviour towards allocating their disposable income between consumption and
saving, and, therefore, a general sound rule is difficult to draw.
The effect of income taxation on the propensity to save of individuals
within the high income groups is that it reduces their savings by nearly
the amount of the tax, aa most Individuals within this income group try not
to alter their consumption expenditure in order to keep up their standard
of living and thus they have to reduce their savings. The impact of
progressive taxation is more severe on individuals within high income
brackets and, therefore, their decision to save is dependent on the aggre-
igate future income derived from savings and other sources subject to high
marginal rates. Their behaviour towards altering their savings or their
expenditure on consumer goods depends on the marginal utility of the last
unit to be spent on consumption compared to that saved which automatically
will be subject to tax on the future fruits.
(2) The civil status of the individual has a great influence on the inoen-
itive to save. A bachelor with the same income as that of a married man
with two children will suffer less from an income tax which provides no
allowances or personal reliefs. The ability of the bachelor to save part
of his income will not be relatively affected by the tax if compared with
that of a married man.
(3) Public services and transfer payments affect the incentive to save as
they reduce the tax burden on the taxpayer. The reduction in the tax burden
due to such services and payments varies according to the type and value of
benefits acquired by the individualj as some individuals do not make use of
such services and, therefore, their real tax burden is not affected.
Consequently, it is difficult to set up a general rule on the level of
a macro-analysis as the behaviour of various individuals towards public
services differs; but on the other hand, one could assess that these
services do reduce the real tax burden of both lower and middle classes
at least and hence increase their ability to save if it did exist.
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The Egyptian Case:
The propensity to consume in less-developed countries is very high
compared to highly developed countries, and hence the propensity to save
is considerably low.
Productive savings in less-developed countries are low due to various
and diversified factors. Among those factors are, the predominance of
agriculture organised on small-scale farming, small industrial undertakings,
integration of business savings with personal savings, and hoarding. The
"demonstration effect", in Duesenberry'e words, reduces the level of savings
considerably especially within the rich class of the population from where
savings usually originate.1 The importance of conspicuous consumption,
growing awareness of the advanced standards of living shifts the consump-
jtion function upwards, thereby reducing voluntary personal savings, hampers
the use of domestic potential sources of capital and, furthermore, creates
balance of payments difficulties due to the fact that industrialisation leads
to increased imports, first in the form of machinery, equipment and other
oapital goods and secondly in the form of consumption goods.
2
The Egyptian personal income could be divided into three income groups;
(a) High income group consisting of individuals who enjoy an income above
£E1,000 a year;"* (3) this class is very limited in number, about 0.18/6 of
1. J.3. Duesenberry, Income, Saving and the Theory of Consumer Behaviour,
Cambridge, U.S., 1949» Chapter 2.
2. Ho official data is available regarding the distribution of the personal
income among the various income groups. My present classification is a
rough and general outline devised to serve only as a guide for the
analysis.
3. Those who enjoy income of £E1,000 or over are subject to the General
Inoome Tax, their total number is 42,005 (latest survey carried out
by the Taxation Department in 1957)•
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the country's total population. This class of individual consists of
part of the landlords,1 businessmen and a considerable part of the self-
employed professionals. (b) The second class which oould be called the
middle class is also limited in number and includes the Individuals who
enjoy an income below £E1,000 and above the exemption limit provided by
the Schedular income tax. This class consists mostly of civil servants,
small landlords, a limited number of the labour force within the business
sector, tradesmen, artisans and the rest of the self-employed professionals,
(c) The third income group includes all individuals at the subsistence
level (the exemption limit) or below, Hie majority of the population
especially the working force in the agricultural sectors falls in this
category.
High income groups, or what we could denote as the rich class, in
underdeveloped countries do react towards the reduction incurred in their
incomes as a result of the income tax by either reducing their savings to
keep up living standards at the accustomed level in order to restore their
prestige in the community, as they cannot reduoe their conspicuous con¬
sumption, On the other hand, some individuals within this class may
reduce their consumption in order to stabilize their rate of savings.
This latter case is of a limited character in underdeveloped countries
as most rich people try to keep their conspicuous consumption at the same
standard, i.e. before the tax imposition, as far as their real wealth is
not diminished. Therefore, it is most probable that in a country like
Egypt, whore the rich class is limited in number and where the expenditure
1. Only landlords who own over 50 feddans could be included in this income
group as the average rental value per feddan oould be estimated at
£E21 per year (the rental value is fixed by the Land Reform Law of
1952).
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on oonspiouous consumption predominates, it is believed that the income
tax, especially the General Income Tax with its high marginal rates, does
have a disincentive effect on the rate of saving.
The second class in our analysis is the middle class which is also
limited in number. The effective rate as well as the marginal rate of
the Scheduler Income Tax are relatively equal, they do not exceed 17$ in
most cases with the exception of individuals earning a few pounds over
double the exemption limit.^ We could simply emphasise that the
majority of taxpayers who come under this class, as previously mentioned,
are employees and wage earners where the marginal rate as well as the
effective rate does not exceed This relatively low rate might have
little, if no effect at all on their propensity to save. This fact
might be true - taking into consideration the lack of empirical investi¬
gations, if we bear in mind that thriftiness is an obvious characteristic
of the middle class and, therefor®, any reduction in their disposable
income due to income taxation would, most probably, be reflected on their
consumption, i.e. decreasing it, more than it would affect their amount of
savings. The actual rate of savings before or after the tax, is mostly
dependable on whether the taxpayer is saving for old age if self-employed,
or that his employer, if he is a wage earner, contributes towards a pension
scheme or any other social security fund. In the first case the taxpayer
would not reduce his amount of savings as old age security does have a
considerable significance to the individual, to which in the second case
the contribution of the employer accompanied by a forced deduction from
the employee's wage is considered a safeguard to the taxpayer, and,
1. See Chapter 4, p. i$l , and Figure III.
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therefore he would not put much emphasis on reducing his consumption in
order to stabilise his amount of savings, or in other words, he would
reduce his savings by the amount of the tax. In practice, income tax
legislators do allow the deduotion of subscription towards old age pension
schemes from the tax base and, therefore, the tax tends to have a minor
effect in this connection.
By and large, we find ourselves inclined to believe that the Scheduler
Income Tax does not have a tangible effect on the inoentive to save among
taxpayers within the middle class,
Nov, we are left with the poor class, those earning income under
the subsistence level. On the whole, the tax has no effect on this
class as the poor have a negative propensity to save, besides they are
oompletely exempt from the tax.
C. The affects on the Inoentive to Invest.
Investment decisions are basically influenced by the net return of
capital invested. An income tax, unless reflected in reduced consumption,
goes to curtail the taxpayer's net worth and would change the initial dis¬
tribution of such net worth and also the terma at which funds are available
to the borrower.1 Any investment decision does involve the risks or the
probability of a loss. It will not be taken unless the expected return
appears sufficiently remunerative. "In every investment decision the
investor weighs the advantage of a greater return or yield, against the
2
disadvantage of a possible loss or risk".
An income tax, proportional or progressive, reduces the net yield of
1. R.A. Llusgrave, The Theory of Public Finance, p. 333«
2. £.1). Dosiiar and R.A. Musgrave, "Proportional Income Taxation and Risk
Taking", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. LVIII, 1943/44, p. 3C6.
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investment and thus reduces the amount of risk-taking. Risks in invest¬
ment, predictable or unpredictable, oontrol individual behaviour in
choosing the most suitable type of investment. While predictable risks
aire of minor effect on the incentive to invest as it is comparatively
easy to forecast such risks, the unpredictable risks or uncertainty is
difficult to assess in advanoe and thus their influence on investment
will be great. Investment in risky ventures demands a relatively high
return compared to investment in secure types, such as government bonds.
On the other hand potential investors differ in their asset preference,
owing to differences in tastes, needs, or restrictions imposed by the
nature of their balanoe sheets. Some investors want to hold cash, others
prefer secure investment, e.g. in land and buildings, government bonds,
and still others seek larger returns at greater risk. As a consequence
of the various and non-uniform individualistic behaviour, the supply of
funds to various types of investment outlets differs, depending on whose
savings are reduced by -Hie tax. On the other hand, the demand for funds,
progressive taxes reduoe funds available by the well-to-do olass of the
community.*
By introducing an income tax, or increasing the rate of the already-
imposed tax on the net return of business will alter the course of events
concerning investment decisions. Bach investor will form an estimate of
the business*s chances of gain, different from what he would have done had
there been no new tax or no increase in the tax rate. The uncertainty
schedule will, therefore, be different than the first, i.e. what it would
1. Progressive taxation may differ considerably "in their qualitative
impact on investment (per dollar of reduotion in available funds)
from proportional or regressive taxes which reduces funds supplied
by the small investor". Cf. R.A. Musgrave, op. cit., p. 353«
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have been had there been no additional tax. The change of uncertainty-
schedule will be influenced by the change in the net return after the
imposition. The marginal investor in risky business will be inclined
to direct his investment towardsaafer kinds.
Another important factor in formulating any investment decision is
"opportunity cost", i.e. the income sacrificed by not investing in alter-
inative lines. It is apparent that a shift to the left of the opportunity
curve will have different effects according to whether the investor's
pessimism about risky ventures has increased, i.e. he believes that for
any given risk the expected yield is smaller, or whether the left shift
is due to the imposition of the tax.* The outcome of the tax imposition
is that alternative earning possibilities are reduced too, and this would
2
weaken the substitution effect and strengthen the income effect. The
opportunity cost of safer alternatives, which is aero before and after the
tax, e.g. consumption or hoarding, is shifted to the right due to the tax
imposition.
Generally, investment decisions in risky ventures which are affected
by the tax imposition are susceptible to various factors which reduce the
tax disincentive effect. Such factors are; (a) granting an accelerated
depreciation for capital assets; (b) loss-effect against profits by
carrying it forward or backward; (o) direct government expenditure
through subsidies to risky business; (d) increasing public expenditure
on social overhead capital; (e) partial or full exemption from direct
and/or indirect taxes; and various other inducements undertaken through
the public authorities which will reduoe the amount of risk taken by the
1. Paul Streeten, "The Effects of Taxation on Risk-Taking", Oxford




Uncertainty involves a possibility of loss, but where there is a
danger of losses there is also a hope for capital gains. The taxation
of capital gains does have an effect on investment decisions. If such
gains are untaxed or taxed at a low rate the investor's reaction towards
risk-taking is lessened relatively to the case where capital gains are
taxed on the same level as ordinary income. Returns of this risky
investment, according to this argument, can be taken in the form of
capital gains instead of taking them in the shape of dividends which are
subject to higher tax rates.
Now we come to the effect of income taxation on capital formation
within an underdeveloped eoonosy. Taxation, especially on income, does
have a direct impact on capital formation in highly developed countries
as well as in a less-developed one. But in the former countries the effect
of income taxation is considered greater due to the high marginal rates
imposed on high incomes out of which most business and personal savings
is generated. In underdeveloped countries where the average income per
capita is below the subsistence level, income taxation does have a relatively
inferior impact on capital accumulation. This assessment has to be evaluated
carefully when considering the role of income taxation in capital formation
as any fiscal policy for investment should, therefore, consist largely in
minimising the interference of taxation with the incentives to absorb
private savings in productive investment. In general, income taxation
in a developing economy should have an incentive effect more than having
a neutral impact on capital formation in order to stimulate savings and
1. Most of the above inducements for investment will be discussed in
Chapter 6 of this work when discussing the question of Income Tax
Exemptions in detail.
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hoardings to he invested in productive channels.
However, one of the main problems of capital formation in under-developed
economies is incentives, fiscal or others, which has to be created to stimu-
jlate private investment, both domestic and foreign. On the other hand,
most underdeveloped countries could increase the proportion of their national
income taken by taxation without unduly disturbing the economy.^ Such
proportion will differ from one country to the other depending on the
citizens' behaviour and tastes; on the administrative competence of the
government machinery; on the relative importance of tax rates, and the
2
standards of external economies as barriers to private investment.
Fiscal policy, in general terms, has to be directed towards the creation
of the most favourable climate for capital formation and the chaneiling of
capital into the most productive investment. Tax incentives (have been
mentioned above)^ are; exemptions from income taxes for a limited period,
losses offset, the promotion of social overhead, etc. On the other hand
economists generally agree that additional taxation should take care of
income that would otherwise have been spent on luxurious consumption and
unproductive investments, vizs foreign exchange, gold, land properties,
and other stock of inventories.
A final word in this oontext has to be mentioned, that is the oompara-
stive importance of the rate of interest within a less-developed economy on
1. S.M. Bernstein and I.G. Patel, "Inflation in Relation to Economic Develop¬
ment", International Monetary fund, Staff Papers. Vol. II, November 1952,
P. 395.
2. U.N., Taxes and Fiscal Policy in Under-Developed Countries, New York,
1954, pTT
3. Cf. P.A.M. Van Philips, Public Finance and Less-Developed Economy
with Special Reference to Latin America, The Hague, p. 122.
1S 5
the one hand and the inoome tax on the other. Lack of capital and
underdeveloped banking institutions and in less-developed oountries result
in the prevalence of high rates of interest which sometimes exceed double
that found in highly developed countries.^ Now, what is the position of
an income tax of a relatively low rate to the would-be investor? High
rate of interest has no doubt a great active effect on the investor*s
decision while the tax on his profits is of a relatively minor importance.
A profits tax is usually levied after the realization of net profits - after
the deduction of interest rate on capital borrowed, as well as other expenses
incurred in realising such profits. If the investor realizes a net loss he
will not be taxable while he has to pay the high rate of interest on his
borrowed capital. In general, one could say, with some caution, that
income taxation in underdeveloped countries with its moderate rate structure,
does have a relatively minor effect as a disincentive to invest especially
regarding domestic capital.
The Egyptian Case;
Private as well as public investment in Egypt has been recently subject
to various studies by the National Planning Commission. It has received
great attention after the 1952 Revolution in an attempt to use private and
public resources, foreign and domestic, to raise the standard of living.
Fiscal polioy measures, especially taxation, were considered from its effect
on stimulating private investment. The first action taken by the Government
was the issuing of a new Law providing for inoome tax exemptions for new
1. The absence of institutional investors and the rudimentary form of the
capital market cause potential investors to be more dependent on bank
credits. Generally, in less-developed economies where the ratio of
liquidity preference is high accompanied by a low propensity to save
along with a low and capital-output ratio, the result is significant
within the monetary system. A high rate of interest is, therefore,
of predominant character especially for medium and long-term loans.
See, Van Philips, op. cit.» p. 67.
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enterprises undertaking new investment in specific fields considered of
relative significance to the economic development.1 The second step was
taken later in 1954 by issuing a Law which opened the door to foreign
oapital to he invested in Egypt through concluding double or multiple tax
conventions. Several other fiscal as well as other econoaio measures
2
were taken towards the stimulation of investment. The main aim of the
Government is to reduce the effect of taxation upon the incentive to invest
and ensure that the fiscal system as a whole will not, per se. hamper
development*
In Egypt as in most less-developed countries, the tendency of the
potential investor to bear risk is very low. Most investors prefer to
invest their savings in a secure type of investment such as Government
Bonds, land and housing. The Land Reform of 1952 restricted the land
tenure by 200 feddans and, therefore, investment in agricultural land
which was the most favourite type of investment in Egypt during the last
few centuries has been limited and/or legally eliminated. Investment in
housing has also been subject to restrictions lately as the building of
new houses came under Governmental control conoeming the permission to
build. On the other hand, the Government policy was always to encourage
public borrowing through issuing tax-free bonds with a remunerative
interest rate.
The outcome of the above factors, or in more precise words, the
result of the economic and other measures undertaken by the Government
1* The exemptions of newly formed enterprises from the Schedular Income
Tax is considered in detail in Chapter VI of this work.
2. Machinery and certain raw materials are exempted or subject to a
small rate of import duties as an inducement to establish new
industries in Egypt. See, The Budget Reports. 1953/54 and 1954/55.
Ministry of Finance and Soonomy, Republic of Egypt.
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was the shift of a considerable part of private savings towards public
investment through public loans. From Tables 3 and 6 w© can observe
this factj public investment rose continuously except in 1952 (the year
marking the change of the political regime). This partly accounts for
the growing government deficit."'' On the other hand, gross private
investment declined steadily while private savings increased in the same
period. Generally speaking, the increase in public investments have
2
been counterbalanced by a decrease In private investment. Since 1954
the public debt has increased steadily."* Taking total public loans in
bonds, the amount was ££123m. in 1953, increased to ££135.5®. in 1954,
to ££147.6m* in 1955, to ££174.7®. in 1956 and to ££180.5m. in 1957.
During the same period, part of these bonds, the Cotton loan, was re-
sdeemed, while new Development Loans were issued as well as Agrarian
Reform bonds*
Pros: the foregoing analysis we find that private investment is
declining steadily which might be attributed to a certain extent to the
failure of private individuals to undertake risky ventures and, therefore,
the Government had to step in. Generally speaking, the present policy of
the Government to finance development programmes is dependable on deficit
financing as well as a limited amount of foreign loans (except that
offered by the U.S.S.R. to finance the first stage of the High Dam, about
£E32®.).
The effect of income taxation, however, is not of great importance
to the private investor as the relatively low rate of the income tax on
Commercial and Industrial Profits, i.e. 17$ besides the complete exemption
1. U.K., Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1956-57, p. 13«
2. Ibid* p. 13*
3. See Table 7, P« Ik
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of new enterprises from income taxation did not help to stimulate capital
formation.'" Therefore, one oould emphasise that there are more powerful
factors other than taxation which were the cause of the decline of private
investment. Private foreign capital is still in a hesitant stage in spite
of the fiscal measures provided during the last few years. Heedless to
say, it is apparent that fiscal measures, especially income tax incentives,
have no tangible effect on foreign capital formation, but it is believed
that there are other various political as well as economic factors involved
in this connection.
III. Income Taxes and Economic Stabilisation.
The problem of economic instability due to the business cycle has
caused a great discomfort to most governments. Economists since the
1950*8 have tried their utmost to discover adequate measures to deal with
such instability and, therefore, various studies took place and various
solutions were put forward. Fiaoal as well as monetary measures ware
conducted and channelled to deal with and investigate the severity of the
business cycles. Tax measures, as an important part of a counter-cycle
fiscal policy, have been unanimously advocated as an effective device for
combating business fluctuations and their consequencies.
Income tax has proved to be an adequate fiscal measure in stabilising
the economy and hence reaching the equilibrium point where full employment
is maintained. Its influence In checking the serious effects of the
business cycle is more apparent in a developed economy, while it has a
relatively inferior importance in a less-developed economy. This is
1. Domestic double taxation has been eliminated through the exemption
of dividends from the Scheduler Tax on Commercial and Industrial
Profits. Moreover, the Law provides for losses carried forward
for three years.
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attributed to the low standard of living as a consequence of the over-
jwhelming low income per capita, which in many cases just reaches the
subsistence level in underdeveloped countries, This significant
phenomenon has to be borne in mind in planning the counter-cyclical
measures. In an underdeveloped economy indirect taxes are considered a
relatively more "influential" device than direct taxes in stabilizing the
economy, while in developed economies the reverse nay be the case.
The flexibility of an income tax as a fiscal counter-cyclical measure
depends mostly on the rate schedule and reliefs which affect directly the
tax liability. The c comparative efficiency of various changes in the rate
schedule on the tax base due to modifications of reliefs could be measured
by the multiplier effects of a tax increase or decrease - that is, by the
relation between the amount of tax changes and the resulting increase or
decrease in the aggregate demand.
Changes in personal income tax are argued to have a greater effect on
the business cycle than an income tax on business profits. Business tax
liabilities are direotly related to the success or the failure of the
business itself. Thus a firm obtains an automatic reduction or increase
in income tax depending on the trend of the economy, i.e. prosperity or
recession. For the Treasury this means that the yield of business income
tax automatically declines during the depression and increases during
recovery. Therefore, it is believed that other taxes, particularly taxes
on sales, production, or cost factor, would be more deflationary than
business income taxes, "that would yield the same amount of revenue over
a complete business cycle".1
1. national Bureau of Economic Research, Policies to Combat Depression,
paper prepared by R. Goode on "The Corporate Income Tax in a
Depression", pp. 150-170.
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Gas of the most important factors which should he carefully considered
is the timing element in applying any fiscal or monetary measure. Any
tax change has to he timed so as to render its expected fruits at the
appropriate time without having an adverse repercussion. Tax cuts during
a recession have to b© carefully put into power at the appropriate time,
otherwise it might start an inflationary trend. In the meantime, tax
changes should bo closely appropriate to changes in the rate of spending.
Another problem which faces the administration is what could be called the
"announcement problem". By this I mean that any change in tax provisions
has to be decided by the people's representatives, as is the procedure
within a democratic system. Therefore, the announcing of the proposed
changes in taxes could have an adverse effect, as some taxpayers might
try to act in a different way in order to obtain a future benefit.*^
Income tax reliefs and exemptions as well as the tax rate are the
most important tools upon which the economist depends in stabilising the
economy.
The following is a brief account of the basic income tax reliefs,
personal and business, and their role in mitigating the severity of the
business eyelet
l) Changes in personal exemptions, either in the exemption limit or in
other personal reliefs, such as dependants' reliefs, etc., are considered
as an effective tool in changing the tax base. This change is usually
coupled with a change in the rate structure. During inflation the
personal exemption limit is reduced in real terms and thus the actual
1. For example, if a new Capital Allowance (such as the Initial Allowance
of the British Income Tax) on new capital assets is proposed to
encourage investment during the recession, this might lead to a
postponement of expenditure on capital goods which, in turn, might
intensify the recession.
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tax becomes wider. In the depression a reduction in the tax base as well
as in rates provides an adequate measure in reducing the tax liability and
thus increasing the disposable income which consequently increases th©
demand schedule. As it is the same in other fiscal measures, the timing
problem raises an important question in choosing the appropriate time to
start such changes. The timing problem in this vary measure is not so
difficult as it is in other fiscal measures. This is true because in
most income tax systems, the fiscal year of all individuals is the same,
therefore, the authorities have only one date for the application of such
changes, that is, the end of the fiscal year.1 During the depression tax
cuts of appropriate siae and at the appropriate timo ought to be produced
&b promptly as possible once a cyclical contraction has actually begun.
The installation of unnecessary tax outs must be avoided on principle, and
particularly because in unfavourable conditions they may result in inflation.
2) On the first appearance of the downtrend of the economy unused personal
exemptions and reliefs could be carried backwards against previous taxable
2
income. This would help in mitigating th© cyclical effect. The carry¬
back method would create a negative tax liability? a subsidy in the shape
of a tax refund. The feasibility of such a measure depends mostly on its
practicability from the administrative point of view. After recovery a
permanent averaging method, either carry-forward or carry-backward of unused
exemptions achieves a stable revenue to the Treasury and establishes greater
1. The government has the choice between the end of the current fiscal
year in undertaking the desirable changes or to wait another twelve
months.
2. W. Viekrey, Agenda for Progressive Taxation, pp. 169-191.
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equity,
3) Methods used for inventory valuation are considered as an important
factor in influencing the fluctuations of aggregate business profits.
During a recession the adoption of Fifo method reduces the fluctuations
in reported business profits and tax liabilities will fall less rapidly
than under Fifo method, as under the latter method "the lag between assumed
cost of goods sold and replacement cost becomes important in a period of
rapidly changing prices",3" Consequently Fifo appears to be a relatively
adequate method for stabilising the economy and reducing the sharp
2
fluctuation in profits or losses due to price changes of inventories,
4) Accelerated depreciation could be used as an anti-oyolioal device
if used after a careful study of its direct and indirect effects on the
tax system ©specially if used as a tool for tax avoidance. Rapid
amortisation of depreciable assets reduces net profits subject to tax and
thus results in greater disposable income to be distributed as dividends,
or, if not distributed will increase the funds available for expansion and
further investment. The ultimate effect depends on the difference and
thus the difference which would result, pari passu, In the multiplier
effect in each portion. By and large, the effect of accelerated depre¬
ciation on depression will depend on various factors, e.g. on future tax
rates, on the availability of loss-oarry-baoks or carry-forwards and on the
difference between the "pay-off period" and its useful life,**
The change in prices, if taken into account in the computation of the
depreciation allowance, affects the cyclical fluctuations. The adoption
1. national Bureau of Economic Research, op. ait., p. 153,
2. H.B. Arthur, "Inventory Profits in the Business Cycle", American
Economic Review, March, 1935, p. 28. Also see, J.K. Butters,
Inventory Accounting and Policies, pp. 124-125.
3. Ibid. p. 164.
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of replacement-cost depreciation during an inflationary period will result
in an undesirable effect5 it will increase the disposable profits after
tax which include speeial reserves accumulated through the application of
replacement-cost depreciation. If such amounts are distributed it will
increase the intensity of the cycle through its effect on the propensity to
consume. If undistributed, such profits would increase the propensity to
invest, whioh in turn, through the multiplier effect, would raise the demand
schedule to a higher level. A desirable compromise could be found to solve
the above dilemma and to bring together the two aims, equity and combating
the inflationary trend. The excess of depreciation allowance computed
according to replacement cost over the normal depredation allowance could
be transferred to a separate account which should not be used unless the
asset is completely amortized or unless permission is granted, before the
asset's complete amortization by the Treasury. In other words, the "excess
depreciation allowance" should be controlled by an authoritative body well
informed on the trend of the eocnosy in general.
Replacement-cost depreciation might be an additional obstacle to invest¬
ment during depression when prices are expected to decline, as future
deductions would be smaller than under original-cost depreciation. But
if prices are expected to rise, in the oase of a short-run recession, the
adoption of replacement-cost depreciation would be more feasible for firms
to invest in depreciable assets.
5) During the depression a special tax on undistributed profits; or any
fiscal measurs which differentiates against retained profits, stimulates
additional distribution of dividends and thus increases aggregate conouiap-
stion expend!ture. The adoption of any method whioh differentiates against
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undistributed profits during inflation would intensify the upward trend
by increasing disposable income and hence consumption expenditure. Th©r@~
sfore, such differentiation ought to be suspended at the first stage of
recovery.
These are the main income tax tools used in mitigating the rigidity
of the business cycle. In underdeveloped countries, as previously
mentioned, the role of income taxation in eliminating the maleffects of
the business cycle is of minor importance, due to the fact that a small
fraction of the population is subject to income taxation. Generally
speaking, it has been strongly argued by the majority of economists who
are interested in problems of underdeveloped economies, that the effect
of monetary as well as fiscal policy measures in the business cycle is
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limited.* This unfortunate fact is due mainly to several reasons, the
imperfection of the price system; the inefficiency of the administration
in general and that of the taxation in particular, the low income per
capita; the inelasticity of the consumption function, e.g. consumption
is a unity for the majority of population; the low income groups; the
poor and underdeveloped banking institutions; the predominance of non¬
monetary economy, and various other factors.
1. "The normal monetary policy open to a Central Bank for counteracting
inflation is also subject to serious limitations in an underdeveloped
economy;
a) The banking system is not sufficiently highly organised for the bank
rate to be effective ...
b) The bank money which is directly influenced by the rate of interest
forma only a small proportion of the total volume of money in
circulation ...
c) Private investment is not in most cases direotly related to the con-
isumption. Hot to speak of the agricultural sector where the banking
system hardly plays any role, even in industries a large part of the
finance is often provided by agencies whioh are virtually independent
of the banking system ..."
"Few countries in the region have so far made any significant progress
towards disinflation by fiscal measures. These are certain limiting
factors;
a) Income tax coverage in these countries is very small and insufficient
to enable revenue from direct taxation to oope with extraordinary
demand on the Exchequer ...
b) Corporation taxes are limited in most countries by incentive oon-
tsiderations ...
c) Proposal to increase indirect taxes, although they deserve the most
serious consideration, meet the following dilemma; the proceeds of
indirect taxes on luxuries do not increase as rates are increased,
the demand for these goods being elastio, on the other hand indirect
taxes on necessaries are inequitable. Consumption taxes are re-
tgresslve as they fall on the poor as an inflationary rise in prices.
Yet they cannot be carried beyond a certain limit in view of possible
repercussion on wages."
Of., U.N., Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far Bast, Third Quarter
1951t Vol. 11, No. 3» Bangkok, February 1952. See also a brief
comment on this topic in G.M. Meier and I.E. Baldwin, Economic Sevslcp-
tiaent. Theory. History. Policy. Hew York, 1957» PP« 301-303.
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The Egyptian Income Taxation and Economic Stabilization;
Now wa turn to the role of the Egyptian income taxes as a stabilizer.
Before indulging ourselves in the fiscal discussion, it is desirable to
give a brief idea about the factors behind economic cyclieal fluctuations
in Egypt.
The fact that cyclical developments in Egypt are so strongly influenced
by cotton prices is explained by the predominance of cotton as the major
export crop in the economy. In broadest terms, the typical pattern of
the Egyptian economic cycle may be summarised as follows? when demand in
world markets rises, the price and total value of cotton exports go up.
Higher profits and wages in the agricultural sector are translated into
greater domestic demand. The rise in the money supply that results from
the active turn in the balance of payments, together with the growing
volume of credit, intensifies the domestic expansion. Government
revenues increase, the value of real estate and other assets rises, and
speculation contributes further to the general increase. The turn coses
when the world market begins to contract. The value of exports then
falls off, the balance of payments turns passive, the money supply shrinks,
prices, wages and profits go down. Government revenues also shrink and
a high percentage of unemployment may set in, until the world demand onoe
more increases*
Heedless to say, the range of action open to the Government, in this
connection, goes far beyond the fiscal field. In faot, measures relating
to international commercial policy, labour policy, and agricultural policy
may, under certain circumstances, prove more feasible and also more
effective than fiscal action fas an anti-cyclical measure. In this study,
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however, It will be necessary to limit the disoussion to fiscal field in
general and to income taxation as part of the fiscal ayetern in particular.
She Egyptian income tax was levied at the start of the World War II
and, therefore, it has only experienced an upward trend up till the present
time. The major cause of the inflationary pressure during the War period
was due mainly to Allied military expenditure, which was aggravated during
some year© by a considerable reduction in the volume of Imports.^
Income tax rates were increased few times during the war period and
reached 12& on income derived from negotiable capital and on commercial
and industrial profits. fhe Excess Profits fax was levied in 1942 with
th© intention of curbing the inflationary trend and supplying the Treasury
with revenue needed to meet the rising public expenditure. While direct
taxes increased in percentage to total public receipts, Indirect taxes,
especially custom duties, declined during that period. The increased
importance of direct Taxes during the war years reflected only a temporary
phenomenon largely due to the decline in customs receipts as a result of
2
reduced imports. Public debt, on the other hand, has been relatively
in a constant condition during that periodj total public debt was
£E93«2a. in 1940 and increased to £E101.8ia. in 1942 (the increase was due
to the floating of 4$ cotton loan to finance that year's cotton crop), and
then dropped to ££93*4®. in 1945. Generally speaking the Government did
not undertake effective fiscal measures, i.e. taxation measures, to
1. "Wholesale prices tripled during the war years while the money supply
(notes iix circulation and deposits) expanded to seven times its 1939
volume. See, U.K., Public finance Information Papers, Egypt, 1950,
p. 1, Allied military expenditures totalled ££314®* from 1940 to
1945 Inclusive, See, U.K., Soonoiaic Developments in the Middle East,
i?4g-i?P4> *• 27. - __ -
2. See, U.K., op. cit., Table 3# PP» 24-27.
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counteract the inflationary pressure due to the war conditions other than
the levying of the Excess Profits Tax.
Table 19 shows us a very interesting phenomenon which existed during
the war period in the Egyptian economy. While the Government realised a
surplus for the last four years of the war (the surplus is sterilised as
soon as it is transferred to the General Reserve Fund) which meant the
absorption of part of the purchasing power from aggregate demand, we
observe a steady rise in the oost of living index. This contradictory
deduction shows that fiscal measures were inefficient to curb the inflation-
lazy trend. This also means that there were other much stronger factors
working in the other direction; they could be:
(a) the sharp and continuous increase in the money supply due to the
increase in the Allied military expenditure! it increased to sevenfold
of the pre-war amountj (b) the lag of domestic production behind the
increase in demand due to the sharp decline in imports and the eh&rp
increase in the purchasing power due to the military expenditures;
(c) taxation in general did not absorb a siseable part of the purchasing
power due to the inefficiency of administration. It is true in the
latter condition if we realise that the E.P.T. levied on war profits
during that period was not collected fully until in later years, say,
five to seven years after the realisation of the profits.1 (d) The
public debt, as previously mentioned did not play its role in the fight
against inflation; it remained constant.
This brief analysis shows the inefficiency of the fiscal system to
curb the inflationary trend during the war period; which it was chosen
to serve as a test for our investigation. As a matter of fact a final

































































judgment of the Egyptian fiseal measures should not ba confined to such a
period as income taxationwas still in its first experimental stage and
also that the government, at that time, did not seek other fiscal measures
to fight the upward trend, suoh as the absorption of the excess purchasing
power through public borrowing and maximising the efficiency of the tax
machinery.
The post-war period was earmarked by a decline in the cost of living
and a deflationary trend was in the march. Taxes remained at the same
level regarding the rates up till 1950 while their yield rose during that
period especially customs duties due to the increase in imports and the
rise in the national income. During the Korean boom the cost of living
index rose and it declined slightly afterwards? it rose from 282 in 1949
to J06 in 199C, to 526 in 1951 and then deolined to 296 in 1952.1
Generally, analysis of the Inflationary and deflationary pressures which
made themselves felt in the post-wax period shows that the main faotor has
been the variation in the price of the Egyptian cotton in world markets
2
and the consequent effects on the balance of payments. In spite of the in¬
crease in tax rates, especially income taxation, and the introduction of
the General Income Tax In 1949 the general effect of this increase was
not felt in the economy as prices did not fall considerably even after the
end of the Korean War in 1955I while, as a matter of fact, it rose steadily
from 1956 due to the Sues crisis of that year and to the expansion of
3
development programmes carried out through deficit financing. "The
1. National Bank of Egypt, Economic Bulletin. Vol. IX. No. 3» 1956 p. 293*
2. U.N., Economic Developments in the Middle East. 1945-54. New York,
1955, J7W*
3. Cost of living indices were 283 in 1955? 297 in 1956? 306 in 1957 and
301 in 1958* See, National Bank of Egypt, Economic Bulletin. Vol. XII
No. 1, 1959, P. 67.
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foreign sector in Egypt sees® to have acted as a shock absorber in its
over-all stabilising effect on the economy, particularly in counteracting
the effects of domestic fiscal policy".1 Consequently, fiscal policy
through tax measures especially income taxation, have a minor effect on
stabilising the economy in the post-war period, even if we take into
consideration the fact that taxes absorb a considerable part of the
national product compared to other less-developed economies} it is
between 22;' and 2$p in Egypt (income taxes compose only a small propor¬
tion of total tax revenues, about 1%'« to 1TA)»




The Hole of Exemptions in the System
I. Motives Behind Exe:actions
Fiscal jurisdictions have from time to tim felt it desirabl to encourage
certain types of economic, social and cultural activities, Stimulating oonoraic
development, encouraging social and cultural institutions to spread and v/id n
their scope of activities, and attaining equitable distribution of the fisOal
burden, gov rnm« nta felt it appropriate to grant various tax privil g s in the
form of exemptions and reliefs to attain such objectives. In thin ohapt r and
the following (Chapter 7) we ar. oonoerned with th role of exemptions, busin se
or personal, in reaching th« tax objectives. By and large, exemptions ar©
considered aa basic 'tools* which any income tax normally uses to r<aoh its
ofoj otivca. Therefore, in our view a special section of our enquiry into the
p rformano© of the Egyptian incoa tax system has to b d -. vot d ontir ly to
this special case; the rol which x. naptlons play in th.- ayat a.
This chapter deals with th© main objects of iucora tax x mptions, which
can be divid d into four oatogori o; a) increasing equity in th distribution
of the tax burden, b) aohi ving economic objectives, c) political obj ctiv a,
and d) administrative reasons.
As our principal object in the study of th® p>rformanc of th© Egyptian
incomes tax is to see how far the system has reached its objectives, it sat ma
more appropriate to oonoontrate on the discussion of th first two categori s
of exemptions; i.u. exemptions for equity, and those for conomic development.
On the other han.,, political exemptions are considered to be of 1 as
significance to our enquiry, aa the only ©x mptions baaed on political raotiv s
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are those granted to tin. memb ra of diplomatic missions on a reciprocal basis."
Exemptions for administrative reasons arc usually bas d on the w 11 known
2
'maxim of economy' laid down by Adam Smith.* How.v, r, tin motiv 3 behind this
type of exemption ar mainly twoi l) Avoiding uneconomical collection xpenses.
Therefore exera. tions are usually gr nted on grounds of expediency, where it can
be proved to the revenue authorlti s that if th je exemptions ar- not ranted,
th collection expenses of thy true from unexempt d taxpayers will prove
uneconomical* Administrative coots, on the wholet should tak into consideration
"compliance costs" besides collection expens a. Th tax productivity should b
compared with administrative costs to verify the adequacy of the tax. Applying
this principle, it is obvious that income tax usually exempts low Income groups
so as to achieve social as well as administrative objects. 2) Difficulty of
assessment accounts for another category of ex mptions. In almost all und- r~
d veloped countri a t ie r- v ran: authorities find it difficult to assess incom
taxation from a'considerable section of population, as th non-monetary income
in the agricultural sector is difficult if not impossibly to assess,"'
These are th« basic reasons for administrativ- x raptions, with which w ■
are not largely concerned at present, as we hav. pointed out b. for< , (Chapter III)
the principal difficultis of the tax administration in Egypt, and w« need not
therefore rediecuss those difficulties. By and large, as we mentioned before,
(1) There are no exemptions of the Sovereign at pr sent, since the 1252
Revolution whan ex King Farouk abdicated.
(2) " every tax ought to be so oontrived as both to tax*; out and to
keep out of th pockets of the people as little as possible, over and
above what it brings into the public treasury of the state," Adam Smith,
health of Katiuna. Bock 5» Chapter II.
(3) On the point of administrative difficulty of assessing income taxes in
Egypt see Chapter III.
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the main aim of this ohaptr, and the following one, is to demonstrate and
analyse the role of exemptions in achieving equity and conomio d v lopn nt
of the Egyptian economy. This study, however, can be more approximately
considered as an indispensible supplement to the previous ch&pt .rs, (Chapt rs
III, IV and V) in which v/ havo already discussed the p. rformanoe of th
"Egyptian incom tax without putting much emphasis on th< role of exemptions in
th system. Therefore, it seems necessary to clarify the plao. of exemptions
in order to complete our study into the performance of the income tax.
r i s Equity Motives
Tax exemptions bas d on equity oonsid rations are widely accept d as th.y
aie usually founded on a humanitarian basis. Our analysis is cos .fin d only
to th major reliefs usually granted through the income tax legislation of most
developed as well as less-developed countries.
(l) Exemption of Minimum Subsistencet
The Physiocrats, who advocated th« single tax on land, opposed any tax on
income, especially that which was dariv d from labour. Their main r-aaon was
that any tax, other than land tax, on the labour rs will be harmful to human
nature, because if the tax l. vled absorbs a part of the labourers income, ho
will suffer from hunger and illness. This will 1 ad to a shorteg of the labour
supply which, in turn, will lead to higher wages for th© oth rs. Th incid noe
of the higher wages will be shifted to th pric of the commoditi s produo d.
Consequently, th demand for labour will Increase as a r suit of shorteg of
supply, which will raise the standard of wages above its normal level to comp nsate
the income tax. In general, they opposed any tax on any income rather than income
derived from land on the basis that a labourer's income is just nough for his
subsistence, hence any tax to be levied on this income will caus destruction to
the nation as a whole.
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Adam Smith, Ricar&o and J.3. Mill felt the need for leaving a certain
minimum of income untaxed, sufficient to provide the necessaries of life to
the taxpayer and his family.
Later, the principle of exempting the minimum of subsistence has been
accepted by numerous economists in different forms and on different grounds,
while other economists, a minority, rejected it on politico-economic grounds.
What is meant by minimum of subsistence?
A minimum of subsistence ia a necessary cost for the population in a
specific country. A certain minimum of income may be defined as that amount
of income, real or imputed, necessary to meet the cost of maintaining thn
average population. To r ach the subsistence income, we n ed accurate
statistics of diff rent indexes, such as the index of cost of living, th®
index of prices, wholesale and retail, and other reliable statistics which
will help in computing the minimum.
Pindly Shirras described the subsistence minimum as "the necessaries for
efficiency.1,1 It means that all the necessari s such as nourishing food and
housing- must be exempted fx^oa taxation. The number of dependents supported
by an individual should be taken into consideration in determining the minimum.
Minimum of subsistence does not consist only of raon y income but also
comprehends special commodities and properties. Homestead exemption in the
property tax field are based partly upon the idea of leaving a minimum free
from tax. The exemption of food and other extreme necessaries under the sales
tax or import duties can be placed in the same category.
The minimum of subsistence exemption must be baa d on a minimum standard
of living of a certain country. What is meant by a minimum standard? Do s
it only comprise th< necessary food and housing for th. exist-nc of th human
b ing, or does it include other things? This question is still a debatable
(l) P. Shirras, The Science of Public Pinanoe, p. 132.
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subject. Seligman answered this question: that if taxes are levi d on the
labourers whenwiges are even higher than the minimum of subsistence, their
standard of living will be lowered.^ If income earners of a c rtain country
are accustomed to participate in the general progress of the society, and are
enjoying the comforts of modern life, i.e. cinemas, theatres, athletic clubs,
obtaining wireless sets, television etc., the minimum will naturally be much
higher than a oountry with a low standard of living. It has been obvious
during this century, with tin, development of democratic ideas, that the limit
of exemption of the subsistence minimum is inclined to rise continually.
The minimum of subsistence is mainly d pendent on the standard of living
of the people of a certain nation; a country whose people enjoy a relatively
high standard of life may recognise what would be luxuries for an under-developed
nation as necessaries and vice versa.
Arguments for tax-exempt minimum of subsistence.
Host of the economists advocated the exemption of th minimum of subsistence
from taxation for the achievement of equity, expediency and other r asons, As
above mentioned the basic reason for the ex mption of a minimum of subsistence is
usually founded on the assumption that a given supply of population must be
maintained at a certain standard of living. This result is based on the principle
that taxation should not disturb the fundamental forces that determine population
and that taxation should not alter population tendencies while trying to avoid
reduction in productivity.
Some other economists advooated the doctrine on th-! grounds that as the cost
of production includes many items which are to be deducted to reach the taxable
profit, (among these items is "the meat and bread for the labourers which were
regarded very much as fuel shovelled into the furnace of a human machine" ), it
(1) .R.A. Seli ;man, The Income Tax, p. 28.
(2) C. Plohn, Introduction to Public Finance, p. 112.
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would, "be burdensome for production to tax the necessaries of the productive
1
power, and if the minimum income is taxed the tax would certainly be shifted.
If the government imposes taxes on the minimum of subsistence, the general
treiid of the population will decline arid the poor get poorer. In other words,
the tax on the minimum of subsistence tends to create paupers and to low r the
standard of living which will aggravate the general social situation of the
nation. This condition will force the government to establish a policy of poor
relief and the result will ba taking the money away with one hand and returning
it with the other.
It has been argued that to observe the principle of economy in the costs
of collecting small driblets of revenue frcm poorest classes, the exemption
of the subsistence income must exist. This fiscal reason is based on the ground
that the coot of collecting the taxes from paupers may be prohibitive compared
with the revenues obtained.
The exemption of the subsistence income is based on social justification;
that allowing such exemptions would mitigate present inequalities and tend to
lessen inequalities in the distribution of income and probably in wealth. As
equity, in matters of taxation, is based on the equal distribution of the tax
burden measured by the ability to pay, the individual taxpayer liable to taxation
on his subsistence income will bear an excessive burden, while his ability to
pay any tax is nil.^
(1) The Physiocrats, Rioardo, Mill and som- of th later economists have stated
that taxes on subsistence minimum tend to be shifted from the poorest elements
of the society to the rioher classes through readjustments in the population
supply and increases in wages. Taxes on the bare necessities of existence
raise their prices in the long run and thereby lessen the purchasing power of
wages. At the end taxes will be shifted to the rich through higher prices
of commodities z*esulting from higher wages.
(2) It started in the British system by the avoidance of duties on th necessaries
of life, and incomes up to £140 per annum are free from direct taxation.
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Consequently a considerable burden of commodity, business and property taxes
is shifted into consumption expenditure, where it bears hsavily on the poor
class, and therefore a substantial minimum exemption in personal taxes
counterbalances the maldistribution of the fiscal burdens.^
In general, all tax systems of different nations exempt the subsistence
income from taxation for one or more of the reasons mentioned, mainly on
humanitarian grounds.
Arguments a.ainst th exemption of the subsistence income.
One of the basic argum nts against the exemption of th minimum of
subsistence is the los3 of revenue as hug numbers of taxpay rs wi11 escape
the tax payment. This argument could be surmounted on the ground that the
cost of collection from the big masses of population will overweight the
revenue collected.
Some economists argued that the existence of the State depends on the tax
revenue just as the individual relies on food. Thus the minimum of outlay
for existence must include the necessary expense of the State. This statement
is groundless, because it will be against the approved doctrine, ability to pay.
So, if the tax is levied on those who barely possess the means of subsistence
and have no ability to pay taxes, the result would be to drive them into misery
and poverty. Then the government will find no other alternative than to
establish a program of poor relief.
(l) Consumption taxes compose a considerable part of the individual income in
general. In U.S.A. for example, an individual paid in 1944 an average of
f 25.55 for th© Federal purchase tax levied on cigarettes and $ 10 a year
per American family for the sugar tariff. Under a 2$ retail sales tax an
individual pays $ 20 in taxes for every $ 1000 spent on taxable merchandise.
H. Grov. sj Financing Gov rnment, p. 295
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The political argument against the exemption of the subsistence income is
based on the doctrine of "no taxation without representation". In the democratic
system taxes are levied after being approved by the taxpayers through their
representatives in parliament. Each member of the society who enjoys the power
of voting should contribute to the expenses of government, ven though the
contribution is small} moreover, this exemption of tax has been criticised on
the grounds that it would extend favours to certain classes at the expense of
others. This objection is denounced on the basis that this type of ex option,
like most of the reliefs, is given to taxpayers to achieve one of the most
significant principles of taxation - equality in the distribution of th tax
burden between the citizens.
The most logical argument advances, by some economists is that State
expenditure may he more productive than private expenditure, and that the gains
of the poorest classes from the taxation of their subsistence income may be
greater than the sacrifice they suffer through taxation. This objection is not
always correct. Taxes are collected to meet the government expenditure in
general and the government does not allocate the taxes according to the class
who paid them, but all government revenues from taxt-s, fees and other sourc s
are mixed and directed to meet the different gov*rnm nt expenditures. No
.accurate statistical measures could ever be reached for choosing between taxing
the subsistence level or exempting it according to this argument.
The exemption of a minimum of subsistence may stimulate evasion by individuals,
but such evasion already exists in th failure to coll ct different taxes which
taxpayers owe to governments. In addition, it is very difficult to verify
the account statements of small taxpayers for purpos a of exemption, specially in
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income taxation. Thus the tax authorities have to d pond largely on their
honesty and their fiscal conociousnass.
The major objection or the most difficult problem is the measurement
of the minimum standard. To decide the least physiological minimum or the
lowest cost of subsistence depends upon different elements, such as the
standard of living, income of the community, cost of living, changes in
consumption habits, number of dependents and many other particular conditions.
Another difficulty in measuring the minimum is that governmental revenues
are not derived only from personal income tax, hut a great variety of taxes is
collected and most individuals, poor or rich, take part in paying one or more of
the taxes. Therefore an acceptable minimum will be relatively arbitrary and
have to be measured roughly.
Forms of minimum exemptions.
The exemption of minimum of income may take one of the following forms:1
(a) 'Lump sura' exemption allows a deduction of a certain amount from the
taxable element but if this element exceeds the sum exempted, the whole
amount will be liable to tax. For example, if the fixed ex mption is
£100, the income above £100, e.g. £101, will be entirely subject to tax.
(b) Continuing exemption permits the deduction of the full amount of the
exemption without any respect to the amount of the taxable element. If
£100 is the amount exempted, a sum of £500 or £1000 will enjoy the privilege
of deducting the full amount of exemption, the £100. This form of exemption
reduces the taxable inoome and it would have a multiple effect in the case of
progressive rates.
(l) W.J. Shultz and C.L. Harris, American Public Finano , p. 262.
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Allowing minimum exemption to rich taxpayers is a diversion from th©
principle of minimum exemptions and causes a reduction in the tax yield
while the lump sum exemption is inequitable. It could be said that both
types contradict each other and they are rarely used in tax systems,
(o) Vanishing exemption: under this form, the exemption diminishes as the tax
base increases over the exemption level. If the exemption level is £100,
a person with an income of £200 would enjoy a £50 exemption, vsrhil- an
income of £300 would be fully taxable. This type eliminates the
disadvantages of both the lump sum and the continuing exemptions.
Consequently, the exemption of minimum of subsistence is a necessity and
it is largely approved for its equity and expediency. The most significant
difficulty involved in the determination of the minimum is its measurement.
Legislators and politicians, as well as economists, should devote th<ir efforts
to devising a scientific measurements of the minimum of subsistence. Another
conflict may occur to legislators and economists between productivity, which is
one of the most important practical considerations in taxation, and equity and
social justice. It is definitely preferable to avoid creating paupers by
indiscriminate taxation than to tax thera on their subsistence and then repair
the damage by expenditure for poor relief. Great social damages are involved
in the heavy taxation of the lowest classes. Specific considerations should
be given to the tax burdens of the poor in periods of economic depression, while
in such periods, governments are most in need of revenues. A wise tax syst< m
should try to avoid taxing th subsistence level and search for other adequate
sources of revenues.
The Egyptian practice;
Since the iranosition of th first Ea-vntian Schedular Income Tax in 1939 the
*n> iX
exemption limit did not change. The same situation is found in the General
Income Tax which was imposed in 1949» (see Table 20). In spite of the various
changes in the price levels during and after the $orld War II no action was taken
to alter the exemption limit. Prom Table 20 we find that the cost of living
index has been rising steadily from 100 in 1939 to 298 in 1957* This phenomenon
shows at the first plaoe the lag of the exemption limit behind the continuous
rise in the cost of living. While this might be unjustifiable from equity view¬
point especially when considering wage earners whose income did not rise by the
same proportion as that occurred to individuals who derive their income from
oth r sources, e.g., commercial and industrial profits, land rent and agricultural
profits, moveable property ... etc. It is perfectly tru that salaried employees
and wage earners have suffered mostly from the unjustifiably low xemption limit
especially those who have dependents to support."'' Moreover, such class of.
taxpayers are considered to b the most honest class between all income taxpayers
as the tax is automatically withheld at the source, while others could evade the
tax, partially or completely, by various ways and means.
The General Income Tax provides an exemption limit of £E 1,000 for a single
person and £E 50 for his wife and every child with a maximum of £E 200. The study
of the G.I. Tax during its short period of application results in the fact that the
existing limit of exemption is higher than it should be for the following r<asons:
(a) A. considerable percentage of income especially that derived from agricultural
land and buildings, is computed on arbitrary basis. The Egyptian prop rty taxes
(l) Taking the Government employees as example, their salaries are increased only
by 25$ to meet the increase in the cost of living. The situation is worse as
most of the employees nowadays do not in fact cash such bonus for various
administrative reasons.
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upon which ths income liable to the 0.1. Tax is based, are assess- d on the
estimated annual rental value of the asset and not on the actual income. Moreover,
the G.I. Tax is assessed on ths rental value after the deduction of a fixed
percentage; 20% for administrative expenses, repairs and depreciation. Irop<-rty
tax already paid is allowed as a deduction from the estimat. d income of the
property. This deduction leads towards the under assessment of the tax of
those who derive most of their income from immovable property, while those who
derive their income from wages and salaries, trade or from professions pay the
tax on their actual earned income. Consequently, the individual who enjoys
unearned income is in a better situation than someone who obtains his income from
work whereas it should be the opposite.'*'
(b) The treatment of income derived from land would result in the decline of
net revenues of the G.I. Tax as the majority of the landowners, 947,hold not more
than five acres, while those 'who own more than 100 acres are about 5083, or about
0.2^'of total landowners.
(0) The cost of living is by no means as high as £131000 a year for the average
Egyptian. According to the above factual evidence I believe that the exemption
limit in the G.I. Tax ought to be reduced to about £S3Q0 with the revision of the
provisions relating to allowances for depreciation, administrative and other
major expenses.
(1) If A derives £134000 a year from his land (according to estimated rental value),
and B derives the same amount from his business as a tradesman (joiner for
example), the first has to pay £S704 in direct taxes (fciJj^O Land Tax + £3144
G.l. Tax), while B has to pay ££892 (£S680 Schedular Income Tax+ £13212 G.I.
Tax). The effective tax rates are 17.6,' and 22.37 respectively. This
example illustrates the unfair treatment rendered by the differentiation of
the way of assessment of the different of income, inasmuch a3 the double
reliefs granted to income derived from property, especially in the case of
buildings, (the Tax on Buildings allows 10, deduction for depreciation and
repairs),
(2) See Table 1-
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TABLE 20
The trend of the exemption limit, single person, under the Egyptian Income Tax
system, and the social services per capita within the period from 1939 to 1957
Item 1939 1942 1945 1948 1951 1954 1957
1
exemption Limit (Soh. Taxes)£B 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Exemption Limit (G.I. Tax) £B - - - - 1000 1000 1000
Cost of Living Indices 100 135 293 281 319 284 298
Per-capita share of social
services £E 0.4 (4)• • (4)• • 0.9 1.4 1.5 2.2^
Notess (l) Most Schedule Taxes have one exemption limit, which is £E 100 for a
single person, but in the case of the Tax on Income from moveable Property there
is no exemption limit as this tax is regarded too impersonal.
(2) The G.I.T. came into force in 1949 but the majority to taxpayers
(i.e. Sohedular income tax-payers are not liable to this tax as their incomes
are mainly below the G.I.T. liability point.) Therefore, any attempt to form
a judgement based on the G.I.T. exemption limit is inadequate and misleading
as this tax affects a small fraction of the population.
(3) The calculation of this item is based on various assumptions whioh
might seem impracticabl or unrealistic. However, for simplification and
expedience, I find myself compelled to assume that-} a) all population, children
and adults, receive the same share of total social services' expenditure} b) that
a single person obtains the same amount as any other parson in a different civic




Sourcess Republic of Egypt, Statistical Pocket Tear Book, 1957} and,
National Bank of Egypt Bulletins, various years.
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Income from property should, b© based on actual basis not on the rental value
which is calculated every ten years as in the case of agricultural land and nine
years as in the case of buildings.
Th- g®n#ral outlook, at present, of the Egyptian income tax system vgarding
minimum allowance is that such exemption is static and does not follow any change
in the social and economic cirounistanoes.
Closely r$lat§d to the exemption of th? subsistence income is the allowance
deducted from taxable income for the upkeep of children and dependents. In order
to achieve horizontal equity doctrine most of income tax systems j>errait the
deduction of a certain amount of the individual's income for each dependent.
The Egyptian tax is no exception. The Scheduler Tax allows a lump sum £T 30
for children whatever their number is, while the G.I. Tax allows £Ii50 for each
child with a maximum of £0150 (no exemption is allowed for more than three
children).
As the family unit within the Schedular Tax is of minor importance because
of the impersonal characteristic of the tax, the 7/riter believes that the amount
allowed as a deduction for children could be considered sufficient for the time
being. But on the other hand, the major defect lies within the G.I. tax where
the personal touch of the tax is of relative significant . To reach equity in
fiscal treatment there should be a fixed allowance of each dependent whatever
their number is. Taking the British expirienco in mind it should be desirable
to differentiate between the various ages of th® children as a child of 5 y>ars
does not require the relatively smaller part of his parents' inoora. for his upkeep
than a child of 20 and receiving' a university education."*" Generally speaking,
(l) See Pinanoe Act, 1958*
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the family unit under the Egyptian income taxation does not receive the required
attention in calculating the final liability and therefore the above mentioned
recommendations have to be put forward after a careful study of the various family
budgets which, as far as my knowledge permits, is under investigation at present,
(2) - Tax Relief for earned income
The discrimination between earned from unearned income by granting the former
a special tax relief is a debatable point. In general, unearned income is d rived
from income-yielding property, interest, rent or monopoly gains. Earned income
is usually derived from salaries, wages, any remuneration from an office or
employment of an individual, professional or vocation gains, pensions, income
from property forming part of the emoluments of any employment held by an
individual, income from patent rights received by the inventor himself, or any
other income derived substantially from labour. The difficulty arises in
drawing the discriminating line between the two kinds of income. Sometimes
individual incomes are mixed, pai'tly earned and partly unearned. In order to
distinguish between the different types of incomes, it is therefore necessary
to state in advance the categories of taxable incomes, classified clearly into
earned and unearned, in order to avoid the misapplication of the tax laws.
The advocates of granting tax relief to earned income base their doctrine
on the argument that earned income is temporary and uncertain} sickness or death
limits and destroys it, and also old age diminishes it, while unearned is permanent
and lasts indefinitely.
The difference in duration between the two incomes gives no solid reason
for discrimination. Unearned income, which is a permanent income, also pays
taxes permanently as long as the sources last. If the Income last forever, the
tax will go on forever.
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It could be emphasised that the differentiation might be based on the weight
of the tazj the earner of a labour income has to save some considerable portion
for future use of his wife and children. If this part is taxed when earned, it
I
would be taxed for the second time when it reaches the beneficiaries. The holder
of permanent income derived from property may indeed do the same thing and his
savings may be subject to double taxation. This plea could be denounced on the
grounds that most tax systems permit the deduction of life insurance premiums
and sums put aside for old age pension from the taxable income. In this case,
any relief given to earned income would be a violation of the equality principle.
Another fact is that every property was partly created out of income derived from
labour so any discrimination between earned and unearned income based on the souroe
of income could be easily defeated.
The differentiation between earned and unearned incoma might b© based on
social gi'Gundss that the property incomes stand for the leisure class - for those
who contribute nothing directly to the community's resources but live on secure
income-yielding possessions. Even though this justification for such
differentiation is groundless, because interest and rent are as worthy and as
defensible as any other sorts of income, any discrimination against thsra is
unjustifiable.
Ultimately the justification for the discrimination b twe»n earned and
unearned income lies on and was an invention of, the socialistic movement during
the last century, and the increasing influence of the labour community upon the
legislative and administrative authorities.
The Egyptian income taxes do riot include explicitly any earn- d income r lief,
but it could be- deduced from two major elements which construct the tax liability.
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These two factors are: (a) the rate applied to the different Schedules under the
Sehe&ular Tax classified according to the source of taxable income and (b) the
exempting limit and allowances granted to special classi s according to the source
of their incorae. An individual who derives his income from moveable property,
i.e., interest, dividends} does not enjoy any sort of exemptions or reliefs,
while that who derives his income from trade enjoys an exemption limit dependent
on family status. On the other hand an individual who earns his income from
wortc is entitled: (a) to a deduction of of* his salary as a relief for
retirement pension} (b) to a progressive rate starting from 2$ on the first
taxable of £B12Q up to a maximum rate of Sf. while it is 17, on income derived
from commercial and industrial business} (c) and also to an exemption limit
corresponding with the family status. Table 21 illustrates this phenomenon.
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TABLE 21
Liability and Effective Rate under the Egyptian Schedule Tax1
(married couple with 3 children)











£3 100 £i 17.0 17 £E - — £2 -
120 20.4 17 - — — —
150 25.5 - -
no 28.9 17 3.4 2.0 .065 0.00
200 34.0 17 8.5 4.2 0.7 0.3
250 42.5 17 17.0 6.8 1.6 0.6
300 51.0 17 25.5 8.5 2.6 0.9
350 59.5 17 59.5 17 8.7 2.5
500 85.0 17 85.0 17 14.3 2.9
700 119.0 17 119.0 17 25.8 3.7
1800 170.0 17 170.0 17 39.5 4.0
1500 255.0 17 255-0 17 75.7 5.0
2000 340.0 17 340.0 17 117.6 5.9
(l) Tax on non-Commercial Professions not included.
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Comparing the Egyptian income tax. system applied within a less-developed
economy, with the U.K., we find out that the latter system low-earned-income
more lenient thai the Egyptian system. Table 22 shows the effective rate and
the starting point of tax liability under both systems. A conclusive fact could
be drawn from such comparison; that is, when incomes are relatively low in Egypt
yet the tax burden on low income earners is higher thai the burden exercised
by the corresponding income groups in the U.K. This is due mainly to personal
reliefs sxpeoially the 'earned income relief' granted to under the British income
tax. Moreover, low income groups in Egypt bear a relatively heavier fiscal burden
than their corresponding group in Britain. This is due to the rcgressifenesa of
th© Egyptian fiscal system where indirect taxation amounts to over two-thirds of
total tax revenue. On the other hand, while the U.K. income tax is highly
progressive an income over £1,200 for example^" the Egyptian tax rate on the sam<
income is considerably low. This 3hould be the other way around as an income
of £1,000 a year is considered in Egypt, wher* the averag® income is low if
compared to a developed country such as the U.K., a high income. Gfcn*rally
speaking earned income, esj^ecially within th®1 low and middle income groups,
receives a relatively harsh fiscal treatment under the Egyptian system if compared
to that treatment received by either the corresponding income groups in Britain or
if we compare it with higher inoome groups within the Egyptian economy. Therefore,
two major adjustments have to take place to achieve equity; (a) increasing the
progression of the tax on incomes over £1,000 a year and (b) granting an earned
income relief for incomes below £1,000 a year, (a regressive relief).
(1) For a married man with three ohildran, see Table 22.




























































































































































































































































































































(3) - Personal davin a and Old Age Sjeourity
life, health inauranoe and other contributions to funds set up to help th
individual to maintain himself or his family in case of death or disability are
usually admitted by tax legislations as reliefs deductible from taxabl income.
Any contribution to any fund for the benefit of the taxpayer or his family
is reoognised as a type of personal saving which should br encouraged for social
is v?ell as economic reasons.1 Savings in the shape of life insurano polici s
for instance represent an important part of national savings, in many countries
which is essential for economic growth mid stability. Other p-raonal savings
through national savings banks or post office savings branch s also repr sant
a sizeable part of the aggregate domestic savings. In lass«-dev-:»lop- d countries
governments should by all possible means encourage personal savings through fiscal
measures. Tax exemptions are one of the most important measures .
On the other hand the present loss of tax revenue due to reliefs given to
personal savings ia usually compensated through the relative decrease in the overall
social welfare expenditure as individuals (tho private sector) provide* a sort of
special safeguard for old age and unemployment or disability which otherwise the
government have to undertake. In other words individuals through private
institutions do simplify and reduce the burden of the Government in providing
sooial help for its needy citizens.
Now w© are faced with the drawing of a list comprising what type of p< rsonal
savings should be relieved and what arc th* limits of such relief. Her? we are
faced with the equity problem. Any r lief has to be limit d in its scop; and
therefore such limitation might produov inequity. Th consideration of any
(1) "Royal Commission on the; Taxation of Profits and Income", Final R port.
Juno 1955» Cad. 9474, pp. 18-24
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idealistic policy for the encouragement of personal savings in an underdeveloped
country has to he guided by the weight the government puts on economic d-rvelopra nt
as against equity in fiscal matters. Generally, equity is overstepped during the
phase of development in order to give way for economic progress and therefore the
government policy mainly is directed towards the encouragement of savings, personal
and business, without major significance is given to equity principle. But care
should be taken in order to prevent any major tax evasion which might affect
considerably the over—all tax structure and render the fisoal relief system
unbeneficial.
Egypt grants complete relief for interest paid to individuals on their savings
in Post Office Savings Banks^" and on their contributions to a pension or
superannuation scheme. Moreover, superannuation and any funds accumulated for
old age security invested are exempted from income taxes on their net return.
Subscriptions for life annuities and other life insuranoe premiums are deducted
from income subject to the General Income Tax. No limit for such subscriptions
is provided in th legislation and hence a loophole in the law has to V fill d
in order to pr vent tax evasion and hence produce inequity in the distribution
of the tax burden. In th« fixation of the limit deductibl we hav- to take into
consideration the following factorss (a) the family responsibility of the taxpayer,
(b) if he does contribute indirectly to other social s» curity schemes and (o) the
encouragement of personal savings in general through fisoal measures.
(l) Deposits in Post Office Savings Banks amounted to ICE 39*4 at the end of May
1958; it was £E 32.6in 31»12.56*,,.. Deposits in Pensions and Insurance Funds
for the Civil Servants was £E 20.7 at the end of January 1957 and reached
£H 32»8'at the end of May 1958* Cf. Bud;et R port 1958/59» U.A.R., gyptian
Region.
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m B m Economic Motives
Tax reliefs are usually devised to aohi Ve economic obj ctiv a, mainly to
encourage and promote economic developenant by stimulating; capital investra nt,
domestic and foreign* Tax Policy is an important tool for stimulating private
savings and investments and mobilizing idls resources. $o xeiaption from inoom-
taxation are required to back up the investments of productive entrepreneurs.
Th© analysis will bo focused on the various important fisoal stimulants for
capital investment within thf scope of innora taxation in a less- developed
economy? Egypt is the oasa study.
(l) Jxomptiona of tin public debt.
Most nations us public borrowing as a supplementary expedient gov ma ntal
finanoing. Different fiscal purposes are often presented to justify th> govern : nt's
action in raising funds by borrowing such as to finance oraerg- noy conditions or
irregular expenditure i.e. wars, floods and other cliaast re, to finane capital
construction proj ects; to t unexpected deficit In current revenues, and to
finance existing debt. Th- most important object of governmental internal
borrowing is to achieve and maintain full us of the nation's pro&uotlv capacity.
Most of governments have used and still use some privileges attach d to debt
issues to attract arid n. proaob. possible markets which would otherwise b clos- d
to them. The major privileges associated with government bond ownership have
be n tax exemption. The tax exonjjtion of the interest on a bond may b appli d
to all taxes, but various nations exempt th transfer of bonds through inheritance
from death duties. It is alleged that a holder of a tax xempt bond will b willing
to pay more for a tax exempt bond, through accenting a lower yield, than for a
taxable one.
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It is well understood that the main objct of issuing untaxable bonds is to
provide mi attractive market for the public debt, strengthen ;ovemn nt credit, and
allow an opportunity for borrowing at a lower rat of int r st. On the other hand
there are various disadvantages which, in general, invalidat the doctrin of the
exemption of interact on governmental bonds *
(i) The loss of revenue* Tho argument arises whe thsr the govarum nts which issue
tax exempt bonds gain more from tax ext caption than they would lose taxing th' e ,
or vioe-V: rea. This debatable question depends mostly on the proposition that the
market prioo of exempt bonds measured by their yield is dat mined by th purohas Yf
who benefit from such an exemption. A millionaire will benefit more that the
ordinary person from such an exemption as th.. first will avoid the high rat«a of
tax levied on his large income} i.e. if person A has an iacom of £2,00 a year
and person B has a yearly income of £100,000 the latter will be subject to the
high rates of income tax. whioh in some countries reaches 8of or more, while the
first person is usually subject to the lower rate. On th whole, the individuals
with high income benefit mor than those of lower incomes.
Every government which intends to issue tax-ex mpt bonds has to comput the
amount of taxes which will not be collected and oompar; it with other privileges
the government will obtain out of th op ration. Th s governments should talc®
into account not only income tax coll oted, but also oth r taxes, such as estate
and inheritance duties, gift taxes arid local taxes. These privil g. s oould b»3
foouesed on the following*— (a) the low.r rat of inter st payabl by th;
government, and (b) the marketing faciliti o of tho bonds.
(l) It was estimated by the Federal Treasury (U.S.A.) that tax x mption on the
average, permits an interest rate reduction of approximately O.J757*
A. G. Bushier, Ammassg. 1'uhlio Pinanoi.. p. 649
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Any fluctuation in tlv rates of taxes or of interest vd.ll affeot th not gain or
loss of the governments issuing tax-uxeiapt s ouritioa, i.e. if tax rat-s rise, the
net fiscal loss is increased, and if the inter at rates deolin* , the tv t loss will
increase.
(ii) Sooio-Boonoralo disadvantages»
(a) The tax exemption of public debt interest gives an unfair privilege to
specific forms of investment. It places government "bonds into a preferred class
and it restrains the market for other bonds to a certain extent b oaus it induces
rich, men to invest their capital, not employed in business, in th government exempt
securities, whereas this capital ah .uld be invested In activu economic operations.
In general, tax exemption of interest on governments! securities lowers the interest
rates at which governments oan borrow, thereby taking an unfair advantage of private
borrowers, and thus diverting oapital ffcora direot private investment to governments.
(b) This typ of exemption creates gross inequality of tax burd rw "It means
1
the lib. ration of unearned incomes at the expense of the earn- d inoom a".
(o) In a progressive tax system, th wealthy individuals will avoid the tax by
investing their wealth in tax exempted bonds and oonaequ. ntly the fiscal burden of
the tax becomes heavier on the individuals with low incomes. Therefore social
juotio-; and fiscal equality will be distorted by the maldistribution of tax burd n
between the taxpayers.
Various countriao nowadays tax the interest o publio d«bt in the same degree
as all oateb'oriau of income subject to direot taxation. This argument arrives
directly from the formal principal of equality before the law# In general, the
(1) E.R. Seligman, dtudies in Publio Finance« New York, 1925, P* 146.
method of taxing interest on pu >lic debt io proper for countries that hav a high
credit system, while on th other hand, countries that do not inspire th same
dogre. of credit oould apply the method of exempting th interest on public debt
from taxation*
Public borrowing in dgypt for economic development io a relatively new
device uced by the Govsrnmont. The first developmental loan was floated in 1955
and immunity from taxation was granted to the bond holders in regard to the
interest paid or the main capital debt value from death duti. 3.1 Gv r two-
thirds of loans issued for economic development sine 1955 has been oov red by
th banking institutions in ,gypt, while a major part of the remaining one third
2
was met by other institutions. Private investors, however, did not contribute
considerably towards th ae loans. Although th g n ral outlook within a 1 ss-
developtsd economy that individuals do pr :for asf. and secured investments rathe r
than investing their limited savings in risky ventures, this fact do- s not help
the governments much in floating a considerable amount of public debt for
development or otherwise* This is mainly duo to the unsound financial policy
of the government or to the political situation In "exiat'noe, or to both. Mor ov r,
individual savings in a less—developed economy is relatively low, and therefore
the capacity of the government to borrow fro a the public is limited, A recourse,
therefore, has to be directed towards financial institutions and oth- r economic
organisations to cover the debt iosu.d.
It has been th rule in Egypt sine- th- 19th c ntury that the public 4-bt,
its int. rest and origin, is immun d from all existing and future tax s. I b »li ve
(l) U.I?., conoaio i> v lopn nts in th- Hlddl act, 1956-57* P. 17* Se also
Table 7, p»2>-
(^) ^.., op*011., p. U
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however, that exemption of public debt from taxation was, and still is of some
attractiveness to individuals, but for a long-run policy, exemption of the public
debt in future would not stimulate public borrowing in a less-d:veloped country
like Egypt. This pessimistic way of thinking is founded on the fact that the
present hazy and poorly-davaloped money and capital market do render the floatation
of any public loan a difficult task for the Treasury. Unl ss well organised and
thoroughly planned steps to develop the money market in Egypt during the first
stages of economic development, public loans could prove to ba inadequate to
stimulate investment and henceforth tax exemptions would not facilitate the
floating of government securities. Of more importance, however, for public
borrowing is the willingness of the general public to invest in public securities.
This requires among other things, confidence in the monetary policy which the
government has to guarantee by maintaining the highest possible degree of monetary
stability.
(2) The Exemption of new enterprises from income taxation.
Different countries, especially after the .Vorld bar 11, granted various tax
exemptions to individual or corporate enterprises to stimulate their efforts to
increase productivity and to reconstruct the undermined economy. On the other
hand undeveloped countries try to stimulate capital invests nt in industrial and
agricultural enterprises in order to increase their national incora . This
stimulation was achieved by different ways and means; advanced credit system,
sound and stable political conditions, and fiscal reliefs for newly establish- d
enterprises. Fiscal reliefs might be approached through} a) tax exemption of
new businesses for a certain period; b) special allowance to be deducted before
arriving at taxable income; c) the carry forward of loss s; d) tax credit for
foreign taxes; e) agreements to avoid double taxation; and f) tariff protection,
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or direct public bounties.
Hero we are mainly concerned with the effectiveness of income tax exemptions
granted to new investments. Basically the exemption of new enterprises from o* rtain
taxes is advocated on the grounds that the new enterprise has a minimum power to
cof?»p te with already established industries. This plea is denounced on the basis
that if any business, regardless of its size of capital or plant, produces no profit
it would pay no income tax, as the capacity of the business to pay th© tax is nil.
The upholders of the equity doctrine oppose the exemption of new enterprises from
specific taxes on tin,; foundation of their traditional philosophy that all persons,
individuals or companies, should be equally treated before the fiscal law.
Our task now is to explore into the effectiveness of income taxation on
investment decisions in underdeveloped countries. This point has been previously
discussed in Chapter V mid we have reached the conclusion that income taxation
has a minor effect on the incentive to invest.*'' But in order to investigate the
impact of income tax exemptions on investment in less-dov®loped economics, it seems
desirable to discuss the role of the tax within th® framework of th marginal
efficiency of investment criteria.
So on© can deny the effect of income taxes on busiru os profits, but on the
other hand investment decisions are largely controlled by th prospective profits
which depend on the various economic and technical considerations other than income
tax. The impact of business income taxes depends relatively on th© possibility of
shifting such taxes forward to consumers or backwards to factors of production.
effect
Therefore the impact of unshiftod business income tax might have a positive/on the
financial capacity of existing firms and on th willingness of companies to finance
(l) See page '$7.
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new investments. It might have also a direct effect on the incentive to invest
as it may reduce the disposable profits and thus reduce the net return of capital
invested. Under a shiftable business income tax, its effect on investment will
be negligible if not neutral, as the tax incidence on profits will not reduce the
net return of investment. By and large, the situation mostly depends on the
economic power the business enjoys in order to shift the tax.
Now we concentrate on the situation where the tax on business profits is
2
unshiftable. Investment depends mainly on various and diversified factors.
The magnitude of these factors in a developed econorry differs from that of an
undeveloped one. Investment decisions are usually influenced by economic,
technical and political factors. Interest rate was considered an important
factor in computing the marginal efficiency of capital, but during the last two
decades, since "the late 1930* s there has been a general tendency to suppose
that investment is relatively insensitive to the interest
1. See a series of articles by G, Cohn; J. K« Butters and J, Lintner under the
title "The Role of Corporate Taxation in the American Economy", published
in the American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings), May 1954, pp. 486-
542. See also D, T, Smith, Effects of Taxation on Corporate Financial Policy,
(Cambridge, Mass., 1952) Chapters 5, 6 & 7»
2. II. G, Aubrey, "Investment Decisions in Underdeveloped Countries", published
in Capital Formation and Economic Growth. National bureau of Economic Research,
(Princeton, 1955) pp. 397-4407"
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4) The smallness of the market may keep the plant from reaching the economic
optimum size#
5) Low state of information concerning profitability of similar industries,
the size of th market, corapetitiv situation .. etc.
6) The absence of social overhead capital.
7) The supply of highly skilled labour is limited, and by and large taking
other factors in account, the total productivity is low.
8) Economic and political stability in under&eveloped countries is often
in doubt. Economic stability usually suffers from cyclical fluctuation
abroad and also from reasonable changes internally? this affects the size
of the market and the price level.
The above factors render investment m the indusirial sector of the less-
developed economy hazardous, and therefore a relatively high net return is demanded
in order to undertake any investment decision especially in poineering industries.
Generally speaking, the above factors raise considerably the percentage of risk-
bearing in underdeveloped countries and consequently th© investor has to ask for
2
a higher net return for his capital.
Profits tax reduced this net return, but it is difficult to assert that it is
a major element affecting the net return. Conclusive evidenoe, especially in
(1) H. Aubrey, op.cit., pp. 399-401
(2) It is th© cost of risk and uncertainty rather than the cost of borrowing safe
funds which dominates the investment decision, the return on safe funds which
is but one element in the cost of funds to the investor. So in a highly
unstable economy, such as inmany underdeveloped countries, where the planning
period is necessarily short, little faith can be placed in the effectiveness
of monetary policy if it is made to hinge on the rate of interest as a cost
factor. The rate of return on safe investment, i.e. interest rate, is subject
to lanipulation by monetary policy, but in uncertain economy it is no major
factor in investment decision. The other component of the gross interest,
i.e. the risk taking or risk premium, is of major importance in the real




Many factors do affect capital investment in underdeveloped countries




1) The lack of entre peneurial initiative.
2) Individuals prefer traditional activities to new ventures and since
industry is considered new in less-developed countries th- preference
is usually towards investment in commerce, real estate and other
unproductive investments.
3) Individuals prefer short term investment which is regarded as more secure
and where risk-taking is the minimum relatively to long-term industrial
investment.
(1) J. 3. Buesenberry, Business Cycles and Economic Growth, (Hew York, 1958) P« 49
It may be useful at this point to recall that the concept of interest rate is
considered of minor importance as a cost factor and in computing the profita¬
bility of investment. The traditional school of thought was that a reduction
in the rate of interest causes a rise of the rate of private investment beouase
it raises the expected profitability of investment. TheK; ynsian theory follows
the same line. This view was changed later just before the Second Yorld War
when explanations of the marginal efficiency of capital were recasted. The
following example illustrates the significance of the rate of interest and its
sensitivity to profitability. Suppose a firm expects a yield of IO7 on
invested capital after taxes and interest charges before any investment could
be undertaken. If the tax rate is and the interest rate is 2$, the
expected yield before the tax and interest must be 22f, If interest rate
rises to 4$» the required yield before taxes and interest rises to 24?
Therefore, a 100?" inorease in interest rate raises the required return by
only 9; • The conclusion would be that even "if the elasticity of the marginal
efficiency schedule (in terras of expected return before taxes) were substantial,
investment would appear to be inelastic to interest rate." See, op.cit., p. 50
Por explanation concerning the old view ae , M. Kaleoki, "The fays of Pull
Employ® nt" print d in The Economics of Pull mployment. Six Studi s in Appli d
Economics, Oxford University Institute of Statistics, 1944«
(2) H. G. Aubrey, op.citj and another articl titled "Industrial Investment
Decisions'} a comparative analysis, "Journal of Economic History," Volura 15»1955
PP. 335-351
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underdeveloped countries, is difficult to find regarding the effectiveness of the
tax on investment. As the rate of profits tax in most underdeveloped countries is
relatively low if compared with existing rates in highly industrialised countries,
we could cautiously say that income tax although it affects the net return; i.e.
profitability of investment, it is only one of various factors which affect
investment decisions.
Another important point we have to investigate before condemning or appraising
the idea of exempting new investments from income taxation. We have to evaluate
the balance between the benefits gained; i.e. the effect of the exemption on the
l
rate of increase in investment, and the loss of public revenue which might have a
direct or indirect effect on other sectors of the economy through the increase in
the rates of other taxes. Primarily, it is difficult to predict the net loss of
revenue through the exemption of new investment and in the same time it is also
difficult to forecast the net increase in aggregate investment as it is limited by
many factors other than fiscal measures. Ultimately, the economist and the planner
cannot forooast the net benefit taxation. Assume that the country adopted this
measure; i.e. exempting new entsrp-rises, and after a few years, say five, we were
faced by the need to calculate and evaluate the net result of such measure. Prom
the budgetary incidence view point we can calculate the loss of tax revenue through
aggregating the net profits of the new firms which benefited from the exemption.
Sut on the other hand we cannot measure or calculate the benefit gained by the
economy through the increase in total investment. Any increase in aggregate
investment is difficult to attribute to a specified factor. Many and diversified
factors, as previously mentioned, affect investment, and taxation is one of these
elements. Therefore, it seems difficult if not impossible to confine any increase,
or even a fraction of such increase in investment to a single factor. As a
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consequence we find that the " pre—avaluation" or "post—evaluatio of the net gain
of the exemption of new enterprises is a perplexed and intrioated task# The final
decision to adopt any fiscal measure of the present nature, i.e. exemption of new
ventures from income taxes, would ultimately depend on, raoxv or l-.cs, subjective
factors.
In 1953 Egypt granted a tax concession to all new joint stock companies as
well as partnerships limited by shares undertaking business considered to be
necessary for the development of the country's economy.* This concession takes
the shape of complete exemption from Scheduler Taxes on business profits as well as
on distributed dividends for a period of seven years from th establishment of the
com; any. Existing companies of ths same legal constitution aa the above are
exempted from Scheduler Taxes on profits derived from that part of capital n. wly
invested and also on dividends distribut & belonging to th n»sw capital addition.
Moreover such companies are allowed to pay only half th- business incom ■ tax on
ils undistributed profits, The main motive behind this oonceasion is to attract
capital formation in productive investment which will increase th level of the
2
national incaia©. Sine© 1953 several companies benefited from this fiscal Measure.
For th© lack of data we are unable to prove empireally the offset of this
tax concession on the Egyptian economy especially on increasing capital accumulation,
(1) Law Ho. 430 of 1953.
(2) Out of 73 applications submitted to the "Special Committee" concern.d with
th© enquiry of the type of investment to be regarded as necessary for economic
development, eleven new companies and only four existing companies were granted
exemption from the Scheduler Tax. Thirty-six companies were exempted from
half ths scheduler Tax on undistributed profits. This data is relatively old
as it represents the situation at the end of June, 195&. Ho further data is
available for th-: confidentiality of all information regarding th® anforoos nt
of Law No. 430 of 1953
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but it soi'3is therefore unavoidable job to attempt to analyse the impact of this
fiscal measure on mainly hypothetical grounds.
It is convincingly helpful to regard the accuroulation of productive capital
as the core of tha problem of development. Such accumulation need not necessarily
be directed tov/ards industrialisation, although in most areas it is clear that the
marginal efficiency of capital is much higher in th industrial sector of the
economy than in others and that th® optimal us® of resources suggest directing
investment into this channel*^ This has been the major aim of the planning
authorities in 3gypt and hence they introduced several different measures,fiscal
and otherwise,to roach this aim.
To form any general justification for exempting now enterprises in Egypt
from the Sohedular Taxes on profits, distributed and retained, w- have to enquire
into two main points; the loss of revenue through such measure, and the net result
on economic development based on our choice pattern between this particular measure
mid other tax measures such as accelerated depreciation allowance, losses carried
forward or direct public subsidies. The ultimate conclusive judgement will be
left to the end of this section after discussing th® other alternative tax measures
which are usually devised to stimulate capital investment.
In general the loss of revenue through the enforcement of a wide tax
exemption programme could be hypothetical. First, tax exempt firms do generate
tax revenues, these arise indirectly out of th flow of wage income and other
Secondary streams. Second, the ex raption in general extends not to more than
(l) The same conclusion is reach d from a consideration of th< possible souroes
of capital funds which may be generated within the economy. Profits,
interest, and rents generated in the agricultural and comm rcial sectors of
und rdeveioped economies notoriously find their way into conspicuous
consumption, land speculation, mid hoarding; very littl is inv sted in
directions which would raio domestic productivity and inor as output.
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seven years, and firms attracted by tex exemption 7/ill thus generate direct tax
income at the end of the exemption period. Inevitably the question arises as to
whether the other tax measures, accelerated depreciation, for example, do give the
same result or a better one. Accelerated depreciation, as we are going to elaborate,
is more or less a free-interest loan to new investments which will be paid back in
latter years while a complete exemption from business taxation is a net revenue
loss from the Treasury point of view. This is a premium for the accelerated
depreciation from regarding its budgetary incidence overtime. Consequently it
is apparent that there would be a loss of revenue in adopting a programme of tax
exemption of new investments, if we believe that such n w enterprises will he able
to realize a sizeabl amount of profits during the first few years of its operation.
This leads us to the fact that in underdeveloped countries where low technical
ability and less efficient entrepeneurialship exists the profitability of the
pioneering industries is small if not negligible. And for such reason the
Government intervenes to protect the infant industries by introducing protective
oustom duties or through guaranteeing a percentage return on paid up capital.
The economic as well as the budgetary incidence of such subsidies and bounti s
are well known as they do have a positive effect in the short run at least.
By and large, private investment in Egypt has been declining since 1951 up
to 1956 (the latest available data is for 1956)5 it was £B112m. in 1950, and
declined gradually till it reached £E399» in 1956."'" Therefore, it is obvious
that the tax exemption concession granted in 1953 did not have any effect on
investment a3 there were other strong factors which irapingsd on private investm nt
beyond the control or the influence of any fiscal measure.
(l) See Table 4, page
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(3) Allowance for Aooalerated Depreciation:
Investment could be successfully stimulated by choosing a sp cial depreciation
pattern which reduces the cost of capital assets and provides an early recovery of
capital through tax-saving, i.e. tax-free reserves. Investment planning under
conditions of relative certainty is easily approached if capital early recovery
is possible.. This commonly takes the form of requiring that the capital asset
pays for itself in a time period substantially shorter than its economic life.
1
This is well known as a "pay-off" for investments.
Investors who seek a protection against risk by an early return of capital,
"accelerated depreciation" may be a decisive factor. Accelerated depreciation
will reduce the amount of profits subject to tax during the "pay-off" period and
increase the available funds for further expansion through internal finanoe.
This avoids external finance if not available. The preference for internally
generated funds is widely accepted by businesses, but it is likely to be felt
most keenly by the small and rapidly growing business that finds recourse to the
2
capital market difficult.
Accelerated depreciation, on the other hand, helps in obtaining external
finances if it is necessary. Most lenders seek repayment of loans raad to
finance assets and equipment purchases over a period shorter than their economic
(1) Analysis of certain aspects of this topic is clearly elaborated in E. Gary
Brown, "Business-Income Taxation and Investment Incentives," in Incomet
Employment and Fublic policy: Essays in Honor of Alvin B. Hansen, pp. 300-16
Also sea, Robert Eisner, "Accelerated Amortization, Growth and Net Profits,"
Quarterly Journal of : oonoaios« November, 1952, pp. 533-44
(2) See Evaey D. Dornar, "The Case of Accelerated Depreciation," The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, Volume 67 (November 1953) pp. 493-519> reprinted in
"Essays in the Theory of Economic Development", by the same author. Oxford U.
Press, 1957» PP« 195-222
23 8
life and thus, accelerated depreciation permits a free of tax cash inflow for
debt repayment. This provides an extra safeguard to the lender.
Two main factors effect the influence of accelerated depreciation.^ First,
is the tax rate; present and expected future tax rates on net profits. Assuming
that other things being equal "the higher the tax rate the more the investor gains
2
from accelerated depreciation." Second, there should bs enough taxable income
in order that accelerated depreciation could be offsetj or in other words, the
enterprise should enjoy an adequate capacity to absorb deductions for aco lerated
depreciation. If the deduction depreciation allowances were not permitted due to
th non-existence of business profits the firm -would not enjoy the benefits of the
granting accelerated depreciation. In this cas a complementary devise has to be
introduc d in order to make the aooelcratad depreciation devise more effective to
small or non-profitabla firms? that is to provide for a loss offset, a carry¬
forward or backward of business profits. This resolution would r suit in
averaging the taxable income after benefiting from the depreciation provision
over a long period.
Consequently, accelerated depreciation for tax purposes encourages investm- nt
by increasing profitability find lessening risk. In underdeveloped countries this
method seems promising and several countries have already adopted such fiscal
measure to stimulate capital investment."^
In Sgypt no attempt was made towards adopting any method which aims at an
earlier ^eoovery of invested capital in new assets and equipment through accelerated
(1) R. Goode, "'Accelerated Depreciation Allowances as a Stimulus to Investment",
Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1955» PP» 191-220
(2) Ibid., pp.201-202
(3) A. Morag| "Income Tax Exemptions and Accelerated Dpr elation," Public Finance.
Volume XI, 1956, pp. 356-365
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depreciation. As such, a device seems more promising in a leas-developed country
like Egypt, my final judgement is left to the end of the discussion after analysing
other fiscal} e.g. income tax, measures as alternative devices.
(4) Losses Offsets as a Stimulus to Investment;
A reward in the shape of profits is the expectation of any type of investment*
Sisk and unoertainity which are encountered in most investment decisions hav to be
secured and covered through fiscal measures.* Such measures are needed to encourage
investment in risky ventures which is considered better, from aggregate productivity
point of view, than conservative invests nt, such as investment in land, residential
buildings and other assets regarded as less productive and contribut littl towards
economic development.
Generally speaking, interperiod offsetting of losses is primarily an instrument
for promoting equity in income taxation. In the absence of carry-over provisions,
a firm with alternating losses and profits pays a larger aggregate amount of income
tax, over a period of years, than does a consistently profitable firm earning the
2
same net income for the period.
(1) With respect to the allocation of investment funds as between risky and unrisky
investments, an unlimited loss offset means that the tax penalty against risky
investment is removed. The investor still has to choose from among investments
with varying degrees of risk, but his choice appears no longer disturbed by
government participation in his earnings. For limited period of loss offset,
the impact upon risk—bearing depends upon the; proportion of losses which can be
absorbed. Gen rally, if the tax loan does not p rmit a complete offset of
losses, there still exists a degree of discriminationagainst risky investment.
See on this topic, article by R. Musgrave and 3. Domar, "Proportional Income
Taxation and Risk-Taking," ^uart--:rly Journal of economics. Volume LVIII,
pp. 388-422
(2) Comparing firm A, which earns £500 in each of two successive years, with firm B,
which loses £1,000 one year and makes £2,000 the next. The two firms realize
the same net income over the same period} yet firm B will he liable for tax on
twice as much as will its profitable rival unless tax laws permits B to carry
its loss forward.
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A progressive tax on profits has a different effect on losses offset than a
proportional tax. Under tho latter, losses deducted from taxable income neutralize
the effect of taxation on the reward of risk-taking. This is tru if the provision
for carry over losses is unlimited.'"' But in the case of a progressive tax such an
effect does not exist. The reward for risk-taking is usually reduced under a
graduated tax if losses occur and the "tax saving from deducting a loss from
taxable income is usually smaller than the tax liability would have been on a
gain of equal oiae.^
By and large,carry forward of losses in particular encourages formation of
new firms by diverting to the government part of the burden of initial losses.
Similarly, carryforwards of business losses promote the expansion of existing
firms into new lines of production. Unlike the carx-yback of losses method, the
carryforward puts the n-w and the old firm on an equal footing. Whereas the
carxyback impedes the entry of new firms into a competitive industry, the carry¬
forward assures the new investor of equal ben fits under the tax law in case of
3
early losses. A choice between the two devices depends upon further considerations,
among thsra the question of whether control of depression, using the carryback device
is more important than the encouragement of new investments. Encouragement of
capital investment is by all means the main aim of underdeveloped countries and
therefore it seems more appropriate to adopt the carryforward device for an
unlimited period.
(1) For the illustration of thig point see this example given by R. Goode,
"The Corporation Income Tax,'New York, 1951> P» 120.
(2) Ibid., p. 121
(3) The superior ability of the carryback method to counteract depression must
he weighed against the inferior quality of resource allocation which it
produces. The carryforward is less useful as a countercyclical device.
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The Sgyptian Sohe&ular Income Tax on Commercial and Industrial Profits do- s
allow a thro® years carryforward of bus in as loss s. Ho provision is .made for a
complete carry over of losses to stimulate capital investment, and our final
decision on the matter would be either to introduce such fiscal devices to attract
investment or to adopt other alternative measures. This decision is the co eluding
part of this analysis,
(5) The Exemption of Business Savings*
The fiscal treatment of undistributed business profit depends mostly on
economic conditions prevailing and on the need for revenue to meet public
expenditure. The discrimination between distributed and undistributed profits
in tax treatment was hold feasible during business cycles as a measure to reach
equilibrium.
The fiscal treatment of undistributed profits takes on of the following
shapes! a) complete exemption from taxes! b) levying a reduced rate compared
to that levied on distributed profits! c) equalising in treatment between
distributed and undistributed profits! or d) imposing a separate tax other
than income tax.A
A complete or partial exemption of undistributed profits, which is our present
concern, would, in normal environments, stimulate the accumulation of business
savings and decrease the amount of distributed profits. Rich shareholders will
benefit from such a policy as they will avoid the progressive rate of fch- income
tax on their high income* Moreover their net worth is inclined to become enhanced
(1) In 1936 an "Undistributed profits Tax" was introduced into the U.S.A. tax
system* The rate of the Tax was progressive, ranging from 7, to 27f as a
supplement to the "Corporation Income Tax"• Business and popular reaction
was generally unfavourable and this let to a repoalraont of tlv tax in 1939.
See I* J. Shulta and C*L, Harris, Am rioan Public financet p, 443.
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by the increased value of their shares. Partheroore if the tax system exempts
capital gains the investor will be encouraged more not to cash any dividends and
stimulate the undistribution of profits, and therefore he could easily realise
capital gain through the sale of his stook which is appreciated in value dm? to
the accumulated profits.A
By and large the major argument which encounters the disorimatory fiscal
treatment in favour of undistributed.profits is usually cone mod with the
rationality of the business to reinvest these retained profits compared to the
rationality of the individual shareholder if such business savings wore distidbut; d.
In other words, what is the greatest benefit gained by the community as a whole
from the viewpoint of economics development by adopting a discrisaatory tax policy?
In underdeveloped countries many governments attempted to stimulate capital
investment through exemptingt partially or completely, undistributed corporate
profits. Egypt provided a tax concession, the application of half the income-
tax rate on undistributed profits within the Law Bo, 430 of 1953 which was introduced
to encourage capital investment for economic development. Shareholders in most
leas-develop, d countries are usually from the high-income groups and the distribution
of dividends, therefore, would result in an increase in their amount of savings and
thus investment. fhilo this abstract judgement might prove to include a great
deal of truth, it has,., on the oth - r hand been argued that such dividends received
by high-income groups would find its way towards either consumption attracted by
the 'demonstration effect* or towards unproductive invests nt, such as in buildings,
2
land or precious raotals. In Sgypt the author!ti a • avs a rigid control over th
^ ^ For arguments on this topic se . Royal Conraisslon on th. Taxation of Profits and
Income, Final Report« 1955 > Cmd, 9474, 'pp.' 155-140
(2) However, in U. 3..".. and Britain, historically self-financing has played an
important part in capital formation) It was estimated that st If—financing
contributed nearly three-quarters of U.... capital formation ovon In 1923-29.
whan capital markets were also very active. GF., G. Aubr.y, op,oit., p. 429
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construction of new buildings through licencing, and the limitation of the
ownership of agricultural land through th Land Heform Law of 1952? 200 acres as
a maximum of land tenure. Although these effective measures were adopted thare
might exist a great tendency towards expending such dividends on conspicuous
consumption and thus diverting a significant source of the nation's resources
towards unproductive goals. On th: other hand if businesses were encouraged to
retain a sizeable part of their profits through the exemption of undistributed
profits, such retained profits might be directed towards investments which are
of less benefit to economic development. This problem has b on solved by the
Egyptian legislator as he limited the application of this fiscal privilege,
i.e. the exemption of undistributed profits from half the income tax, to companies
which are engaged in economic activities highly significant for economic
1
development. Therefore, retained profits, however, could be reinvested nor©
benefitially in underdeveloped countries than if it was distributed.
Finally, during the phase of economic development inflationary tendencies
2
are widely experienced in less-developed countries.
(1) A ministerial Committee is formed from various government experts to study
each application submitted to benefit from such provision; and upon the
decision of this Committee depends the granting of such fiscal privilege.
See Article 6 of Law No, 430 of 1953.
(2) R. Goode, "Special Tax measures to Restrain Investment", Staff Papers (I.H.F.)
1957, pp.
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Adopting a fiscal policy of discriminating in favour of undistributed profits,
1
inflationary pressure could be partially defeated.
(6) Direct Public Subsidiesi
The various previously discussed tax measures are considered as indirect
public subsidies to special tyj>@s of investment. Direct subsidies on the other
hand take a straight and outright aid to investment either through paying off losses
or guaranteeing a minimum return for each share of equity capital. Direct subsidies
could be prescribed as an alternative to tax exemption. Although subsidies might
appear feasible and effective yet it is most difficult to devise a direct subsidy
which provides an incentive for efficient operation. Subsidies designed to
underwrite initial losses, for instance, will encourage a failure to eliminate
these losses, and will tend to become permanent. The govrnm nt incentive to
(1) The effect of a fiscal policy discriminating in favour of undistributed profits
on economic stability is a controversial issue. The ex- raption of undistributed
profits from income taxes during inflationary periods has been adopted by several
countries during World War IX so as to stimulate busin 3s not distribute large
amounts of their profit and thus decrease the purchasing- power and consequently
mitigate the inflation. On the other hand, such policy was opposed on the
grounds that if profits were undistributed it would be used to finance internally
further expansion and would not reduce the inflationary trend as expected through
the increasing demand on capital goods which, according to th multiplier effect,
would Increase the propensity to consume. This argument is not completely
valid even if it tends to include soma truth, but it is difficult to measure
its effect on the economy; which of the direct impact of exempting
undistributed profits from taxation on the business cycle is n arer to our
touch through its effect on the consumption function. See, R. S. Williams,
"Fiscal Policy and Propensity to Consume" Tha Economic Journal, 1945«
Government control through legislative measures, in times of inflation, could
bring a sound and practical compromise. It could prohibit the use of
accumulated savings for further expansion unlass official consent is granted.
This measure was adopted by the Swedish Government just after the World far II
See article by J. P. Shelton and G. Ohlin, "A Swedish Provision for Stabilising
Business Investment," American -'economic Review, 1952, pp. 375~3SO.
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subsidise tends to grow with failure in business, for fear of losing subai&i a
already invested. Therefore, in this case subsidies tend to enoourag unstable
temporary and fugitive industries. Any programme of subsidies would be far more
susoeptiblo to errors of judgement and to corruption, than other types of fiscal
devices designed to encourage capital formation.
What is The Appropriate and Effective Measure for an Underdeveloped '..oonony ?
A concluding attempt at synthesis*
Any fiscal programme must be judged not aoeor&ing to the abstract principle
but according to their developmental effects. A loss of revenue even if it were
real and not largely fictitious, would have to be measured in terns of a comparison
of present oosts to future benefits. Likewise, the use of other abstract id' as
such as 'equity1, are void of significance unless th«y refer to a specific situation.
Any tax might be condemned outright as inherently unequitable and discriminatory,,
Ail that can be hoped for, in the wide sense of the equity principle, is that a tax
law will give equal treatment to similarly situated taxpayers, and that its
differential impacts between classes of taxpayers will correspond with tin goals
and the intentions of public policy. With regard to the first criterion income
tax exemptions granted to industrial and commercial enterprises in hgypt (Law No. 430
of 1953) do give equal treatment to similarly situated firms. Such a situation
could bo advocated on the grounds that it is needed to enforce public polioy.
However, inevitably the question arises aa to whether tax exemption of new
investments is an efficient use of such powers, or whether alternative better measures
could be devised. Accelerated depreciation accompanied by a carryforward of loss a
for unlimited period seams to be most desirable in underdeveloped countris for
stimulating capital investment. The reasons for this explicit justification have
been implicitly discussed previously whoa discus ..sing the various raeaaur a, but
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it would be of great help to sum thorn up:
1) Accelerated depreciation speeds up the amortization of capital invested
especially if we take into consideration that interest rate are ordinarily high
and that capital is scarce in underdeveloped countries and therefore permits
greater reliance on internal financing.
2) Accelerated depreciation is considered, more or less, a tax-free loan to
new assets which will be repaid after the end of the full amortization of the
new asset, it is usually five years for new plants. Only small loss of revenue
therefore is encountered.
3) Accelerated depreciation offers a much greater incentive to a growing enterprise
than to a mature or a declining one. For a declining enterprise accelerated
depreciation offers only a temporary deferment of tax payrn nt. For a growing
enterprise it is a permanent one.^"
4) Accelerated depreciation is most attractive to capital-intensive industries
in which the ratio of depreciable assets to total investment is high.
5) Accelerated depreciation could be efficiently administered if compared with a
programme of direct subsidies for example. The former is much less apt to
corruption than the latter especially in less-developed countries where adminis¬
tration is inclined to be inefficient and partly corrupted.
6) A provision for unlimited carryforward of losses renders the accelerated
depreciation allowance an effective method in attracting capital investment.
Such combination helps to average total profits over time and hence equity could
be more adequately achieved.
(l) CP. E.D. Domar, "The Case for Accelerated Depreciation", Quart rly Journal of
Economics, 1953, pp. 493-519? and also see, E. Gary Brown, "Busin ss-Income
Taxation and Investment Incentives", in:Income, Employment and Public Policy;
Essays in Honor of Alvin H. Hansen, (IJ w Tor :, 1948} pp. 300-316
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7) Ail types of investment, new or old, will benefit from aocolerated
depreciation allowance but the amount of benefit will be related to the amount
of investment, rather than the size of profits as under a full tax exemption.
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Chapter VII
The Role of Exemptions in the System (Continued)
II. The Probing of Double Taxation
The problem of double taxation has attracted a great deal of discussion by
several economists since Adam Smith* However* the double taxation dilemma
became more acute when countries became more Interdependent especially with
regard trade and commerce. Domestic double taxation has also been the subject
of various discussions regarding the overlapping of local jurisdictions with
the contralj and also th problems arising from the taxation of savings, to.9
twice or mora by th© same tax.
The discussion of the problem of double taxation in this chapter is an
attempt to analyse the various causes and remedies of double taxation from th®
theoretical viewpoint and also from their application to the Egyptian income
tax systsm.
The first section is devoted to the domestic double taxation probl a; i. .
the taxation of income twice or mors by th© earn© authority or by several domestic
authorities. The discussion will be focusaed on the theoretical analyses of th®
problem and the situation within the Egyptian income tax. en attempt to be made
to elaborate the basic handicaps and to analyse solutions adopted in solving the
problem.
The second section deals with th© problem of double taxation from the
international side. International double taxation has boon considered a® the
leading' example of a tax barrier to foreign trad and investment. The removal
of international double taxation has traditionally been th first aim of those
who sought to promote the expansion of international trade and investment through
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tax. measures. The problem of international double taxation extends to many
tax categories, property taxes, ©state duties, etc., but it is most strongly
felt by foreign investors and tradeare in the field of income taxation* Therefore
>
our discussion will bo limited to international double taxation of incomef its
causes and remedies. The Egyptian experience in this field is very limited and
the important steps towards th® use of international tax agreements have been
taken only during the last five years whan the major policy of the Government
was directed towards encouraging investment and using fiscal measures to reach
this aim. As the Egyptian experience is limited in this field our analysis
will b© basically confined to the main problem and the various devices which
could be used to solve it. However, foreign private investment in ;gypt is
still in a very elementary stag© and a pressing need for international tax
agreements may arise in due course. if© have, therefore, to compare th • most
effective devices for the prevention of international double taxation of income
and try to find the moat suitable device without causing undue inequity or loss
of revenue. Finally, w® have to bear in mind that the basic reason for
international tax agreements is to prevent multiple taxation of th© same income.
Hence, we have to consider these agreements as a safety valve and to assure that
the same income is only taxed one© by the legitimate jurisdiction.
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(A) Domestic Double Taxation
Double or multiple taxation in its broad sense occurs when the same income
is subject to more than one tax. Multiple taxation may be either intentional
or unintentional. The former is mostly due to a certain legal confusion which
is taken into consideration by the legislator, i. . imposing central as well as
local taxes on property} the latter results from using raor than one cone pt in
assessing taxable incomes.* 0 tierally such intended multiple taxation bears
little or even no unequitable burden as the legislator takes into account the
total amount of taxes paid by the taxpayer. On the other hand the unintentional
double taxation raises the most unequitable distribution of tax burden between
the taxi ayars. In most oases such multiple taxation is due to the rigid and
th© conflicting jurisdictions adopted by th< various countries especially wh n
th© question of taxable income arises.
Our discussion in th course of this section will b concentrated upon the
domestic double taxation which arises by taxing th© same income by different
authorities within the nation, or by the same jurisdiction or authority more than
once•
Double Taxation due to th distribution of legislative lower betw n Central and
Local Authorities:
The a ntral Government is the principal authority in levying taxes. But
(1) It is dsslrablo to clarify that the imposition of a sohsdular tax and then a
general tax is not multiple taxation because the latter import is a sort of
surtax. Multiplicity does not occur if all incomes were taxed twice at
comparable rates or if the income tax is supplemented by an 'excess profits
tax', because these ar cas s of raer ly high tax. See 1, . Taylor, Th
Econoaioa of Public finance, p. 432.
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decentralisation of power controlling the various provinces of th nation had
developed and eaoh province oIsland its independence from th© central government
in fiscal matters* Revenues were needed to meet th© ever increasing expens- s of
the local authority and therefore, imposts had to bo levied upon property located
within the boundary of the province and later on income of its inhabitants.
The problem of multiply taxation within th© same nation causes great
hardships for trade and commerce in a federal country and its rigorous
consequences in th interstate relations. In the U.S.A. th problem of
multiple taxation has been partially solved by the Court decisions and th©
complete solution of this problem remains in the hands of time. This problem
of conflict int. taxation is of interest to governments because the competition
and duplication of taxation affect the availability of tax revenues. The
problem is also Important to taxpayers who have to endure unequal and unjust
taxation because of th struggle of rival governments for revenue. To solve
the* issue that arises from conflicting taxation, the reforms undertaken should
ensure adequate revenues to all governments and should bring to taxpayers the
maximum of equality and uniformity of taxation.
Co-ordination in th fiscal policy, especially in imposing taxes, should
be th® major aim in order to roach a fair and just solution of multiple taxation
in a federal country, as the independence of state and local governments is the
most powerful feature which sometimes rules out the federal government policy.
Therefore, a co-ordinated fiscal policy, a uniform method of assessing state
income taxes, is needed in order to avoid duplicate taxation and to overcome
inequalities in taxation among states and other local governments. An important
fact has to be mentioned} it is that, in a federal country, since federal, state
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and local governments must bs supported by taxes on the wealth and incomes of
th© people, soma duplication is inevitable, unless there is to bo rigid observance
of a scharao of segregated revenue sources for th© respective jurisdietions.
The situation in Egypt differs as it is non-federal country, Th" local
authorities enjoy a serai-independent fiscal policy. The overlapping of judicial
power is very limited mid the looal bodies are authorised to tax on a limited
scale so as not to encroach upon th© central government taxation structure.
Therefore, it could bs said that such limitation is a coiling in relation to
income above which local taxes cannot rise without economic disloction r suiting.
In an advanced country ouch as Britain looal taxation is mainly rataa imposed
on persons occupying land mid buildings.^ As rates are the only levies permitted
to local authorities in Britain, multiple taxation between central and local
jurisdictions is r duoed to a great extent. It is a well known fact that th©
British local rates are of a regressive feature which changes the progressive
2
structure of the national tax system. Therefore, the over-all tax system can
thus be made less progressive for some or all inoorae groups, and Inequality In
the distribution of the fiscal burdan results. The following tabl illustrate
the regression of rates in th® lovsr-inoome groups and its affoot on the distribution
of aggregate prirc ntage of both, rat s and dir ot tax s.
(1) Rates in Scotland ar levied on both owners and occupiers and usually shared
equally between thoa.




Regression of Rates, and Rates I-lus Direct Taxes
In the Low-Income Groux>a, 1951-52.
Gross Household






Rat --S & Direct Taxes
at
i
Under £100 10,4 0.1 10.5
100-199 6.8 1.8 8.6
200-299 4.2 4.8 9.0
300-399 3.3 5.4 8.7
400—499 2.8 5.9 8.7
500-599 2.4 7.0 9.4
600—699 2.3 8.2 10.5
700-799 2.3 10.0 12.3
800-899 2,2 12.0 14.2
900-999 1.9 12.8 14.7
1000-1499 1.9 16.1 18.0
1500-1999 1.5 23.2 24.7
2000 and over 1.0 45.2 46.2
2.4 13.6 16,0
H.B. Sample of 1399 households
Source} Lydell, H.F. mid Dawson, E.F.?. , "Household Income, Rent and Rat a",
Bulletin of Qxford Unlv rsity Inatitut" of Statistics, Oxford, 1954, p. 111.
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One can abstract from the above table that the local rates have weakened, the
progression of the direct taxes which are mostly composed of the Income tax. The
first attracting observation is that the local rates have a considerable affect on
the lower-income groups, from under £100 up to £299 which should be the other way around
and bear relatively low tax burden in realising their social necessities and the
subsistence standard of living they enjoy. To put it in other words, the British
local rates do in fact disturb the scale of progression of the Income Tax and distort
the; distribution of the over-all tax burden in unequitable condition especially
within the very low-income groups of taxpayers. But to leave suoh a statement
as it stands is not completely true. We must take into consideration ths effect
of 1} other taxes, oihor than income tax and loon rates, suoh as purchase tax,
excise and customs as wall as inheritance duties, on th over-all tax burden on
the majority of th© British population? 2) the social services rendered by both
central and local governments. In considering these factors we have to deal with
the relationship between th© general tax burden, which in turn is related to the
taxable capacity of the nation, and the problem of national double taxation under
discussion.
Double taxation within the same country and due to the overlapping of
jurisdictions depends on the ways and moans by which the diff rent taxes, dlr ct
and indirect, aro distributed among th. taxpayers and also their final incidence.
Moreover, the impact of all types of taxes on the different sources of income
subjected to such taxes should be considered. The major object is to discover
the relative impact on each taxpayer enjoying th earn© income and in the same
civic status, supplemented with the intention to reveal th- direct iapaet of the
various taxes on various sources of income, i.e. income from property, income
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from trade and com® roe, income from mare labour employment and others. In case
that the overlapping of central and looal tax jurisdictions, in a unitary oountry,
does not distort the corresponding relation between taxpayers deriving their income
from the same source and enjoying the same family status, such overlapping oould
not justifiably be reckoned as doublo taxation, but it could be cautiously
emphasised as an increase in the- tax rate or an increase in the over-all tax
burden. Although doublo taxation in its concise sense does increase the over-all
tax burden yet a well studied local impost oould lead to an equitable and non-
distortion of the over-all tax burden on the various taxpayer groups. Thereafter,
the question of taxable capacity could be easily raised as it is closely related to
the distribution of th* tax burden. This question is a matter of the g n> ral
socio-economic policy Qf the central governs at which does not contradict with a
justifiable and equitable local levy.
The Egyptian situation has had several changes regarding the fiscal structure
of th local authorities. Before 1939 when the first Inoome Tax Act came into
effect, the law allowed an additional rata ranging from 85 to 11/ on the existing
taxes. The only functioning taxes during the 1930s period were those on land and
houses. Later on Provincial Councils extended the additional taxes to the newly
imposed Schedular Inoome Taxes, The Municipality of Alexandria for exampl 1 vied
a rate of 2,%" on the amount of the tax on commercial and industrial profits arid on
the tax on moveable property. Taxes on property is the central governm nt levy but
the Provincial Councils have the authority to levy an ©xtra rata on such tax s with
a minimum limit.
The fiscal policy of the Egyptian Local Authorities was criticised from the
following points; a) th constitutional right of these authorities to levy such
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taxes, and b) the direct and indirect impact of such levies on the location of
industries and other business concerns. The Parliament admitted the constitutional
right of the Local Authorities to levy such extra rates.'"" The Chambers of Commerce
criticised such imposts condemning them as being unequitable, penalising the'
i
companies whose -head offices were in the jurisdiction of certain municipalities
2
and threatening the dislocation of the administrative- domicile of business.
In 1950 Law No. 155 came into effect imposing an over-all excess tax of 10'
above the Scheduler Incom Tax on commercial and industrial profits for the
benefit of th Local Authorities except th municipality of Alexandria which was
allowed to retain its excess taxes. The Municipality of Alexandria and that of
Cairo have special category in relation to other Local Authorities. They enjoy
a fiscal privilege over other municipalities as they are allowed by law to levy
an extra rate of 10^ on the Schedular Income Tax on moveable property which is
not allowed to other Local Authorities. Moreover, Alexandria Municipality is
allowed to impose an extra 5£ on the Death Duties.
Besides the additional taxes levied for the benefit of Local Authorities a
Defence additional Tax was imposed in July 1956 levying an additional tax on the
various incomes subject to the Schedular Income Tax, the General Income Tax and on
all types of property subject to Land and Building Taxes.^ The rates of this tax
vary according to type of incomes l) 3• 5/' on net income subject to tax on moveable
property, tax on coram;rcial and industrial profits and tax on non-commercial
professions} 2) 1, on th first £S500, 2$> over £E500 of income subject to the
(1) Gfficial Journal, Parliamentary Ed. No. 24» 1944.
(2) The Journal of the British Chamber of Commerce of Egypt, May 1943» p. 65.
(3) Law No. 277 of 1956
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Sohcjdular Tax on wage a and salaries; 3) progressive rat© starting with 2;*' of the
first C32500 subject to the General Inoora# Tax, 3f on the following sora of £F15Q0»
5/ on the next £E10GG0, on the following ££15000 and lOf on higher brackets.
Prom the above rovi - «v wo can abstract the obvious unequity resulting from
the dlfferenoe imposts levied by the various Local Authorities in Egypt. A
shareholder living in a city other than Cairo or Alexandria < njoya a sp cial
privilege compared to that shareholder living in those cities. Such clear unequal
fiscal treatment of taxpayers could result in the dislocation of industry as wvll
as in considerable inooma tax evasion oapeolally the extra rate levied for the
benefit of th«> Looal Authorities.
The following tables illustrate the distortion in the final distribution of
the different taxes on income as a result of levying the additional rate for the
Local Authorities and the additional tax for defence. The tables show the
difference in the aggregate tax liability between taxpayers living in Cairo or
Alexandria and taxpayers who live in other parts of th- country. The net income
subject to tax is ££500.
TABLE 24
The Central and Local Tax Liability on Hat Income of £L50O
X X
Income from liov- Income from Coram, Income from Income from
able Property and Industrial ilageo and ITon-ooran rcial
Business Salaries Prof -ssions
Cairo or Other Cairo or Other Cairo or Oth < r Cairo or Other
Alex • Areas Alex, Areas Alex, At as A1 x. Areas
m SE £3 £E £E £F; C • £E
hcka&uiar Income
Tax 85 85 85 85 15.8 15.8 55 55
Local Add, Tax 8.5 - 3.5 8,5 - - -
Total 93.5 ' 85 93.5 93.5 15.8 15.8 55 55
Defence Add, Tax IT.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 5 5 17.5 17.5
Aggregate HI 102.5 111 111 20,8 20,8 72.5 72.5
x Before the latest araendnent of Dec..mber 1955
TA.BL3 25
The Siroot Impact of Central and Local Taxes on Set Income of £3500
Inoome from Itov- Income from Coram, Income from Income from
able Property and Industrial Wages and ITon-comrar roial
Business Salaries Professions
Cairo or Other Cairo or Other Cairo or Other Cairo <or Other
Alex, Areas Alex, Areas Alex. Areas Alex, Areas
3£
f"
M....i^ i.I mi i
r $ <? f 4.7 f
Scheduler Income
Tax 17 17 17 17 3.16 3.16 ii 11
Local Add. Tax 1.7 - 1.7 1.7 ~ «•*» —
Total 18.7 17 18.7 13,7 3.16 3.16 ii 11
Defence Add. Tax 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 1.0 1.0 3.5 3.5
Aggregate 22.2 20,5 22.2 22.2 4.16 4.16 14.5 14.5
Table 25 shows the distortion caused by th levying of local taxes on the
Schedular Income Taxes especially in the case of the additional rate levied on
income tax on * movable- prop, rty* for th benefit of Cairo and Alexandria
municipalities only. This discrimination amounts to l#8y on net income which
ould have, in the long run, a positive affect on the location of business.
Hi) Vi_'J i
The general comprehensive result of multiple taxation of the same income by
either th aarae jurisdiction or by several in Egypt should be judged on the equitable
distribution of the tax burden before and after th> levying of the additional taxes.
Suppose that the total burden of taxes on income, central and local, is 100, therefore
according to Table 24 a person living in Cairo and deriving his income- only from
moveable property, i.e. securities compared with another person living in Cairo
too and enjoys the same amount of income from his salary arc nearly in the same
situation before and after the levying tho additional taxos, e.g. the relationship
is 34.3 to 13*7 before levying additional taxes, and 84.2 to 15*3 after levying
additional taxes.
Consequently the Egyptian oase of multiple taxation is only a riso in the
rate of the Schedular Income Tax without serious alteration to the ultimate tax
burden. .Yhile the mere drawback is the various legislations which differentiate
between the municipalities and, as is mentioned above, could result in tax evasion
and in th© migration of business where looal levies are considerably low.
Double Taxation of Business Savings:
Savings, according to the classical school, should be immune from taxation in
order to achieve equity in distributing the tax burden. The problem of the double
taxation of business savings and their exemption has been discussed from th
theoretical point of view in the previous chapter.* The following is the practical
analysis of the way in which the problem of savings and undistributed corporate
profits is tackled under the Egyptian income taxes.
Multiple taxation within the frame of direct taxes on income in Egypt is
partially controlled by legislation. Corporate profits are subject to the
Schedular Tax on Coram roial and Industrial Profits but exemption is granted to
that part which is distributed, as the latter profits, i.e. dividends, are subject
(1) See page £4/
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to the Soli dular Tax on moveable property# Various complications arise in the
course or applying these provisions which sometime® result in double taxation of
the oaiao inoom • For example , if a corporation retains part of its profits as
reserves in one year* it has to pay the *3ohedular Tax on Commercial and Industrial
Profits*. Later it might daoide to distribute part of these rservos in the shape
of dividends or free shares, and they would then beoome subject to the Scheduler
Tax on Movoabl Property. * Thus these distributed profits are in faot taxed
twice, onoe us undistributed income and. then as distributed dividends# According
to the present rata of the Sohednlar Taxes on either Commercial and. Industrial
Profits or on Moveable Property is IT, , and hence, in our example, suoh dividends
would be subject to a rata of 34?
Th solution for the double txation problem in the above xample is relativ ly
difficult to attain. From the acoountanoy point of viow the undistributed profits
may ba added to the reserve aooount or might be invested in securities or reinvested
in the company through the purchase of t&ngibl or intangible assets# Therefore,
it is considerably uneasy a task to trace the undistributed profits* position in a
company*a aocounts and'consequently if the company decides to distribute an account
in excess of any year*s realised profits, it is, in moat tim a, difficult to follow
the real course of such excess distribution and its year of origin. From the
fiscal view point, the tax rates might change from on© year to th© other# Thus
(1) Article 1. Law Mo. 14 of 1939 provides that "... a tax, at rates herein stated
shall be levied on thy inoom derived from negotiable securities. The tax
shall be levied on* l) Dividends, inter at, axeors and other profits derived
from all sorts of shares, including founders shares, in all sorts of financial,
industrial or commercial companies and general enterprises, whether suoh xcofits
are periodical or not and whether distribution is effected in raor. y or granted
in the form of shares, tl benturea ..... or in any oth r form even indir otly."
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any adoption of granting credit against th already paid tax- a on the- exo^so
distribution will b.- an unsound solution in view of quity as all accumulated
undistributed profits iiav paid inoom taxes at different rates. Therefore, any
credit giv-n against the taxes paid will bear heavy on soni- profits and light on
others,
Tho only solution to tha above problem, which I believe is still r lativoly
inadequate from th* view point of equity, is to adopt an av-.-ra&■-: system in the
course of applying the credit method. Such a method has to hi. carefully studied
in relation with the overall fiscal policy of the country which in turn depends
upon the economic circumstances in a specific period and tho future socio---conomio
plans of the country,
Other Oases of Double Taxation within th,; Egyptian Income Taxes:
Tho Egyptian taxes on income, especially the Schadular Income Tax which came
into pernor in 1233, provide for the avoidance of double and multipl- taxation
whenever it is possible and legally adequate. Th.: following casss are the most
important in th- structur. of Egyptian Income Taxes which will b discussed from
th'- equity vi «r point arid the adequacy of th- present provisions adopted to avoid
double taxation of the earn* income,
1) Business profits of an enterprise might contain different *1' meats of
revenue other than business profits) auoh as income of investments in a- ouriti s,
in immovable property, i.e. houses or land or other typt-.s of indir.ot investments
(1) The fiscal policy of an undord<-<veloped country as in Egypt depends on
enooura .ing investment in either already functioning nterprlsue or in new
ones. Therefore I believe that it is adequate to discourage any redistribution
of undistributed profits by taxation and even more, to ncourage the r< investing
of profits by granting a tax relief, in a shape of reduc* d rate to undistributed
corporation profits# This policy srf.ll achiev two basic objt otiv s, overcoming
inflation and encouraging investment.
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which might not be the principal object of the ent^rpriso. Such revenue is
subject to either the Scheduler Income Tax or the Taxes on Property. Ther fore,
if the income derived from these investments is added to th net business profits
and the aggregate becomes liable to the Tax on Commercial and Industrial Profits,
the subsidiary income is deemed to be taxed twioa. The Egyptian la® provided an
exemption of 90,' of any indirect revenue which accrues to any enterprise in
assessing the business tax liability.1 A fixed rate of 10f of the revenue has
to be added to the net business profits to pay for the expend s of the raanag aont
of such property. The fixed proportion, 10;-', is somewhat arbitrary and it should
bo in progression of the indirect revenue and depend on the typo of prop erty own- d
by the enterprise as, for iastanoe, th- management of immovable property is quite
different from that of securities or other immovable property} the first is
inclined to cost a considerable amount of expanse and also time of the firm's
employees than in the case of immovable property. Consequently according to the
pr-sent situation a business investing part of its capital in moveable property
ouch as buildings or land is in a relatively better standing from the equity point
of view than a firm investing part of its capital in securities.
2) Banks, central or commercial, and any enterprise dealing with issuing
credit are granted a relief from Income Tax on the interest due on debts or d posits
in so far as proof is established that such interest is included in the accounts of
the enterprises situated in Egypt which are subject to the Tax on Commercial and
2
Industrial Profits.
(1) Article 36 of Law 14 of 1939.
(2) Article 15 of Law 14 of 1939 which levin a tax at a rate of 17f on interest
on all privileged mortgages mid ordinary debts and on all cash & posits and
guarantees due to Egyptians and foreigners domiciled or resident in gypt.
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This privilege is issued to avoid double taxation of the Interest whioh is, in
credit firms, the major part of the eatah1islimeat * s profits which in turn is
subject to the Scheduler Tax as an int r.at and then wh n ntered m the firm's
profits baooraa liable to the Tax on Commercial and Industrial Profits.
Specific limitations are provided by the Law as to differentiate between th
various bsnkin categories. Ordinary commercial banks as distinguished from
industrial, agricultural or oth> r types of banks which deal only with issuing
loans on large scale and in consid rabiy big sumo. Th * first category enjoys
th exemption of the tax on the into rest if a) the advance should b a short
term loan, not more than on© year) b) the amount of th advane should b<
relatively small| and o) the rate of inter-,st is flexible, i.e. the .-.otablishmer.t
issuing th.- credit has the freedom to change th.- int rest rat© at any time.
Industrial, agricultural and oth r establishments whioh arc- apeoialis d in
issuing loans against property mortgages are exempted if the loans issu d do not
exceed £11100,000# The causa for ouch limitation is alleged to be the fear of
companies borrowing their capital from banks at a low rate of interest exempted
from income tax instead of issuing debendituree whioh yield interest subject to
taxation# In other words tho legislator had to fill the loophole and to prevent
evasion throu h tho ooura- of borrowing the enterprise's capital from banks instead
of issuing debenditares for public subscription whioh or. subject to Inoom.- Tax.1
The motive behind this exemption is the protection of th. ban ing and credit
system of the country through the lifting of doubl? taxation on one or its basic
source of business#
(1) Articl.i 1, Law Ho# 14 of 1939.
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3) Holding companies arc proura d to pay Incon Tax on the distribution of
dividends including that k.art d rived from the dividends distributed by the
affiliated companies which had already paid their share of Income Tax* Therefore,
to avoid double and even multiple taxation it was provided in the Scheduler Income
Tax Law that the distributions of the affiliated companies are deducted from the
parent company's distributions in computing the tax liability.^
In 1957 special provision was issu d to avoid double taxation on 'inv stment
companies* which invest at least 30/ of their capital in securities and other
moveable property* As the major object of an investment company is to help small
individual investors to become shareholders of ether companies through an organic d
enterprise which is inclined to have a comprehensive experience in capital
investment. Thus the Egyptian Government following the plan drawn to stimulate
investment by internal incentives and to avoid the evils of doubl- taxation on this
type of establishment it had to grant an exemption to ouch companies regarding
their distributions derived from their investments from thr Soh-rdular Incom. Tax
2
on Moveable Property#
To sum up, it is quite obvious that the Egyptian tax system rsp- oially Income
Tax has provided oonsid - ruble ways and means in order to avoid doubl- or multiple
(1) Article 6, Law 14 of 1939 atat at "Jh a an "gyptlan corporation has received,
in return for its participation, in kind or in oash, in the share capital of
another Egyptian or foreign corporation, b nrer shores or sycuriti s, the
dividends for each financial year paid out by th former corporation shall be
exempt from th tax on income- derived from moveabl property laid down in
Article 1 of this law, in proportion to the profits on nominal shares or oth r
interest bearing securities realised by the oorporstion during the abov:- mention-d
financial year, provided that such shares shall be registered in th« nam© of th-
corporation and that tax shall have boon paid on th profits which have accrued
on the income derived from each moveable property
(2) Law Ho. 95 of 1957.
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taxation of th same inoorar as the tax system is relatively complicated arid
overlapping in sorae oasses* It has been always the nature of a multiple income
tax system to include various conflicts or overlapping:; which result in double or
multiple taxation which has to bo avoided carefully through legislative means# In
the same time care should be paid in forming the necessary provisions in order to
prevent any misinterpretation of such provisions which might lead to und< r~taxation
or evasion. Thus if evasion or even avoidance takes place the equity problem
starts to rise and the balance of distributing the tax burden among taxpayers
Is liable to be distorted.
rl & h
(B) International Double Taxation
The principles and the bases upon which the tax. system is construct d
differs from one country to the other according to the fiscal policy aim d
to accomplish and according to the socio-economic conditions of the country,
Soraw countries levy a •unique* income tax whil others levy a scheduler Inoom
tax supplemented with a general income tax* Moreover, the- basis upon which
income liable to tax is compute d differs from one system to th? oth r, depending
on the fiscal policy it follows.
Th * problem of double# taxation between nations is due larg ly to th mass
exploitation of income taxation ao nearly «v- ry nation introduced i acorn
taxation and is setting its system in the form which can bring in the gr at-st
amount of rv nu . The consequences of such action imperil the free mov ment
of capital and work, ao well as distorting th- equitable distribution of tax
burdens. The problem of double taxation simply originated through the xtansion
of tax jurisdictions and th. overlapping of tax ideals and methods adopted by the
different tax authorities regardless of th personal status of th income recipient
or his ability to pay*
International double taxation has b.tn widely discussed especially aft r
World War I by tho League of Nations, and also in th period following th last
War by th#; United nations. Economists as well contributed in th study of this
problem and solutions have be n discovered, but the problem itself still exists
as the causes are not r.moved from t'a roots. To explain th fundamental causes
b hind double taxation th theories underlying th imposition of inoom taxation




Th- ori-us Support!n,, the- Imposition of Incora Ta.,.at:' on;
The original classical theories of taxation &r- th *ooot theory* and th
'benefit theory*. According to the 'cost theory* it who held that the individual
ought to be taxed in accordance with tin cost of the service performed by the
State. tinder the 'benefit theory* the tax should be imposed in r 1ation to the
particular benefits conferred by the State upon the individual. Both theories
are helpless in solving th problem of double taxation an th. individual may
reside in on. country wh re he enjoys civil rights and hie property is located
in soother country. Th. r-ufor , he o uld be subject to taxation in th« first
country and also on his income derived from his property situated in th other
country shere it is maintained and defended. Heith- r theory is commonly
adopted at pr seat.
The theories of 'aaorific * and 'ability to pay* superseded th abov
mentioned theories. Th« 'aaorific ' theories ar- based on th assumption
that eaoh individual should sacrifice equally part of his income towards th
aggregate needs of the Statu, The ultimate idealogy of these theories is that
the tax burden as a whole should be arranged to provide the small -st burd-n as
possible. On the other hand the *ability to pay1 theory assumes that ©very
Government has to raise a certain amount of revenue to meet the public expenditure,
therefore, every individual ought to contribute towards the needed revenue in
accordance with his financial ability.
Th;.- above mentioned theories did not influence and gov- rn international
competence in taxation."1"
(1) League of Nations; Import on Double- Taxation. April 1923, by I rofs. Bruins,
ulnandi, Seligman and Sir J. Stamp, pp. lo-lj.
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Tiny also did not contribute to th;: construction of offeotiv. practical bases©
for distributing tax burdens between nationals and foreigners or b- tw: r
residents in the country and those who derive their int roots from it. The
basic factor which governs the imposition of any tax is the need for revenue
rather than the theoretical principles. As each country differs oonomically
and, in most oases, thy may either b a capital-importing or capital- xvorting,
the taxation policy depends to a groat extent on the economic status of th '
country. Consequently, on- could emphasis that the abev theories did not
help to solv.- the problem of international double taxation. Thus we must
continue the exploration to discover the most suitable theory which might h<
inclined to solve our problem. The following are the practical theories which
face the tax legislators in sotting up any income tax system from the liability
viewpoint*
1. Political Allegiances It is the oldest principle which guided income
tax liability, A oitisen of a country is subject to income tax whether he
lives within or without his country and whether he derived his inoon from sources
inside or outside his country.
Political allegiance has ceased to have any significance in most of the
income tax cystoma when the commercial relations botw -on th different nations
developed and as the actual population of a country is not limit & to cltla ns.
Therefore, to tax only th oltison and exempt th© foreigner, even from tax; c on
income derived from the country, is inadequate and against th equity principle.*
This principle has a negative significance in most old establish* d incom
taxes, whil it is adopted in th- Egyptian Incom Tax syst m.
(1) 3 ligaan, Essays in Taxation, p. 111.
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2* Eeonosiio Allowance i This principle has already gained power and
importance in most tax systems as it proved to be relatively adequate as a
basis for a tax formula* This doctrine, as put in Seligman'a words, ie based
on that: "Every man may b taxed by competing authorities according to his
economic interests under each authority, Th« ideal solution is that th
individual's whol faculty should b taxed} but that it should b tax d only
once, and should bo divided among the tax districts according to his rolatlv
int rest in each,""1"
Economic allegiance should be interpr ted in connection with the principl
of 'ability to pay' in order to reach a fair and juatifi&bl basis for the
imposition of income taxation. But in ord r to aohi ve a cl. ar definition of
th * conondo allegiance* doctrine which in turn would help in accomplishing a
solution of th international multiple taxation probl a, th following prinoipl>s
have to be elaborated,
a) Origin or ditua; Th. origin of wealth ard ineoa. is one of the basic
fundamentals ruling the taxation of business profits and also, to a considerable
extent, income derived from employment* In the case of income taxes the
principle of origin is referred to the origin of the income or th plac wh re
2
the earnings are created* Sites or location are terns normally used to identify
the place whore property is located and therefore, a tax on such property has to
be levied by th. jurisdiction of the country in which such property is locat d.
(1) S ligtnan, Qp,oit«, p. 113
(2) L ague of ITations} 0; «oit. * p, 24
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b) Residence and Domicile? The concepts of r sidone and domicile are
closely connected to tlx < principle of •economic allegiance1 and it mostly governs
the liability of individuals to taxation. It also has a considerable signifioanoo
within the frame of business taxes ©specially incorporate taxation.
By •domicile' it is meant the place whore a person chocs a to ex rois. his
political rights and where ho is summoned to discharge political obligations - *
A p raon can be domiciled in one country and resident in anoth r. Such
residanoe could be temporary or permanent and, therefore, domicile and permanent
or habitual residence coincide, The interpretation of these terms diff-rs from
on© country to th other and thus the problem of doubl taxation arises. In
order to avoid double taxation, domicile or habitual resideno must v rywhere
be interpreted alike in connection with income taxation. By •residence* w
mean temporary residence which might be for a short or a long period. The
fixation or the determination of the time factor upon which th# residence d ponds
is usually decided by the tax authority# Such decision is in reality different
from one system to th© other and, therefore, th problem of double taxation
remains acute#
Bow after reviewing the basic principles underlying the imposition of an
income tax, one has to decide what are the most adequate principl a to be
adopted by all income tax systems and to follow a single pattern in ard r to
avoid int x-nation multiple taxation.
In faot any inoom tax system now in exist no-■> adopts more than on- of th
above mentioned principles and, thus, an international single pattern is a
(1) Ibid, p* 25
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difficult and absurd solution for double* taxation problem. The L agu of Nations
had studied the problem and put forward to all Interest d nations a patt m
according to whioh taxes, income, property, and death duties, should be levied
in order to avoid international multiple taxation.'1'
International tax agreements wore devised by the League of Nations as the
most adequate solution for the problem of double taxation and it established a
model agreement to be a clear guidance for those countries who would reckon to
2
solve the problem through tax conventions.
Principles of Income Tax Liability within the Egyptian System*
Practical application of th above theoretical principles to the Egyptian
Income Tax is unavoidably as such study is important in the dieoov ry of the
basic causes of international double taxation in relation to the Egyptian income
tax.
The Egyptian taxes on income, as previously explain*-d,^ arc compos d of th
Sohadulur income tax with its impersonal feature and the Gen*ral Income Tax with
the personal charact r. The Egyptian taxes on the returns of land, houses and
movable property and on the corporations1 profits, are impersonal. While taxes
on other source of income enjoy a relatively personal characteristic.
a) Movable property, i.e. securities, shares, interest and others, are
liable to the Sohedular Income Tax if they ar- derived from firms carrying on
(1) Several studies had been made by the League of Nations during th? intr-war
period by economic exports. Th© most significant research was that pr pared
in 1923 by Profs. Bruins, Sinandi, Seligstan and 3tamp.
2) League of Nations, London and Mexico Model Conventions. Commentary and T*xt.
3) See Appendix to I art I of this work.
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business within Bgypt regardless of tho domicile or th nationality of the
beneficiary. Therefore# the 'economics allegiance* and 'source* of income
governs th- liability of this type of income. If a person lives in another
country which adopts the principle of 'political allegiance' or * domicile* and
derives part of his income from his investments in Egyptian company, such income
would become subject to double taxation. Moreover, the *residence' principle
rules the liability to the Scheduler Tax on movable property if the individual
is resident or domiciled in Bgypt and derive his incora from foreign movable
property,
b) Commercial and industrial profits of all firms, Egyptian and for ign,
are subject to tax according to principle of 'economic allegiance• and the
•territoriality of taxation*.
c) Wages, salaries and other emolumnts are subj ct to th Soh dular Tax
if they are paid by the Egyptian Government or any Egyptian public authority,
s,g. Provincial Councils, miniclpallties, and other public organisations, or by
any other enterprises residing in Egypt. If such raolura -nts are paid by a
foreign firm residing abroad, for a work done in Egypt, they becom. subj. ct to
tax. Thus more than one principle applies to income derived from emoluments;
residence of the employee, the place of the work for which emolument is paid and
the payor of th. emoluments.
d) Income from professions or vocations is liabl to tax if c ach profession
or vocation is practised within Egypt and therefore, th principle of • conomio
all glance* and that of the *territoriality of taxation* governs th liability
to th Soh.dular Tax,
Th© General Income Tax, as a oupplem ntary tax on income, adopts different
principlesi
1. 'political allogiance*i the Income of any Egyptian wherever he
resides is subject to tax;
2. 'Origin's income arising from Egyptian sources to a foreigner
residing abroad is subject to tax;
3. 'Residence' and 'domicile's any foreigner residing or domiciled
in Egypt is subject to tax on all his income from sources within Egypt and
from overseas.
Prom the above review of the principles underlying Egyptian Income Taxes
liability, it is significant to deduce that the adoption of such different
principles makes the solution of tho international double taxation problem a
remote one. Another fact is that liability underlying a specific Scheduler
Tax implies the application of more than one principle, besides that th
General Income Tax still follows the out-of-date 'political allegiance'
principle which is proved to be impractical in most income tax systems. For
example, if an Egyptian lives in Britain and derives all his incom« from that
country, he will be liable to both the Egyptian General Income Tax and also to
the U.K. Income Tax. But it might be administratively impossible for the
Egyptian Revenue authorities to assess tho tax and, therefore, th© Egyptian
tax is bound to bo evaded. Another fact is that th number of Egyptian
nationals living- permanently abroad is very few and any attempt to assess such
nationals would prove fruitless without a very close co-operation between th©
various foreign Revenue Authorities. In general, it has been proved during
th last deoade, since 1949 when the Law of General Income Tax was issued, that
th© Egyptian Taxation Bepartm nt has been meeting several administrative
difficulties which make the assessment of this tax from Egyptians habitually
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r oi&r.-iit abroad a difficult task. Consequently, it would be more adequate and
equitable if suoh provisions are repealed regarding th. taxation of ' Egyptian
nationals residing abroad and deriving all their income from non-Egyptian sources.
To make th© picture more comprehensive, it would be profitable if we adopt
the suggested principles in the London Bilateral Convention model to avoid double
taxation drawn up for the League of Nations in 1946, and apply them to the
Egyptian system. The following table illustrates th© situation:
Bpuroe of Income Preponderant Elament
London Model
Real Property 0 0
Mortgages (property) 0 0 & B
Mortgages on sea and/'or air vessels 0 (Reg.) 0 & B
Industrial & Com. or Agrio. nterpris a B 3)
Operation of ships or aircraft D 13
Labour or personal services B B
Liberal professions D B
Government payments not to Com. agents 0 0
Shares in corporations B B & 0
Shares belonging to foreign doraioil d Co. D D & 0
Bonds, securities, deben&itureo ©to. 33 B G
Immovable Property, mines, quarry ... etc. 0 G
Use of patent, trade marks .... 0 0
Pensions and life annuities
*•"1 \
B x> & 0'
All factors ' B D & 0
B •» Boaicil© or Habitual Residence 0 - Origin or Situs
1} If they wort; given for work don© in Egypt.
2) The State of domicile retains the right to tax th entire 1; come, but
deducts from its tax on suoh entire income an amount equal to the tax collected
by the other State. If the taxpayer is consid red as domiciled in more than one
State, the tax which depends on fiscal domicile shall be imposed in each Stat' in
proportion to the period of stay in each or according to any proportion agreeable
to the competent administrators.
Sourcei League of Nations, London and Mexico Model Tax Conventions, 1946.
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The Fiscal Treatment of the International pubis Taxation:
Various devices have bean proposed as a solution for the problem of
international double taxation spoolally by the League of nations in its several
reports on this subject.1 The following- is what is considered to be the basic
realistic methods of relief from international multipl- taxation. Such method#
could be achieved either by a unilateral action through national legislation or
by bilateral action through international agreements. Unilateral relief has
!>..•©» suooosfully used especially by capital exporting countries giving a tax
ino*ati .-® to their citizens engaged in foreign tr&ds and inveatm- nt. On the
other hand different capital importing countries offered tax exemptions to foreign
capital through its national tax legislation. Multilateral conventions could .be
devised to help curtail the multiple taxation between the various countries whose
2
tax systems tend to overlap, but such conventions "have not proved practical."
The major methods applied to avoid international doubl taxation or to
eliminate it could be enumerated in the following:
1. The allowance of the foreign incorns tax as a deduction from the net
taxable income: This method is adopted by almost all income tax systems which
do not approve of offering other unilateral reliefs for foreign income. It is
quite obvious that this method is easily condemned to be of minor use or even
use1 sa in overcoming the double taxation of foreign income as, in fact, the tax
liability would be only reduced by that fraction of the national tax presumed to
1) League of nations: a) Report on Double Taxation, by Irofessors Bruins, Binandi,
Seligman and Stamp, 1923J b) Report and Resolutions on Double Taxation and Tax
Evasions 1925s o) Report on Double Taxation and Tax Evasions Model Conv- ntions
for the Prevention of Double Taxation, 1928} d) London and Mexico Mod 1 Tax
Conventions, 1946.
2) United Rations, The Effects of Taxation on Foreign Trade- and Inveutm--nt»
1950, p.40 "*~~ " * ' "" " """~
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bo levied on th® foreign tax paid, e.g. if the foreign tax is £100 and the
national tax rat© is IQf, the reduction in th over-all tax liability would b £10.
Thi? impact of such method on a capital-exporting' country is very grave as th
foreign enterprises in any country could have to resist the loss through the
difference of the tax burden as compared to th national enterprises which bear
one tax only. If ? is the total tax liability, tn is the national tax liability,
T is th •. net income and R is tk - tax rate of the par nt company's country therefore
the liability of the foreign company ioi
T e tn + (Y - tn) R
and th» liability of the national company with th© same n, t income iss
Ti - tn
therefore it is obvious that T Tp as *n > *n (* " tn) R
Tax Credit; Under this method taxes paid to a foreign government may be
deducted from taxes levied on the same income by the taxpayer's domicile government.
This method renders a substantial privilege to the taxpayers of capital-exporting
countries as tfcuy would be paying only the highest of either their hom tax or
the foreign tax# On th- other hand oapital-importing countries, having a low- r
tax rate, in most cases, are not inclined to give furth r tax incentives to for ign
enterprises as the final result would not bo effected. Furthermore, it might
be sound for capital importing* countries to raise their tax liability to the
allowable credit in order to increase their tax revenue and without affecting the
taxpayer's position. This might not bo practical as most for ign enterprises
do not belong to the same country, but such for Ign enterprises usually belong
to different countries which differ in their tax trealm nt of th profits derived
from abroad. Therefore the capital importing country has to off; r fiscal
incentives to attract for ign capital. Son. capital exporting countries such
as the U,K, limit their credit to a percentage of the for ign tax,(bufor 19535
This method., however, has got different gaps and loopholes} the
determination of concept ♦source of inoom ♦ and its interpretation, whether
taxable income Include that derived from trade within the country or also from
trade with other countries? Taxes subject to credit hav to bo defined very
carefully as to correspond with, the foreign taxes. In fact, tax agreements
were able, to a great extent, to close the gaps and fill up the loopholes by
"providing definitions of concepts and specific •;numerations of taxes covered."*
3. A Reduced Tax Kates According to this method a special reduced tax rate
is applicable to foreign income. Usually the fixation of the rate is provided
o
in tax agreements# This device is not widely used aa it doss not help to avoid
completely doubl. taxation but, on the other hand, it has so®! advantages. The
most significant cm? is that it eliminates the loss of revenue of the crediting
country, besides providing a more justifiable division of tax revenue between
the parties of the agreement. This method also helps in the detection of tax
evasion especially in the case of inoom® derived from foreign securities,
4* Exemption of pertain types of Incomes This is the extreme method used
for solving international double taxation. Under this device foreign income is
exempted from taxes levied by tin country where the taxpayer is resident or
domiciled. Other types of income as well could be exempted from taxation if
such incomes were subject to taxation in another country."^
1) p. 50.
2) This device is adopted in the Anglo-Am..roan tax agreements# Artlcl XI of the
Agreement bet./eon the U.S.A. and Canada of March 1942 provid s that the maximum
rat of withholding tax for inaora of non-residents if 15f. Sees U.K.
International Tax Agr«e??3.-nts. vol. 1, p. 106
3) Under th* French Income Tax (Dec. 1948 ft form) foreign busin as profits of
Fr nch untarprio a are exempt from tax if thy axis- from operations or a
separated establish® nt abroad. Egypt as wall appli s the same principle
as in Franca.
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Reciprocity is th usual condition governing the offer of such privilege as
in th case of th exemption of foreign maritime and air transport enterprises
from taxation on their profits derived from local operations. If a country does
not hav shipping- or air transport enterprises, this method is inclined to he
unfavourahl and the agreed system of allocation of profits has to be applied
to prevent double taxation#
This device as the other ones has its advantages and disadvantages. The
loss of revenue of a country granting such a relief is the basic apparent danger
especially if this country doos not have overseas business branches or subsidiaries.
Moreover, this device encourages evasion of taxation as there is no reliable
assurance that the exempted income will be taxed in the other country. The only
principal advantage of such a method is it3 simplicity from the administrative
standpoint.
In general the practical use of this device has proved adequate in the case
of maritime and air transport enterprises under reciprocal agreements.
5# Allocation of Income: Income under this method is usually allocated
according to the agreement of contracting countries who include the basis of
allocation in the tax agreement. Usually they divid taxable income according
to its source and type. The allocation depends on the interpretation of s
a) various categories of income, e.g. income from movable and immovable property,
income from trade and others, b) residence, c) domicile, and d) source or Situs.
The League of Nations, as previously mentioned, set down the basic principles of
income allocation to be taken into consideration when concluding- any bilat6ral or
multilateral tax agreements.
The allocation method creates one of the most difficult problems in its
<-f
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application, that is the taxation of basin as income realised from activities
carried on in more than one country.* Several devices aro used for splitting
up th profits of such enterprises. Tax agream*nts usually include the
fundamental basis of profits* allocation. The following ar th various
methods used in allocating the total profits of an enterprise* a) separate
accounting system for each branch or any dependent permanent establishment
carrying on activities in a foreign country, b) a fixed parentage of the
branch*a gross receipts; and c) using coefficients, e.g. local assets, gross
receipts or number of hours worked; whenever it is impossible to decide
accurately the branch's profits, i. . if such branch constitutes an important
2
element of profit-Hanking of the parent enterprise.
The significance of this method could only be proved if it is adopted by
countries enjoying nearly th© same level of economic development. Capital
exporting countries era deemed to lose a considerable amount of tax revenue in
adopting the allocation method with any capital-importing country as the latter
do s not have any branches operating in the former countries which could offer a
similar treatment or "a satisfactory 'quid pro quo *."^
To complete the picture a comparative study of th various ra tho&s has to
take place. It is appropriate for th comparison to tok« th- following hypothesesi
An enterprise having its head offio in a capital-exporting country "A", and
investing' part of its capital in another country **BM. K t income r al'jltad in
country "A" within a specific y ar was £10,000 and £3,000 from business carried on
in oountry "B" • Tax rata in country "A" is 30f and in country "B" 20; .
Boduoed rata ua d in column (3) is 10'/ on for ign profits.
1} League of Mat ions, o .clt., pp. 44-46
2) U.K., on.oit.9 p. 45
3) Ibid, p. 46
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TABLE 26: Comparative Illustration of Methods devised for the Prevention
of International Double Taxation.
Reduced Tax
Exemption Credit Rate f Deduction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Net Profits in Country A £10,000 £10,000 £10,000 £10,000
Net Profits in Country B 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000
Tax Liability in Country B 600 600 600 600
Total net tax liability 3,600 3,600 3,900 4,320
Effective Rate on Total Profits 27.7# 27.7# 30# 33.3#
Prom the above table, it is clear that the credit method and the complete
exemption of foreign income from home taxes render favourable results. The
final impact of national and foreign taxation on aggregate profits is deemed
to bo th© same under both methods. Under the reduced taxation method the
total liability depends on the reduced rate levied upon foreign income.
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.Bilateral and I'lultilateral Tax Agreements as an Adequate Solution of 'Double
Taxation Problem;
Bilateral tax agreements have proved an adequate device in detecting
international double taxation during the last half century and more specifically
during the post ?/orld War II period*
Up till the First World War the basic motive for concluding tax agreements
is the desire to re-organise the fiscal matters concerning European trad©.
After World War I most of the countries introduced and established an income
tax system on different bases which caused more harm to trade than ever existed
as the problem of double taxation became acute. Thus, tax agreements w re
needed to solve these international fiscal conflicts which mad© international
trade and capital investment relatively impossible. Most of the tax agreements
which were concluded in the inter-war period tried only to organise the taxation
of maritime companies and foreign commercial banks.
After World War II the need for tax agreements and other fiscal provisions
became a significant stimulant for capital investment through its immigration
to underdeveloped countries. In the meantime most underdeveloped countries
adopted or developed direct taxation, especially income taxes; therefore the
problem of double taxation on income had to be solved in order to stimulate
foreign capital investment. Under&eveloped countries are confronted by two
conflicting desires; the need of revenue for the expanding expenditure and the
need for foreign capital for further development. Therefore in ord< r to achieve
one of those aims the other has to be sacrificed. To stimulate foreign trade and
investment the underdeveloped country has to offer tax Incentives besides other
fiscal ones which would reduce the public revenue. In general tax measures are
used as an adequate instrument for the channelling of foreign investment and trade.
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Taz agreements to avoid doubl taxation are used as a fiscal stimulant for
foreign capital in underdeveloped countries. But such agreem nts are also
concluded between developed countries not as a stimulant for foreign capital but
as a pure device to avoid double taxation between two equal countries. The
underdeveloped country which believes in tax agreements with capital exporting
countries to stimulate the latter*s capital has to be sure that every capital
exporting oountry does not offer a tax credit against foreign taxes, otn rwise
any tax unilateral or bilateral though agreements would prove us less.
In fact, and according to the present situation, many of the independent
underdeveloped countries have not concluded tax agreements to avoid international
double taxation of income with other developed countries. The basic reason for
this fact must be sought in the economic unbalance between capital-exporting- and
capital-importing countries which allows less scope to the bargaining factor
involved in the tax credit provision in the major-capital-exporting countries
has lessened the significance of bilateral agreements for the underdeveloped
countries which are anxious to assure foreign investors of freedom from the rigidity
of double taxation."*"
From the above analysis the tax credit method offers powerful protection
for an effective income tax system in underdeveloped countries. Although there
are various considerations, which are mentioned above, contribute to weaken the
incentive of underdeveloped countries for the conclusion of bilateral agreements
with capital exporting countries which offer a credit system, it is more beneficial
1) Ceylon, Bunaa and Israel have signed tax agreements with the U.K. in 1950 in
order to gain the benefit of tax credit up to the full amount of the U.K. tax
in absence of a tax agreem nt. See. U.N.t International Tax Agreements.
Volumes I and II.
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to the former countries to become incorporated in bilateral agreements which
would serve to bring fiscal relations between contracting countries to an
effective subtle condition regarding trade and investment. Bilateral tax
agreements could be -widely used as instruments for co-ordinating the tax
relationship between the contracting countries and it could be said that such
agreements have achieved the co-ordination of international tax relations of
developed countries and their dependencies as the case of most tax agreements
concluded between the U.K. and its colonies, Dominions and also the Commonwealth
countries. But in the case of underdeveloped countries tax agreements have not
yet served their purpose in simplifying international tax relations or played
thair expected role as an incentive for foreign capital investment.
The problem of double taxation was not considered an element disturbing
the fiscal structure in Egypt. Therefore no major legislative provisions were
introduced to eliminate any presumable international doubl taxation. Until
1952 Egypt did not conclude any type of tax agreement as it was the overwhelming
idea that any tax agreement would grant foreign enterprises carrying on business
in Egypt an advantage, or mors specifioally "capitulations" over the national
enterprises even if these agreements »re based on reciprocal treatment as there
were very few or no Egyptian overseas businesses.*'" Egypt as an underdeveloped
country followed the ideology put forward by the League of Nations and the
United Nations as any underdeveloped country does "not have an important stake
in relieving double tax burdens resting on the first investments of (her) own
2
citizens."
1) This view was actually due to the 'complex1 resulting from foreign domination
of Egyptian economy and other aspects during the p riod previous to 1937,
when all capitulations ware abolished by the "Montreux Treaty" of 1937
2) United Nations, International Tax Agreements. Voluras II p. xi.
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On the other hand the Egyptian Government•a id -a was directed towards the
deterring of capital flight from domestic investment. Therefore, double
taxation was believed in this case, as an important factor; e.g. a tariff,
to keep capital from flowing outside the country.
But in 1952 .after th© Revolution need for incentive to stimulate? capital
investment and also to approach indirect revenue} e.g. through tourism, dues
from the operation of airports and harbours, Induced the Government to grant
fiscal privilegea to special sections of the economy. Th first fiscal Law
towards this and was issued in August, 1952 allowing th© Government to exempt
foreign air t ranisport enterprise* from income tax on Its profits on reciprocity
basis. Afterward© in December 1953 an amendment to this law took piece to
include a further exemption to foreign air transport firms from tax levied on
its movable income.1 Reciprocity is th® basic principle for exemption under
auoh provisions. Up to 1955 one treaty was concluded between Egypt and
2
Switzerland while negotiations with other countries took plaot.. Th exemption
of foreign aviation companies carrying on busln< so in Egypt and abroad b.-oarae
indispensable for attracting tourism and to increase th© amount of traffic using
Egyptian airports and hence increasing traffio dues and other revenues. The
geographical situation of Egypt, besides this fiscal incentive, would in fact
achieve th© desirable aims.
Various foreign maritime companies carrying on business in Egypt decided
to raise the question of its liability to the Egyptian income tax to Courts as
1) Law ho. 169 of 1952 amended by Law Ho. 533 of 1953#
2) Those countries ares Jordan, Syria, Uorway, Ethiopia, Finland, Holland, Italy,
U.K., U.S.A., Canada, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, India, Pakistan, Greece, France,
Denmark, South Africa, Sweden, Iran and Belgium.
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thoy believed that they should be tannined frorc the B£-;yptian tax. The Court's
decisions were in favour of the Companies and thereafter in January 1953» a law
was passed j;0 ^lay th© collection of taxes due on these foreign companies
pending a fiaoal decision of the Egyptian Supreme Court on the problem of their
liability. The trend at that time was a complete exemption of such oompani s
on reciprocal basis.*
Profits arising from speculations in th Egyptian Cotton Future Market
(Alexandria) for foreign firms carrying on their activities outside Egypt are
2
exempted from the tax on Commercial and Industrial Pi-ofits. This action
undertaken by the Egyptian Government was a necessity in order to protect the
cotton market and the fluctuations in prices. Hedging and settlements by
foreign purchasing firms are indisponsible in the cotton market, and therefore
any profits realised from these contracts oould be liable to the Egyptian Tax
if it is oarried by an 'establishment* residing in Egypt. As Liverpool Cotton
Market was the principle settlement market for Egyptian cotton, and as profits
arising from hedging operations in Liverpool Market and Alexandria Market are
exempt from the U.K. tax, it became a necessity to grant the above mentioned
exemption for the stabilisation of the Egyptian Cotton Market.
In 1955 the Egyptian Government after a detailed study of the benefits which
might be gained by concluding comprehensive tax agreements with other nations
especially capital-exporting ones, passed a law allowing th« conclusion of
bilateral or multilateral tax agreem nts on r Ciprooal basis to avoid international
double taxation.^
(1) Law Wo. 43 of 1953. I'o further information on this question is available.
(2) Law No. 47g of 1955*
(3) Law Ho. 542 of 1955.
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The Egyptian &xperi no©, however, In the field of double taxation agreements,
eap' cially within the field of incoraa taxation, is Very limited. The first two
Conventions regarding income doable taxation were concluded in 1958 between the
United Arab Republic (Egyptian Region) on the one side, and Sweden and West
Germany on the other.
The question of the adequacy and the expediency of such conventions has to
be Judged from a long tana point of view,* However, there are two main categories
of arguments, for and against the conclusion of double taxation treaties. The
following are the argun, nts against:
1} It may not seem advantageous to Egypt to conclude such agreements, on
the argument that Egyptian investments abroad ar© too negligible to
benefit from such agreements;
2) Moreover, it was argued that the loss of revenue arising from the tax
privileges granted through such agreements would overstep the benefits
arising from new foreign investments; and
3) A final argument against the conclusion of double taxation agreements
is that the tax privileges granted would discriminate against locally
financed enterprises, and thus give rise to a broach of equity.
On the other hand, however, 'wo should not base our Judgement on the adequacy
of these agreements on a short term policy viewpoint, although pr s r<t sacrifices
may be obvious, A long terra fiscal policy concerning foreign capital investment
is deemed to bo more beneficial than a short t .rra one. Therefore the Justification
of any fiscal measure has to be Judged on its long term merits. The two recently
concluded agreements do establish the basis on which income taxes are imposed in
each country in order to prevent any double taxation of the same incorr,,
(1) Our discussion here is basically theoretical as Egyptian experience in the
field of double taxation agreements is new and therefore limited.
However, no basic concessions either to individuals or to firms have been granted
through these conventions. Accordingly, such agreements could bs considered
simply as a grinding tool which leads towards a better understanding of" the
fiscal legislation of the contracting countries, which would facilitate capital
movements. I5o actual loss of revenue would occur under such agreements as no
exemptions are granted to foreign enterprises of foreign individuals on their
income arising from Egyptian souroes and activities carried out in Egypt.
Consequently wo oould emphasise that Egypt would benefit ultimately from the
conclusion of such agreements - which do not include any direct or indirect
tax exemption - ©specially with apital exporting countries.
PART III.
3UGGBSTEP REFORMS | MAJOR POLICY GlflLS
( CONCLUSION )
" Change is one of the constant3 in our
icaleidoscopic world." Sherman J, Maisel,
Fluctuations , Growth and Ibrcasting.p. 3.
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esi n for more effective Income "ax
In our study we have analysed the various aspects of the Egyptian income
tax system. how, after reachin ; various detailed conclusions in the course o
the fore,pain„ analysis, it appears necessary to conclude ou • discussion by
putting forward the recommendations required to establish a *nore effective and
efficient income tax in hgypt.
Our main purpo .e in this concluding chapter is to devise a more effective
inco.:ie tax which will be competent to reach the followin . objectives
(i) ecrease the inequality of the tax system where inuirect taxes with
their regre sive nature outweigh direct taxes. income taxation has to be
deve opeu to play the main rOi..e in reaching tiiis objective with tiie aid of
exemptions, and reliefs as well as the rate structure;
(ii) Inc easing the flexibility of the tax through the rate structure
and increasing the efficiency of the adrainistrative machinery. This
flexibility is needed to raise revenue for economic deve Lopment and increasing
the role of the tax as an economic stabilier. lublic revenue is badly
needed too for public investment, which is increasin ; at a rapid rate, to
compensate the decline In private investment; and
(iii) initi&zing the disincentive effects of the tax on private capita
formation through the introduction of a series of tax incentives to business
enterprises. however, the ultimate aim, herein, is to construct an income
tax hich would be ab.'.e to pi y a dual part in the overall economic
development; raising revenue for puclic capital formation and encouraging
private investment.
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The reforms proposed ±11 our conclusion are two; the first aea_.s with the
very i mediate future, i.e. the transitional period before introducing the major
reform; and the seoon is confine., to an overhauling o the present income tax
for a long-run application. Most of the arguments behind these reforms have
been discussed before in the various sections of this study, and therefore it
seems undesirable to repeat such arguments in framing the outline in this final
part. dy and large our main object as acove mentioned is to present an outline
of an effective income tax based on our previous analysis.
1
I. ohort-'-ern .eforrn
In fact our recommendat ons for the short-terra changes in the tax are only
to help us in liquidating the problems of the present system before introducing
the long-ter reform where the income tax system has to be overhauled.
Therefore, after liquidating the anomalies and heavy burden of the unassessed
tax, public policy makers have to set up a long-run tax policy, which includes
the reformation of the income tax. This poli y should be ready for
application after the expiry of the transitional period.
The main object of the proposed changes within the transitional period
is to collect the unassessed tax without creating inequities and unnecessary
complications. lie immediate changes are two-fold; legislative and
adminis trative.
(a) legislative ensures:
(i) legislation has to be enacted in order to provide for a quick
ij The length of the short-ter e reform depends on the ability of the
Taxation department to clear up the problems and the cases before the lourts.
This period could be as hort as two years or longer, op to five years.
Any period longer than five years would be inappropriate as the long-term
reforms iiould be introduced as soon as possible in order to create a stable
tax syste.: in the first tages of economic development.
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settlement of the cases already at court or in dispute.
(ii) abolishing the discrimination in tax treatment between self-employed
graduates and other taxpayers. Income tax shoul. be i posed on the former
group on their actual earneu income instead of the present treatment base on
the payment of lump sum tax acco din , to the namber of the years or' practice,
equity, would thereby be achieved and revenue from the Schedule Tax on on-
Gommercial Professions could be increase.! at least by half (the 1957-5
1
revenue from this particul r Schedule v/as about half a million pounds .
Retrospection of the legislation could be sought in order to remove the
inequity cause by the introauction of such discriminatory treatment, i.e.
partial exemption in 1955.
(iii) in regard to the inequity and loss of revenue resulting from the
exemption of agricultural profits (other titan profits realised through
corporations) a progressive sur-tax could be i pose on the present -and ax.
however, the rate of progression would be basod on the number of feddans (acres)
2
comprising the agricultural tenure. This device will be only te porary for
the transitional period as the long-term reform would include these profits
in the basic system of income tax. 3y this device equity would be partially
achieve., and extra revenue raised,
(iv) Tiie banking institutions could be authorise through the Government
and the Central dank to provide credit facilities with a low interest rate
for taxpayers to enable them to pay their accu imulated tax debts. Interest
3
paid by taxpayers should, therefore, oecoine deductible from taxable income.
1) or the detailed arguments on which this recommendation is based, see
Chapter IV.
2) ee Chapter IV on this point.
3) The economic impact of this measure is discussed later.
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(v) / percentage deduction, say 5 per cent to 10 per cent from the tax
debt could be made available to taxpayers who pay their tax deuts within
an early period. The loss of revenue through this privilege is compensate
by the immediate availability of cash funds which are needed for further
investment by the public sector. This measure includes a considerable
degree of inequity but it is an unequivoca,. matter in this short transitional
period. Prance adopte this measure in 1949 when introducing the new
income tax reform of ecenber 1948.
(vi) inc easin , the present inadequate penalty provisions and introducing
imprisonment for tax evadors in addition to the present fines.
These are the main legislative measures which ooul be provided i rte iately
in order to reach the main object in the transitional period, that is to pave
the way to the introduction of a more effective income tax. : egislative
measures alone without effective snu adequate aduinis ation are, however,
fruitless, and, therefore great weight has to be placed on the administrative
side of the picture.
(&l ,-b.minis tration in the Transitional eriod
The inefficiency of the administrative machine is not expected to alter
greatly in the near future even if we introduced the up-to-date new techniques.
This is due to the fact that the accuramulated irresponsibility and corruption
in the administration as a whole is a heritage of centuries and not of a short
period. herefore, one cannot rely to any reat extent on reforms institute
in the administration of the Taxation department in ugypt. On the other hand
this fact should not hamper our legislative reforms for the transitional period
as we h-ve to reach the aim at the mo t reasonable cost.
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The following are the principal administrative reforms designer for the
execution of the above mentione legislative measures:
(i) Mobilization of the necessary personnel to assess the arrears,
especially those of the Tax on Commercial and Industrial ± rofits and on Non¬
commercial -rofessions. 'he basic aim is the assessment of the ohedular Taxes
and the General Income Tax up to date.
(ii) Not much regard should be paid, within the transitional period, to the
maxim of economy in taxation, as the basic derive will be towards the quick
assessment of arrears. A loss of revenue due to the increase in the cost of
collection is ocvious but such inevitable loss would be only temporary.
(iii) A nation wide campaign through various ways and means is needed to
explain the advantages of the early payment of the tax debt and the national
objectives behind the tax payment in general.
-'he Economic issue of the hort- -un olloy
A relative increase in the public revenue due to collection of arrears in
1
the transitional period is inevitable. Therefore, the economic effect of such
an inc ease would depend on the way the Government is going to spend it. If
suoh an increase is directed towards pu >lic investment the result should be the
acceleration of productivity and an increase in the national output. If it is
assured that the tax debt might be paid from private savings the ultimate effect
would depend on two factors; first the channels through which such savings were
supposed to be invested if they were not paid to the Treasury; and second, the
form in which the public sector is going to dispose of the tax revenue. In a
developing country like Egypt such an increase most probably would be directed
to public investment either in social overhead schemes or in contributing to new
1) The amount of uncollected income taxes was about £S53 million in 1955 according
to the latest available data. See Chapter III.
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ventures which the private sector is avoiding for one reason or another*
If the payment of the tax debt by the private sector is through dissaving!
the result would be a decrease in the domestic investment* On the other hand,
if such dissaving cane from hoarde money or preoious metals and not from
productive capital, the result would be different* The effect on the economy
in this case would be a rise in the price level due to the increase in the
1
aggregate deraand over aggregate supply. On the other hand an inn ease in the
domestic output would become most probable if such dissavings were not emended
on unproductive pods and services.
In lases where taxpayers were unable to pay the tax debt n full or in
part through limited (in time) instalments, monetary measures might be relied on*
G edit opportunities could become available for taxpayers to pay their tax debt*
die economic incidence of such measures depends mostly on the way the ere it
is created and the amount of such c edit* An increase in the supply of money
through the Gentral dank might lead to inflationary tendencies as a result of
the ino ease in aggregate demand which in tu n would raise the price level*
The ultimate effect de ends; firstly, on the percentage of the increase in the
supply of money to the aggregate amount of money supply; and secondly, on the
percentage increase in the domestic output*
by and large, if such ere it measures were undertaken and an inflationary
trend resulted, monetary policy measures would have to be applied to counteract
this trend. Fiscal policy devices could be applied es well but their
effectiveness would generally be considered less titan monetary policy measures
due to the time lag in the application of the first type and the inefficient
administrative machinery in control. Finally, if suoh an inflationary trend
l) in a less-developed econoiny aggregate supply is fairly inelastic in the
short-run*
29 4
did begin it might be controlled by the amount of c edit and the reduction
in the period of the loans. tort-term legislative measures could hel
in achieving this,
11. ion 'ecm reform
The main aim at present is to design and construct an effective income
tax, other than the present one, to achieve the following objectives:
(a) a higher degree o.' equity in the tax syste where indirect taxation
with its regressive character predominates; (b) raising ample revenue for
capital formation through the public sector; (c) income tax should not hamper
production but encourage private saving and investment; and (d) maintain
economic stability.
The needed reform has acco dingly to be directe towards:
(i) a more personalises and flexible income taxation; and
(ii) the establishing of a more efficient administration.
To reach these major targets we elieve that the reform should be the
change and shift towards a unified, or one-fold income tax system instead
I
of the two-fold present system.
A 'athway to a "'Unique" Income Tax system
A. Framework of the deform:
The defects of the existing income tax sy tem have been increasing in
spite of the innumerable amendments and patching up of the legislation
1) 'he proposed reform should be studie carefully and then legislation could be
enacted. These steps have to be taken in the transitional period. The
administration has to be prepared to carry out immediately the application of
the new reform, in order to avoid any time lag such as actually occurred when
the present income tax was introduce in 1939. he actual functioning of
the tax administrative machinery only began about two years later, and this
retarded the full enforcement of the tax for almost two years. e have to
bear 'his unfortunate experience in mind before enforcing the new reform.
and changing the administrative tools. A complete change in the structure
of this- tax is therefore necessary. --gypt has gained valuable experience
during the last tvvo decades from the imposition of the income tax;
trained officials*, equalisation, to a certain extent of the distribution of
the tax burden; tax consciousness, although limited; and other legal
and accounting discipline which spread among taxpayers as well as lawyers and
accountants.
1
The change is based on the introduction of a one-fold income tax, having
2
in mind the United Kingdom, the U.S.A., the Canadian, and the French systems,
e are not going to import one of the above systems, out a careful study of
each has to take place before adopting any of their features. e should not
forget the unfortunate expe.-ience which results from the wholesale adoption
of the French system (before 1943 reform) in 1939. -his mishap should not be
repeated as the country is in great need of stability in the fiscal structure,
and flexibility of the revenue on the other hand.
Two fundamental factors have to be considere carefully when introducing
the new tax reform;
(a) the nationalization of the tax base, which includes the conflict
between equity versus revenue yielding, and
(b) maximi ation of the ^overall flexibility" as well as the "built-
in-flexibility " of the new tax.
These two targets could be achieved basically through the medium of exemptions
and reliefs as well as the definition of taxable income.
1)in our discussion I refer to the United - ingdom and the U.K.A. income taxes as a
one-fold system. I consider what is called the Surtax or the Super-tax as only
a change in the tax rate and not as a separate tax.
2) The 'rench system after the reform of December 1943.
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Before disoussin , these two faotors it see us desirable to give the basic
outline of the proposed system, without indulging in details, as details need
careful study after agreement has been reached on the principles.
The proposed tax contains two fundamental sections, (i) a personal
income tax; and (ii) a corporation income tax.
The personal income tax is levied on all individual taxpayers on their
total income from various sources at a progressive rate applicable after the
deduction of personal reliefs. The differentiation of the proposed system
between personal and corporate incomes does not imply that the tax is not of
a "unique'', i.e. unified appearance. It is only a differentiation necessary
to introduce into the new income tax an element of personalization of personal
income as against income realised through non-individualistic organizations.
1• The 1ationalisation of the Tax case
-iiny wise and foresighted fiscal policy requires selecting the best
possible combination of revenue measures rather than relying upon any one
measure alone. In its basic design the combination has to provide for
(a) a means of mass taxation which would raise large amounts from the
population without imposing an excessive burden on particular groups, i.e. an
equitable tax system; (b) a more exclusive tax applying to the well-to-do
groups of the population without hampering their propensity to save; (c) one
or more taxes designer to check and taper windfall incomes arising out of
fluctuations in prices and speculation in non-productive assets; and (d)
special tax provisions for regulatory objectives.
Income taxation in almost all underdeveloped countries, where the
agricultural 8nu non-monetary economy predominates is of limited application.
This is uue to low income per capita, usually below the subsistence level or
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just around it. The income tax base, or, more comprehensively, the tax field
of operation is very narrow in these countries. 'hi., fact does emphasise that
the public sector cannot depend on income taxation alone for capital formation.
From our previous analysis (Chapters Hi and IV) we have seen that the
majority of the Egyptian population, about 73 per cent are engaged in the
agricultural sector where income is below what could be recognised as the
subsistence level. Generally speaking the number of taxpayers .ubject to
the present sy. tem is very small and we have to take this fact into considera¬
tion when reforming the income tax system.
To raise a sizeacle amount of revenue through income taxation in • gypt as is
the case in most less-developer countries, we find ourselves faced with the
problem of equity. As the equity maxim is of primary importance in taxation
more emphasis has to be put on this concept in formulating the new income tax
in order to lessen the regressive burden created by the indirect taxes. If
we inclu e individuals below the subsistence level, without givmg in return,
direct or in irect social benefits on a compensating level, a severe violation
of equity occurs. orcover, loss of revenue might occur due to uneconomical
collection of the tax on low-income groups. Also, we should not forget the
socio-political implications in this case. By and large, in planning the size
of the tax base, income needed for more subsistence necessities such as food
and shelter should be excluded.
The second, but more important, item to consider is the definition of
taxable income within the scope of the personal income tax. A clear definition
of taxable incomes has to be provided in order not to exempt any type of income
which the planner intende . to tax. Definitions of ''origin", "domicile",
"residence" .... etc., have also to be clearly define in order to facilitate
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the application of the tax and prevent any unjustifiable exemptions or over¬
taxation of incomes or taxpayers. Agricultural profits have to become
taxable after even if their inolu.ion might arouse some administrative
difficulties. Generally, the new income tax shoulu be imposed on all
sources of income on an accrual basis and not otherwise, such as is the
case in the taxation of non-commercial self-employed professionals under the
present system.
Capital gains taxation must be . tudied on its economic effects and from
the viewpoint of equity as well as administrative feasibility. As previously
mentioned (Chapter IV) a capital gains tax could be established for
2
regulatory objectives and not as a revenue yielder. The main object of
the tax, however, is to eliminate, if not to prevent, investment in non¬
productive assets, ana to tap. away a sizeable part of windfall gains which
usually originate in the first period of development. e have to consider
very carefully the disincentive effect of the taxation of capital gains
on saving and investment. For avoiding any disincentive effects in this
case, it seems appropriate to exempt profits from speculation in the stock
exchange. Mon-fiscal measures, on the other hand, could be introduced to
eliminate any abnormal and har ful fluctuations in the stock exchange markets
and thus avoid the rigidity of fiscal measures and their disincentive effects.
After identifying -.1early incomes to be includes in the tax base we reach
the stage where the personalization of the tax (the personal income tax), as
one of the main objectives of the reform, has to be aohieved. This objective
1) bee Chapter IV on this topic from the equity viewpoint.
2) oee arguments on the taxation of capital gains in general and in r.gypt in
particular, Ghajter IV,
could be attained through the introduction of a series of personal reliefs
which take the personal circumstances of the taxpayers into account.
Allowance for all expenses necessary for the creation of income has to be
provided while double deduction of some items should be prevented.
The following are considered the most important personal reliefs which
have to be introduced in order to maximise the personal element of the personal
income tax and achieve a more equitable distribution of the tax burden than
the present system:
(i) The provision of earned income relief to differentiate between
earned and unearned incomes. e would take as a model the British system;
i.e. the regressive percentage on earned income. This differentiation
will inc ease the progression of the tax rate.^
(ii) -ife an.; health insurance; pensions should be deductible, yet a
limit has to be provided for the insure amounts in order to prevent tax
evasion.
(iii) All payments for social security schemes and old age pensions have to
be deductible from taxable income. Amounts deductible have to be fixed in
relation to the capacity to pay; in other words acco din ■; to the person's
earnings and his family status. A maximum has to be provided, however, in
order to avoid tax avoidance and hence inequity.
(iv) Personal allowances; an exception limit for a single person (a
personal allowance} should be available to each taxpayer resident in gypt.
Other person?! allowances have to be made available in respect of the wife
and for each child. Ve recommend a single proportional allowance subject to
I)See arguments on this topic in chapter VI.
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a maximum and. minimum; for example, this allowance could be 2^50 where the
income does not emcee °£E500, and 7 per cent of income for incomes between
1
CcoOO end £E700. On the other hand a limit fo • the number of children for
whom the person benefits from this allowance has to be provided. The limit
in this case serves as a dete 'rent to the increase in population, which is
one of the fundamental pro lems in less-developed countries. dy and large
no income tax system can provide a list of all personal allowances covering
all personal circumstances. Therefore, we find ourselves directed towards the
adoption of few but clearly identifiable allowances covering a substantial
number of cases. Equity is better achieved in this case than having a system,
of personal allowances including innumerable types of cases which render
its administration with reasonable certainty and accu acy extremely difficult,
^inclly, the main aim of personal allowances and reliefs is to provide for a
more equitable distribution of the fiscal burden especially on those who
are in low and middle income groups. On the other hand, these reliefs would
serve as an effective tool in increasing the graduation of the tax rate. On
the whole the tax burden would be adjusted not only by variations of the rate
but also by the grant of allowances in respect of certain categories of
personal ci -cumstances that affect the taxpayin; capacity of the individual
taxpayer, and a differentiation between earne income and investment income.
Now we turn to b .siness profits either reaii ed through a private
enterprise or a corporation; the latter is subject to the corporation tax
rate. The computation of business profits has to follow closely accounting
principles with few exceptions concerning specific allowances; such as
depreciation, depletion and others, which have to be considered on an economic
T) e have been guided by proposals set up by the voyai Commission on the
Taxation of Profits and Income, econd Report, pp. 55-58 April, 1954,
hnd. 9105.
301
as well as a technical basis. Economic basis does include considerations
regarding the effect of the size of the allowance and the different ways
of its computation, on economic growth.1 its effect on tax revenue, on
the other hand,is anticipated.
2. aximi-.ing the Tax iexlbility
The tax flexibility is normally created through; (a) the flexibility
of the tax rate; a progressive tax is more flexible than a proportional
one; (b) the ability to change the size of the tax based by increasing or
decreasing the exemption limit and other personal reliefs.
The tax rate is of great significance as it affects the yield and the
recistribution of personal ,_ncome. Reliefs on the other hand increase the
graduation of the rate scale end hence promote the overall p ogression of
the income tax. The rate should be progressive, but not steep to the
extent that it would become a disincentive factor to private savings and also
to work. A test of the progressiveness of the marginal rate is important
in our case in order to prevent evasion and the adverse effect of the tax on
incentives. Yet the overnment public policy guides the structure of the
rate and in this context it usually faces the conflict between equity and
2
revenue. Generally speaking the main core in constructing the tax rate
during the economic development period is to increase the rate, in relative terms,
on inco- c oreeketi. where the majority of taxpayers come from. In •■gypt ra.st of
the income taxpayers Some from middle and higher income brackets and to increase
the rata, in relative terms, would result in inequity. 'his could be remedied
by the aid of the various personal reliefs. On the other hand we do not
recommend at all very steeply progressive rates on high income brackets because
1) Incentives for economic development throu ,h income tax measures within the
framework of the proposed system are stated later.
2) It is well known that governments could control the fixation of the tax rates
but not the yield, and therefore equity considerations seen more important,
as the increase in the yield due to the increase in the rate is probably not
high enough to sacrifice equity.
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such steepness, as previously mentioned, would reduce considerably the
propensity to save of the class where the large proportion of rivate savings
originate.
The tax rate on corporation profits is a two-fold flat rate; a reduced
rate on pro its below a certain level say CE10,000 and a higher rate on
profits above that level# The differentiation would help small and closely
held corporations with small capital to be established, as it is highly
beneficial for economic development to encourage private investment in
corporations where capital plays a secondary role compared to other factors
of production; e.g. labour intensive rather than capital intensive ventures.
Two basic consideration have to be borne in mind; (a) the avoidance of
the double taxation of distributed pro its, and (b) to reduce the tax rate
on undistributed profits to encou-'age the ploughing back of profits and hence
increase private investment.^
In general we have to assume a high rate of built-in-flexibility of the
new tax in order to meet the inflationary tendencies which usually accompany
the first phases of development.
Consequently, to render the tax more effective and more responsive to
economic fluctuations and to revenue needs, the tax rate, personal and
corporate, has to be fixed annually by the Treasury when preparing the budget.
Similar action could be applied in the case of personal reliefs which, as we
know, affect the projressiveness of the tax rate.
B, The Admini.itrative Issue
The relative simplicity of the single-tier income tax compere 1 to the
1) -hi incentive is discussed in Chapter 71 in detail and we shall refer to it
later in this Chapter when considering the economic effects of the reform.
'*j> 3 j-
present two-tier system is the basic advanta ge of our proposed reform. As
e have pointed out in various parts of this work, administrative efficiency
of the tax is very important. duch importance lies in the fact that a tax
backed with an efficient administration although inequitable, is better than
an equitable tax with a corruptee and inefficient administration.
aiadrainistration opens the door for evasion, lost of revenue and
inequity.
Under the new income tax the individual will submit one main comprehen¬
sive return instead of the several returns he submits under the present
system if he has income from different sources; e.g. diviaenus, salary,
business profits etc. One system of personal reliefs and exemptions is
applicable to the taxpayer instead of a diversified and unco-ordinated
system of personal reliefs.
Assessment and collection will also be simplified. One tax inspector
will be in charge of the tax asse sment of the individual, while unuer the
present system we find that two or more tax officials assess the income tax
on one taxpayer as he may be liable to more than one schedule tax. Appeal
to interna* Commissioners and to Courts of Justice will be simplified too.
by and large, the administrative burden of the proposed tax would be
considerably less than the burden of the present system."*"
To ensure an efficient income tax the ''reasury has to undertake the
l) dee a translated bnglish version of f. report submitted by the writer to
the Egyptian Taxation Department in April 1954 after spending a year in the
U.o.A. anu Canada, where he attended the internat onal Programme ia Taxation
at harvard niversity ana studieu the application of both U.S. and Canadian
income tax systems at respective Government Dsgartffl®ntg| under a grant from
the Unites Nations Technical Assistance Programme. This report proposes a
sin, ,le-tier income tax to replace the existing system. The administrative
organisation of the new proposed tax is draftee in detail in this report.
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training of oersonnel in order to prepare them for the proper enforcement of the
new system. On the other side, a wide scale campaign through radio, lectures
and other means of spreading information regarding the p oposed tax is
necessary to increase the taxpayers' fiscal morality and tax conscience.
Incentives for early payment of the tax; i.e. paying the tax of the
current year in instalments instead of waiting until the end of the year, could
be considered. Such incentives could take the form of a percentage deduction
from the tax paid in advance. This type of incentive has a dual advantage to
both the Treasury and the taxpayer; accessible revenue to the former and
percentage reduction of the tax debt to the latter.
3. Economic Effects of the deform; r'ublic olicy issue:
The public policy issue of the proposed tax implies the discussion of
its effect on the following: (a) capital formation through its impact on
incentives to save and invest, (b) stabilisation of the economy, especially
during the phase of development, and (c) the redistribution of the fiscal
1
burden.
("I) Capital ''o -mation:
As previously mentioned, income taxation within a less-developed
country like Egypt does not supply the sizeable amounts of revenue needed for
capital formation, for many reasons. The most i :portant reason is the low
income per capita. Therefore, the Government has to rely on other sources
of revenue to supply the public sector w .th adequate amounts for capital
formation. Fiscal and non-fiscai measures oould help in attaining this
objective. ^courage.ment of private savings through fiscal policy is an
•
1) The uiscussion of these criteria will be very concise as the main object
is to explain the basic fiscal policy objectives and the effect of tire tax on
then. The discussion is merely a guide to policy makers.
3 0 5
important factor which has to be considered when framing our fiscal and
monetary olicies.
xn general the major theoretical considerations guiding a tax policy
towards investment and initiative in the public sector are:
(i) A developmental policy has to be integrated with monetary policy
which closely effects the capital and money marlets, price and wage levels,
consumption etc.
(ii) The tax policy should appear to be permanent but must at the same
time be flexible so as to respond to changes as they arise.
(iii) Multiplicity in taxes, i.e. unnecessary subsidising, "nuisanoa"
taxes should be avoided. examples of such taxes in ugypt are, the
.defence Tax, the burtax on the Schedule Income Tax for the benefit of
1
Municipalities and local Authorities, the tax on Jorporations*directors
and so on.
A high degree of multiplicity in taxation of a haphazard nature is not
in the Ion", run in the interests of the economy especially where the tax is
direct and noticed oy the taxpayer.
These are the aain criteria of a tax policy directed towards capita
formation. but what are the basic incentives which we should provide in
the proposed reform to stimulate investment? These incentives could be
suaime . up in the following:
l) The tax revenue in this case is collected by the Taxation Department
for the Ministry of Municipalities and thereafter distributed among the
various municipalities according to their requirements.
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(a) Granting accelerated depreciation relief to new enterprise recognised
as necessary to economic development;!" 'A committee composed of experts,
financial and technical, should be responsible for decisions concerning the
importance of the new enterprise to the economy.)
(b) Uncertainties involved in investment have to be reduced. his could
be achieve through liberalising the 'carry-forward" of business losses
2
indefinitely.
(c, Applying a reuuced rate on undistributed corporate profits to
encourage their reinvestment. The differentiation in fiscal treatment between
dividends and business savings in underdeveloped countries is based on the
fact that the capability of individuals to invest their dividends in
productive assets is very limited. ost of suoh dividends are usually
spent on conspicuous consumption, hoarded or invested in unproductive assets
such as land. by and large, as corporations enjoy a more efficient
entrepreneur-ship then the individual. The application of the re uced rate
has to be limited in two ways; first, in time, in order to avoid evasion
through inc eases in the value of equity capital and then realising untaxed
capital gains; and secondly, to the type of enterprise which is important to
economic development.
(d) Agreements for the avoidance of double taxation end evasion could
help greatly in encouraging foreign private investment. Their conclusion
should be limited only to capital exporting countries. ^
1) Gee arguments for and against accelerated depreciation and conflicts
which frise oetween incentive to invest and loss of revenue, in Chapter VI.
2) gee Thapter 71 for detailed analysis of business losses reliefs.
5) t,ee Chapter VII especially the section on International ouble
Taxation.
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(e) In regard to the encouragement of private .savings, the personal
income tax should exempt interest paid on savings accounts deposited with the
•Post Office Savings Banks and other banking institutions. This would
encourage the middle income groups and even individuals below that class to
save. I on-fiscal measures could be applied too; e.g. money prises given to
individuals who save above a certain level, etc.
(2) stabilization of the conoiav:
Income taxation in less-developed countries has been critisized as
not being effective in stabilizing the economy. This is mainly due to the
limited scope of its application, i.e. small numbers of people subject to
tax. Therefore, we have to find another fiscal device as an alternative.
Indirect taxation lias been devise to stabilise the economy, especially
when the inflationary trend spreads during the execution of development
1
programmes.
Taxes on consumption, e.g. purchase tax, excise, etc. are more
effective in curbing inflation resultingfrom inc eases in purchasing power
over the domestic output within the first phase of development. The
imposition of such taxes would raise the problem of equity, as indirect
taxes are considered regressive. But we could impose purchase tax, for
example, on a progressive rate with the exemption of food stuffs and other
necessities, e.g. clothes consumed by the poor class. Another argument
could arise, that is the imposition of a sales tax which would result in
an increase in the cost of living indices which would result in an increase
in wages, and this might intensify the inflationary pressure. This
1) Sales taxes are considered more feasible than income taxes from the
administrative side and thus more effective; especially excise
and import duties.
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argument can be refuted as although most of the working class in a
less-developed country like Hgypt do spend their wages on mere necessities,
especially on food, these are exeiopted from the indirect tax. Most of the
inc ease in the wage sector of the national income would be directed towards
increasing the consumption of necessities whi :h the wage earner could not
buy before. This is because their previous wages were much below the
subsistence level, as most of the now working power would come from the
abundant labourer supply of the agricultural sector where there is a lot
of disguised unemployment.
Tcnsequently, stabilization, without which economic development is
difficult, needs an instrument more flexible and quicker than fiscal policy
to handle it, and monetae policy, being more flexible can act end manipulate
it more quickly. Thus, there should be a close integration and partnership
between fiscal policy and monetary policy to achieve a high degree of economic
1
stability within the developing economy. Non-fiscal measures, other than
monetary policy, could be applied, such as rationing of specific commodities,
but ther*. is great doubt concerning its feasibility with an uneducated
majority.
However, the above factors do not destroy the aoulity of the proposed
income tax to help in stabilizing the economy. The exemption limit and
other personal reliefs as we'll as the tax rate could be easily adjusted to
combat the instability in the economy. Within the business Sector, the
1)" The co-ordination implies two things: (a) a day-to-day understanding
between the Treasury and the Central Bank of dgjrpt on equal partnersj and
(b) the readiness of the tax policy maker to analyse experience, minimize
errors and learn lessons from cu -rent mistakes to help him in future
planning.
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corporate tax could be conveniently used for controlling economic fluctuations
through the different allowances, such as the depreciation allowance, loss
carry backward or forward, and also the rate structure differentiating against
or in favour of corporate savings. 3ut, on the whole, as we mentioned, the
over-all impact of any income tax measure is limited and has to be supplemented
by other measures fiscale and non-fiscal, to accomplish a stabilized economy.
3. tedistrroution of the fiscal Burden; .acuity - spect:
In backward economies development has been retarded because of low
savings. The need in an underdeveloped country is for a revenue-produoing,
investment generating tax policy. Such countries, therefore, depend on
indirect taxation as a main source of tax revenue. Hence, equity considerations,
in many cases, are disregarded, as indirect taxes with their regressive
character, increase inequity in the distribution of the tax burden. The new
proposed income tax, however, would help considerably to attain a more equitable
distribution of the public burden, as the main aim of the reform is to
introduce a more personalized tax.
On the whole income taxation should be looked at during the first stages
of development as the basic tax which brings equity to the tax system. It
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